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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
 
Acronym Description 
CA Contribution Agreement 
CCs Candidate Countries 
CEB Council of Europe Development Bank 
CEB/KfW CEB in cooperation with KfW (see below) 
CEEC Countries of Central and Eastern European 
DIS Decentralised Implementation System 
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
EC European Commission 
ERC* Exchange Risk Cover 
EIB European Investment Bank 
EU European Union 
€  Euro 
EW* Equity Window 
FC Framework Contractor 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FI Financial Intermediary 
FM Financing Memorandum 
FP Financing Proposal 
FSL Fee for Smaller Loan 
IE Interim Evaluation 
IF Investment Fund 
IFI International Financial Institution 
IPA Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 
IRC* Interest Rate Cap 
JOP Joint Venture Phare Programme 
K€  Thousands of euro 
KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
LA Leasing Agreement 
LG* Loan Guarantee 
LGLW Loan Guarantee and Leasing Window 
LTTE Long Term Technical Expert 
M€  Millions of Euro 
MBP Multi-Beneficiary Programme 
MCF Management Cost Funding 
MEDA Mediterranean Economic and Development Assistance 
PFee* Performance Fee 
PFI Participating Financial Institution 
RSW* Rural Sub-Window  
SME Small and Medium-sized Enterprise 
SMEFF Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Finance Facility 
TA* Technical Assistance 
TF* Transaction Fee 
ToR Terms of Reference 
Note: Terms marked with an asterisk (*) are explained in more detailed in the following Glossary of Terms Used 
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Term Description 
Exchange Risk 
Cover 
The objective of the ‘exchange risk cover’ instrument is to enhance long-term lending in 
domestic currency to clients/enterprises with little/no foreign currency income and who 
prefer to loans in local currencies.  The ERC is used to: a) cover the price of foreign 
exchange forward transactions that the PFI arranges to hedge the foreign exchange risks 
related to payments the PFI makes to the sponsor international financial institution (IFI); 
b) indemnify the PFI for foreign exchange losses (devaluation of local currency against the 
€ in comparison with the exchange rates that are used for the conversion of the disbursed 
loan amounts into local currency) incurred with respect to the payments by the PFI to the 
sponsor IFI. 
Equity Window The objective of the Equity Window is to provide support for self-sustainable small and 
medium-sized enterprise (SME) Investment Funds. Support through the Equity Window is 
not invested directly into SMEs but into Investment Funds operating in the participating 
countries that are specifically designed to take equity investments in SMEs. The Funds 
supported by the Facility are managed by independent fund managers. These Funds may be 
either new Funds set up for the purpose of SME investment or existing Funds, which open 
a dedicated operation for SMEs. The Funds may cover a region within one country, a 
whole country or several countries and each Fund is structured individually to match 
market conditions in the applicant country concerned as well as best international business 
practice for investment funds.  Two components are offered through the Equity Window:  
1) Equity Co-Investment funding. Phare takes equity participations alongside EBRD and 
other investors on the following basis: i) with regard to rewards, Phare funds will 
participate in profits when other investors have received a minimum return (hurdle rate) 
which shall be negotiated on a case by case basis; ii) with regard to losses, the basic 
principle is equal sharing. However, in exceptional circumstances to be justified, Phare 
may accept a higher proportion of losses on its contribution as compared with other 
investors; 2) Management Cost funding. Phare funds are used to cover costs of the 
Investment Fund on a grant basis and are specified within the project agreement signed 
between the sponsor IFI (EBRD) and the Investment Fund.  
Fee for Smaller 
Loan 
The objective of the Fee for Smaller Loan (FSL) is to stimulate the PFI to expand its 
lending of smaller loan amounts.  The FSL covers part of the lending cost, thus increasing 
the attractiveness and profitability of this business. The size of loan/lease which can attract 
a FSL is agreed between the sponsor IFI (CEB-KfW) and the PFI and can be up to 
€50,000.  In the case of leases, the FSL can be used to reduce the down payment payable 
by the SME. 
Interest Rate Cap The interest rate cap applies to floating interest rates and sets an upper limit for interest rate 
increases. It primarily reduces the interest rate risk of the participating financial institution.  
Leasing Window The Leasing Window was introduced in 2001 to further support the access of SMEs to 
small and micro credit.  Leasing is seen as an effective mechanism for financing SMEs 
which may not qualify for bank lending, but which may qualify for a financial lease, due to 
the different status of the security.  In the case of financial leases, transfer of ownership of 
the asset to the lessee (the SME) at the end of the lease corresponds to a form of long-term 
finance to the SME.  Through the Leasing Window, the Commission aimed to promote the 
development of leasing mechanisms through grant support to eligible leasing companies. 
Loan Guarantee Where appropriate, a partial first-loss guarantee may be provided on the SME sub-loan 
portfolio managed by the PFI. It is envisaged to limit this guarantee to a maximum of 40% 
of the first loss risks of the PFI involved in its first year SME loan portfolio. Where such a 
loss occurs, the IFI verifies that the criteria for triggering the guarantee, as set down in the 
original project proposal, have been met. Any funds used to meet an acceptable claim 
would be earmarked for servicing of the SME related loan/credit line agreement with the 
IFI and deducted from the principal amount owed by the PFI to the IFI. The guarantee can 
take the form of a lump sum or specific insurance premium for a fixed period bought on the 
open market. In principle, PFIs are discouraged from taking on SME lending based upon 
any other financial incentive than a higher than usual margin (between the cost of funds 
and interest earned). However in exceptional cases a first loss guarantee as defined above 
may be made available. 
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Micro loan Micro loans are defined within the Facility as loans of up to K€30 (in the case of EBRD) 
and K€ 50 in the case of EIB and CEB/KfW. 
Performance-
Based Incentives 
Performance-based incentives are paid to the PFI based on compliance with certain 
performance criteria as set out in the project proposals.  These vary between performance 
criteria related to the quality of the lending - in the case of EBRD loans (i.e. less than 5% 
arrears rate over 60-days, calculated as portfolio at risk on the volume of outstanding loans 
to SME borrowers funded by the Facility).  In the case of CEB/KfW, the criteria for draw-
down of the performance fee relate to the achievement of certain policy objectives. For 
example, in the case of the Rural Sub-Window, the eligible loans must be to SMEs in rural 
zones or farmers with less than 100 full-time employees (or the equivalent number of part-
time employees).   
Performance Fee The Performance Fee is a fee paid to the PFI to compensate for the special risks and 
administrative burden involved in lending to SMEs. The payment period starts with the 
signing of the credit line with the IFI and is conditional on the PFI meeting certain 
performance criteria, as set out in the project proposal, for example loan size and/or quality 
of the lending (i.e. less than 5% arrears rate over 60-days, calculated as portfolio at risk on 
the volume of outstanding loans to SME borrowers funded by the Facility).  
Project This is a financial package with a PFI comprising the IFI credit line and one or more 
incentives according to the specific arrangement:  transaction fee, technical co-operation, 
guarantee etc.  
Risk-Based 
Incentives 
Risk-based incentives aim to assist the PFI to manage the increased risks associated with 
lending to SMEs, and include Loan Guarantees, Exchange Risk Cover and the Interest Rate 
Cap. 
Rural Sub-
Window 
The Rural Sub-Window (RSW) was introduced in 2003 as part of the Loan, Guarantee and 
Leasing Window.  The RSW aims at strengthening the financial sector’s capacity to 
increase access to finance for farmers and rural businesses and had the following aims: to 
help financial intermediaries to provide appropriately structured, including long-term 
financing to rural businesses; to help financial intermediaries develop a clear strategy to 
support the rural economy; to help financial intermediaries adapt products and risk 
assessment procedures to circumstances of the rural economy and thereby make available 
credit financing to rural businesses at more affordable rates and to improve services of 
financial intermediaries towards rural sector borrowers. Beneficiaries of the RSW 
beneficiaries are: 1) Farmers (i.e. “registered agricultural producers” and; 2) Rural 
Businesses (i.e. businesses located in rural zones).  The indicators used to define an eligible 
rural zone are based on criteria such as population density or location and in line with 
definitions under the national legislation.  
Small loan Small loans are defined within the Facility as loans of up to K€250 (with a voluntary cap at 
K€ 125 in the case of EBRD). 
Sub-Project Sub-loans or leases to, or investments in, individual SMEs made by the PFI according to 
rules and conditions set down in the project agreement signed with the sponsor IFI.  
Technical 
Assistance 
Technical Assistance (TA) is defined as help provided specifically for institutional 
development, strengthening and capacity building, usually in terms of advice, guidance, 
studies, training, information, know how, and similar actions.  TA ‘packages’ are designed 
in line with the needs of the beneficiary and are delivered by private sector consultancy 
companies.  
Transaction Fee The Transaction Fee instrument is used to encourage SME lending by PFIs. For each sub-
project (i.e. loans/leases to individual SMEs) a grant from the Phare Facility funds is paid 
in the form of a flat Transaction Fee in line with the agreement between the Commission 
Services and the sponsor IFI and according to the agreement with the PFI. The Transaction 
Fee is used extensively by the EIB whereby a grant of €5,000 is paid for every loan made 
in accordance with the eligibility criteria specified in the project proposal. 
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PREFACE 
 
This ex post evaluation report has been prepared by the MWH Consortium1 during the period 
January-March 2006, and reflects the situation at 31 May 2006.  It examines the performance 
of the programmes in addressing the objectives stated in the formal programming documents, 
provides a general assessment of the programmes and draws conclusions and lessons learnt 
from them.   
 
The evaluation is based on analysis of documents provided by the Commission Services and 
the participating international financial institutions, as well as interviews with, and 
questionnaires to, participating banks, financial intermediaries and leasing companies in the 
new EU member states, Bulgaria and Romania. 
                                                 
1  The Report was prepared by Lead Evaluator, Elizabeth Cunningham and Short-term International Expert, Harvey Susser.  It 
was reviewed at MWH by Martin White and Andrew Fountain and Short-term International Expert, Anders Grettve. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Finance Facility 
 
Scope and Objectives 
 
The overall objective of this ex post evaluation is to provide accountability with respect to the 
use of European Commission funds, and lessons learned for decision making on improvements 
to the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Finance Facility (the Facility) for remaining and 
future candidate countries.  The purpose of the evaluation is to review 1999-2001 Facility 
programmes as well as the design and performance of the Phare allocations in the 2002-2005 
period.2 
 
Key Evaluation Findings 
 
The Facility has been implemented effectively by the participating International Financial 
Institutions.  In the period under review, €M 323 of Phare grant support was matched by €2.2 
billion in credit lines from the participating institutions; the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the Council of Europe 
Development Bank (CEB) in partnership with Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW).  Over 
74,000 loans and leases to small businesses were delivered through more than 150 credit lines 
in 10 new member states, over 4,400 staff were trained and more than 70 technical assistance 
packages were implemented.  
 
The grant support to the Facility was highly relevant for the first years of its operation, but 
its relevance declined over time.  When designed in 1997/1998 all the available evidence 
pointed to a need for a supply-based instrument to induce financial intermediaries to address 
market failures in providing finance for small and medium-sized enterprises.  This fitted well 
with the institutional mandates of the international financial institutions.  However, by 2000-
2001, privatisation in the banking sector was largely complete and accompanied by substantial 
foreign bank investments.  Additionally, advances were made in the regulatory environment 
and with accession firmly in sight, investments in all sectors and transfer of knowhow, 
including banking, increased substantially.  From 2001 onwards, competitive pressures caused 
banks to re-define their small and medium-sized enterprise business models, deepen and widen 
target market segments and refine their products (maturities, margins, and terms).  In practice, 
market changes have driven changes at participating financial institution level, rather than the 
Facility itself.  Relevance of the grant support declined, since at programme level, the Facility 
did not adjust sufficiently to changing conditions.  It was essentially a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach, i.e. not differentiated based on real market needs. 
 
Catalytic effects of the grant support to the Facility diminished over time.  Whilst in general 
the average loan size of the participating financial institutions has decreased, and the maturity 
of loans and percentage of loans to regionally based small and medium-sized enterprises have 
increased, there is no evidence that this is significantly attributable to the catalytic effect of the 
grant support to the Facility rather than to the evolution of the competitive environment.  At 
best there were initial catalytic effects from technical assistance supporting new credit 
methodologies.  Thus the recommendation from the previous interim evaluation to carry out a 
needs’ analysis study examining general market coverage and regional market differences 
should have been implemented to ensure that the catalytic principle was respected. 
                                                 
2  Allocations from the 2005 Phare envelope were not at implementation stage, therefore the analysis focuses on design. 
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Additionality in line with the Phare definition has also declined over time.  The consistently 
high levels of commitment of credit lines by the sponsor international financial institutions 
indicate that they rate the Facility highly according to their own internal criteria for delivering 
additionality, demonstrating that they can satisfy their internal tests for additionality even in 
near-developed markets (i.e. where the supply of funds to small and medium-sized enterprises 
in the candidate countries and new member states, is at tenors and conditions approaching 
those of the EU-15 member states).  However, while there may be remaining gaps to be filled, 
for example niches that the market is unwilling to address (particular geographic regions or 
types of enterprise), this may not be an appropriate use of Phare funds.  The Phare test for 
additionality is that “Phare support should not displace other financiers, especially from the 
private sector or from the international financial institutions”.  In early stage markets, 
displacement was unlikely.  However, with the influx of foreign capital, expertise and technical 
assistance into the banking sector, the scope for additionality from the grant support to the 
Facility has substantially diminished. 
 
The intervention logic of providing grant support to the Facility was weak and has resulted 
in inadequate strategic direction for the Facility.  Management of the Facility has focused on 
disbursement of credit lines and monitoring of implementation.  The design of the Facility was 
not underpinned by a robust intervention logic and lacked agreed and appropriate indicators for 
anticipated impacts at participating financial institution level.  This reflects insufficient 
leadership of the Facility on the part of the Commission Services. 
 
Outputs were delivered effectively by the international financial institutions, and benefits 
from grant support were obtained in early stages, but these diminished over time.  The large 
number of outputs was obtained at a perceived low cost to the Commission of a 1.25% flat 
management fee.  However, assessment of the cost-effectiveness of the Facility (from the 
Commission Services’ point of view) must include the extent to which the catalytic principle 
has been respected, as well as the additional costs due to a) the ‘Performance Fee’ provided by 
the Phare grant being used thereafter in the take-up of the international financial institution 
credit lines, and b) the extent to which the programme has built sustainable capacity within the 
participating financial institutions.  Given that the catalytic effect of the substantial grant 
support was highest in the early stages and this diminished with time, cost-effectiveness of this 
support to the Facility is now considered to be low. 
 
Support including technical assistance delivered immediate impacts, but the intermediate 
and wider impacts of Facility projects were limited.  The model of credit line + incentives + 
technical assistance (as used by the EBRD) provided the bridge between the use of the credit 
line plus incentives and the development of a sustainable business model.  The impacts of the 
technical assistance built on the delivered outputs, which provided support for organisational 
development.  This model was most effective in participating financial institutions in the early 
stages of transition as it provided good opportunities for ‘learning by doing’.  Projects without 
technical assistance may have delivered immediate impacts, but these are difficult to attribute 
to the Facility.  Where the technical assistance interventions had good immediate impacts, 
these had only been taken up into wider bank strategies towards small and medium-sized 
enterprises in less than half of the cases reviewed.  The comparatively small size of the 
Facility’s intervention (cumulatively barely the size of a small bank) limited the extent of its 
impact on the wider business environment.  The Facility was only one of a number of funding 
options used by the participating financial institutions to tailor their products to the needs of 
small and medium-sized enterprises.   
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Risk-based incentives and the Equity Window were small components with limited impacts.  
Risk-based incentives (e.g. interest rate or currency conversion risk protection) were effective 
only where the instrument used was new to the participating financial institution, and this was 
the case in only a limited number of instances.  Early negative experiences with the Equity 
Window, including the collapse of boom markets and the loss of appetite by investors for what 
were perceived as high-risk or low-return funds meant that it was not continued under 
subsequent programmes.  The Phare grant was re-allocated to incentives under the Loan 
Guarantee and Leasing Window.  
 
Long-term sustainability of effects of the Facility assessed as marginal.  The majority of 
participating financial institutions were already targeting small and medium-sized enterprises 
and had business models/strategies in place prior to their participation.  Some aspects of the 
Facility have been carried into the medium-term (e.g. credit management skills, credit-scoring 
methodologies etc.).  However, in most cases the fast changing business environment has 
required further evolution of the small and medium-sized enterprise lending business model.  
Where sustainability is judged through development of human resource skills, these too have 
diminished in the medium-term (24-36 months) if not refreshed in line with market 
requirements.  Some ‘soft’ impacts have been sustained, for example attitudinal changes 
towards small and medium-sized enterprises and an improved image of the participating 
financial institution in the market place, through association with an EU-supported product that 
is perceived by clients as being of a ‘European standard’.   
 
Conclusions  
 
Market developments were not matched by timely changes in the Facility, and the 
intervention logic of grant support became less valid over time.  
Over time, the intervention logic underlying the Facility became less about addressing market 
failures in the broader sense, and more about gap filling in a developing market.  This 
represented a significant shift in positioning and ethos of the Facility that was not matched by 
appropriate changes in objectives or methodologies.  The case was not made for the continued 
high levels of blanket support of the Facility, as a pre-accession instrument, in these new 
market conditions. 
 
Catalytic impacts of grant support and Phare additionality diminished over time.  
Despite considerable changes in the competitive environment, there is little evidence that the 
Facility was reoriented to focus on clearly identified market failures in relation to particular 
countries, regions or segments.  Instead, changes in the availability of funds to participating 
financial institutions and generally to small and medium-sized enterprises have been driven 
principally by the market, so the catalytic effect envisaged for the grant support to the Facility 
has not emerged as a significant factor.  These changes in the business environment also 
created new challenges for the Facility to maintain additionality.  Whilst the international 
financial institutions could satisfy their own internal definitions of additionality in near-
developed markets through their participation in the Facility, the increased availability of 
alternative funding as accession approached, and the growing ability to buy in or transfer skills 
and methodologies from the parent bank or other sources, eroded the additionality of the Phare 
funds.   
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Despite substantial outputs, cost-effectiveness of the grant support to the Facility has 
declined over time. 
Whilst comparatively limited Phare resources were deployed, and good use was made of 
international financial institution resources to deliver substantial outputs in terms of numbers of 
loans and leases made, staff trained and technical assistance contracts completed, the high level 
of Performance Fees paid coupled with the difficulties of ensuring that sustainable capacity 
directly attributable to the Facility was built, particularly for later programmes, mean that the 
cost-effectiveness of the Facility declined over time.  The most effective model was where 
incentives were combined with technical assistance, and whilst this had undoubted initial 
beneficial effects, it could not be sustained over time as the competitive business environment 
evolved, more foreign banks were involved, and alternative funding and support mechanisms 
were attracted into the small and medium-sized enterprise sector.  For projects comprising 
incentives only, it is difficult to identify and attribute changes in bank behaviour to the Facility, 
rather than to responses to market changes.   
 
Wider impacts were limited by the size and approach of the Facility.  
As the Facility was never intended to be a significant presence in the markets, the potential for 
wider impact lies principally in its ability to deliver demonstration effects.  However, there was 
little evidence of widespread take-up of Facility models or tools developed through the 
Facility.  The exception to this were the successful technical-assistance-based projects, where 
processes and practices were taken up in wider business models and adapted over time.  Given 
the dynamic environment, only limited sustainability could be identified, particularly for 
projects that comprised only incentives + credit line.   
 
Recommendations 
 
There are two key areas in which the recommendations are made for action: redesign of the 
Facility and need for proactive strategic management. 
 
Action 1: Redesigning the Facility  
 
Recommendation 1: Before launching a new facility, thorough re-assessment and redesign 
of grant support is required. 
There is a need for a full review of the future role and operations of a new Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprise Finance Facility, and its introduction under the Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance should be preceded by a thorough re-assessment and consequent redesign.  The 
future facility must have a clear intervention logic, establishing the case for any grant support 
for the new instrument. 
 
Recommendation 2:  The thorough re-assessment and redesign of Facility should be based 
on detailed analysis of differences in the maturity of economies and markets.  
The redesigned instrument would need to be examined critically and reconstructed at every 
level, starting with an examination of the areas of market failure or a differentiation in the level 
of market maturity or market underdevelopment that can reasonably be addressed.  Any 
methods and tools proposed should take account of the differing regional and country 
conditions and market segments.  Specific objectives relating to micro-credit institutions or 
development/promotional banks should be clearly identified. 
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Recommendation 3: Redesign should respect the principles of catalytic impact and 
additionality.   
The principles of catalytic impact and additionality should be set up as positive criteria by the 
Commission Services, which must be met by individual arrangements with the international 
financial institutions, and should be clearly reflected in individual project proposals with 
participating financial institutions.    
 
Action 2: Need for proactive strategic management  
 
Recommendation 4: The Commission Services should be proactively at the heart of strategic 
decision making on the development and implementation of the Facility.  
As the entire Facility is largely driven by absorption of the Phare grant, the Commission 
Services (DG Enlargement, DG ECFIN, DG Enterprise and other Commission stakeholders) 
should be at the heart of strategic decision-making on the development and implementation of 
the Facility.  This would involve clarity about the policy objectives at regional, national or 
segment level that the Commission is pursuing and the role of the Facility in achieving these 
objectives.  This should be set out in a series of working papers outlining the Commission’s 
expectations of the Facility, guidelines for ensuring additionality and catalytic effect and a set 
of core monitoring indicators linked to specific policy objectives.    
 
Recommendation 5:  The management of strategic operations of the Facility should have 
appropriate tools and resources to tailor the Facility’s response to changing conditions.  
It should be the responsibility of the Facility’s strategic management to equip itself with the 
tools and methodologies to identify in which countries and market segments the intervention is 
warranted, in accordance with the intervention logic.  Decisions about programmes should be 
placed firmly within the context of the competitive environment at that time.  Fulfilment of the 
Commission Services’ requirements for catalytic impact and additionality should also be 
ensured.  Changes should trigger a process of review and refinement, for example to accelerate 
or stop implementation mid-programme if necessary.  This would be particularly applicable 
where the original intervention logic is no longer relevant or where a Commission Services 
definition of additionality can no longer be met.  Achievement of the policy objectives should 
be made central to strategic management by linking instrument design, management structures, 
performance measures and reporting tools to the underlying intervention logic.  
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MAIN REPORT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Objectives 
1. The evaluation of the Small and Medium-Sized Finance Facility (the Facility) Multi-
Beneficiary Programme (MBP) is one of a series of MBP evaluations carried out as part of the 
ex post evaluation of the Phare programmes 1999-2001.  In view of the significance of this 
programme and planned contribution for the Western Balkans this is an in-depth evaluation 
that will be published as a stand-alone report.  In addition, it feeds into a consolidated report on 
the Phare MBPs in the 1999-2001 period and also contributes to the thematic evaluation of 
Phare support for the SME sector in the period.  Both of these will in turn form part of a 
consolidated ex post evaluation of the Phare programmes in the period 1999-2001. 
 
2. This evaluation report complements the ex post aspect (dealing with programmes from 
1999-2001) with an interim evaluation aspect, whereby it addresses design and performance of 
the Phare allocations in the 2002-2005 period.3 
 
3. The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the extent to which the Facility has met its 
objectives.  These differ between the ex post or earlier period (1999-2001) and interim or later 
period (2002 –2005).  In the ex post period, the objective is stated in the Financing Proposals 
(FPs) as “... to induce financial intermediaries to expand and maintain, in the long term, their 
financing operations with Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises.”  In the later period (2002-
2005) successive programmes have widened the overall objectives: “… to assist the candidate 
countries in meeting the Copenhagen criteria and to contribute to the reform and 
strengthening of the financial sector”.  This is dealt with in more detail in Section 2.1 below 
and in Annex 8. 
 
1.2 Background and Context 
4. In the period 1999-2005, Phare allocated total grants amounting to M€ 323 to the Facility 
(see Table 1).  This has in turn been matched by M€ 2,214 of funding from the participating 
international finance institutions (IFIs) – the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB),4 and the Council of Europe 
Development Bank (CEB) in partnership with Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW).   
 
                                                 
3  Allocations from the 2005 Phare envelope were not at implementation stage, therefore the analysis focuses on design. 
4  Up to 2005, EIB had signed three Contributory Agreements under the 2001, 2002 and 2003 budget lines, but 
implementation has been slow to date for a number of reasons, including: a) the EIB was the last IFI to join the Facility and, 
b) the implementation scheme adopted by the EIB involves approval of each sub-loan (rather than ‘project’ with the PFI) 
individually, which slows down the rate of implementation.  Despite the slow start and slowness of the implementation 
scheme, the number of sub-projects approved has grown annually. 
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Table 1.-  Overview of Phare contributions to the SME Finance Facility 
Prog.  No. Prog.  Title Allocated 
(M€ )5 
Contracted 
(M€ )6 
Disbursed 
(%)7 
ZZ-9901 
ZZ-0013 
ZZ-0106 
1999 SME Finance Facility 
2000 SME Finance Facility Phase 2 – EBRD 
2001 SME Finance Facility Phase 2 – EBRD 
110 106.40 70.67 
ZZ-0007 
ZZ-0108 
2000 SME Finance Facility Phase 2 – CEB 
2001 SME Finance Facility Phase 2 – CEB 
51 47.40 59.65 
ZZ-0126 2001 SME Finance Facility – EIB 30 26.1 25.9 
2002-000-621 2002 SME Finance Facility  - EBRD 20 19.77 33.33 
2002-000-622 2002 SME Finance Facility  - CEB-KfW 15 15.05 33.06 
2002-000-629 2002 SME Finance Facility  - EIB 15 13 16.88 
2003-005-745 2003 SME Finance Facility  - EBRD 25 22.01 11.00 
2003-005-765 2003 SME Finance Facility  - EIB 10 0 0 
2003-005-766 2003 SME Finance Facility  - CEB-KfW 15 7.5 0 
2005-017-220 2005 SME Finance Facility  - EIB8 5 0  
2005-017-221 2005 SME Finance Facility  - EBRD9 18 8.50 12.00 
2005-017-222 2005 SME Finance Facility  - CEB/KfW10 9 0  
Total 323 265.74  
 
5. An Interim Evaluation (IE) of the Facility was carried out in 2003.11  The IE Report 
concluded that while the Facility was a good concept, with a high potential for success, it 
required fine-tuning across a range of areas to respect Phare guidelines related to the catalytic 
effect, additionality and sustainability.  Key issues identified in the IE Report included the need 
to ensure additionality and the need to focus on promoting sustainability by focussing on 
capacity building at the participating banks, leasing companies and other financial 
intermediaries - hereafter collectively referred to as participating financial institutions (PFIs).   
 
6. The IE also noted weaknesses in the technical assistance (TA) delivered under the EBRD 
credit line + incentives + technical assistance model, due to lack of commitment of the senior 
management of PFIs, need for a better ‘fit’ between the consultants and the needs of the PFIs; 
and the need for pro-active management of the TA components by the EBRD.  At the time of 
the IE, the Equity Window (EW)12 was performing poorly and the potential impact (in terms of 
demonstration effect) was at risk.  Operational issues identified by the IE included: a) the need 
to ensure a uniform quality of reporting from the participating IFIs to the Commission 
Services, and b) more transparent management of the IFI pipelines, including the availability of 
information on terms and conditions offered by all participating IFIs to PFI affiliates.   
 
                                                 
5  As per the Financing Proposal. 
6  In this context, ‘Contracted’ refers to funding committed on the basis of Project Proposals submitted by the IFIs and signed 
off by the Commission Services.  Source of information; DG ECFIN as per 10 July 2006. 
7  Of signed projects. 
8  Covers Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Turkey. 
9  Covers Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. 
10  Covers Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Turkey. 
11  R/ZZ/SME/02.146 issued on 18 February 2003, EMS Consortium. 
12  The Equity Window is only sponsored through the EBRD.  It involves the establishment of special funds using 
Phare/Facility capital matched by EBRD funds.  Its aim is to facilitate access to equity investment by SMEs in the ten CCs.  
Independent fund managers are appointed as partner FIs to manage the funds on a fee plus profit sharing basis.   
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7. The IE report concluded with thirteen recommendations which focused inter alia on the 
need to fine-tune the Facility to be more responsive to regional and sectoral variations; to 
re-examine how the Facility projects deliver additionality and catalytic impact, and to improve 
the quality of reporting by the IFIs.  Annex 3 sets out the recommendations and the related 
action agreed by the Facility Steering Committee.  A number of changes were introduced over 
time, e.g. more attention to tracking indicators, greater attention to justifying the need for 
second credit lines in the individual project proposals, greater standardisation of reports from 
the IFIs to the Commission Services) and a new format for the project proposal that included 
more attention to issues of sustainability and additionality.  However the underlying rationale 
and intervention logic, despite the fast pace of change in the competitive environment in the 
CCs, remained largely unchanged.  Where changes were made, for example to increase the 
focus on micro-loans, or to target new clients (particularly in the case of the later EBRD 
projects), this was at the initiative of the IFIs, rather than as a central part of a strategic 
reorientation of the programme.  Importantly, the recommendation for an updated analysis of 
the situation in the countries in which the Facility operated was only partially acted on.  The 
Steering Committee13 for the Facility downgraded this recommendation to focus only on 
Bulgaria and Romania, despite plans for second credit lines in the soon to be member states.  
Even this downgraded recommendation was only partially implemented.  The recommendation 
relating to the Equity Window (EW) was implemented, with the result that this was 
discontinued. 
 
8. To date the three IFIs (EBRD, EIB and CEB-KfW) occupy an exclusive position within 
the Facility that the Financing Proposals justified as follows: “The technical nature and the 
multi-country approach of the SME Finance Facility required the involvement of highly-
specialised financial institutions, with a long track record in international finance and SME 
development.  Also the preference was for financial institutions with the status of international 
public-law bodies, who shared the values of the EU, in particular, in relation to enlargement 
and had similar public policy objectives, rather than private-sector financial institutions 
looking for commercial investment terms … In terms of the Financial Regulation applicable to 
the general budget (Art.110), and its Implementing Rules (Art.168), the characteristics of these 
financial institutions as public-law bodies, pursuing European public policy objectives not just 
for profit, as well as their track record and specialisation in financing international 
development, therefore put them in a monopoly situation leaving no other choice as partner for 
the Commission in these actions.”  It is worth noting that the original conception of the Facility 
(with EBRD) emphasised the delivery of technical assistance (TA) as a core capacity-building 
instrument.  The later inclusion of other IFIs without the capacity or mandate to deliver TA 
marked an important change in the modus operandi of the Facility.  
 
1.3 Evaluation Methodology 
9. Evaluation questions were set out in the Terms of Reference (ToR) for this evaluation 
(see Annex 1), and were divided into performance evaluation questions and thematic/cross-
cutting questions.  Following consultation with the IFIs, DG ECFIN and DG Enlargement 
(Implementation, Contracts and Nuclear Task Force Unit14 and Evaluation Unit) an Evaluation 
Plan including the primary sources of evidence was finalised (see Annex 2).  
 
10. By December 2005, a total of 142 PFIs were participating in the Facility.  Of these, 32 
were signed up in 2005 and were therefore at a very early stage of implementation.  The final 
                                                 
13  4 July 2003. 
14  In mid 2006 this became D3, Regional Programmes Unit.  
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sample, agreed with the Commission Services and IFIs, focussed on PFIs where the Facility 
was at an advanced stage of implementation.   
 
11. The final sample was selected using the following criteria: 
• Distribution by country; 
• Distribution by IFI; 
• Stage of implementation; 
• Distribution by type e.g. banks/leasing companies; 
• Follow-up of PFIs interviewed earlier under the interim evaluation; 
• Inclusion of the Rural Sub-Window (RSW). 
 
12. A total of 37 PFIs were selected and interviewed for this exercise,15 of which 18 were 
follow-up interviews from the last IE exercise.  The list of PFIs interviewed is contained in 
Annex 4 and the complete list of persons interviewed is given in Annex 11.  The sample 
comprises 26 % of total PFIs, but approximately 38 % of total credit lines committed/disbursed 
in the 1999-2005 period (very little funding has been delivered to date under the 2003/2005 
budget lines). 
   
Table 2.-  Breakdown of sample by IFI 
IFI Total No of PFIs No of PFIs in Sample % 
EBRD 65 19 28 
CEB-KfW 48 11 23 
EIB 29 7 24 
Totals 142 37 26% 
 
Table 3.-  Breakdown of sample by country 
Country No of PFIs % 
Bulgaria 5 13.5 
Czech Republic 5 13.5 
Hungary 4 10.8 
Latvia 2 5.4 
Poland 7 19 
Romania 8 21.6 
Slovak Republic 2 5.4 
Slovenia 4 10.8 
Total 37 100 
 
13. A questionnaire was developed and distributed to the interviewed banks.  The 
questionnaire is given in Annex 5 and the findings are integrated into the relevant sections of 
this report.  Interviews with PFIs were undertaken using a structured interview methodology 
designed to: 
• Establish the linkage between the strategic priorities of the respondent and the objectives of 
the Facility; 
                                                 
15  In addition two ‘on-lending’ banks were interviewed in Slovenia (i.e. banks that borrow from the Facility PFIs for on-
lending to SMEs). 
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• Differentiate between wider influences of the competitive environment and the capacity of 
the Facility to induce behavioural changes; 
• Identify the method of the Facility implementation and its impact on the SME business 
model used by the PFI. 
 
14. Each interview was conducted around four core modules, commencing with the wider 
SME competitive environment, how the PFI addressed commercial opportunities and 
competitive pressures at the strategic and operational levels and finally implementation of the 
Facility itself and its impact (immediate and intermediate) at the strategic and operational 
levels.  The interview structure was highly complementary to the questionnaire in that it 
provided a good vehicle to explore strategic and commercial imperatives governing the SME 
business within the institution.  More detail on the interviewing methodology is given in 
Annex 6. 
 
15. Evaluation of the Facility is constrained by a number of factors.  Firstly, the extensive 
penetration of the banking sector by the Facility through the IFIs means that the majority of the 
major banks are participants, thus making it difficult to identify a control group.  Even if a 
control group had been identified, detailed information on their SME loan portfolios would 
have been virtually impossible to obtain.  Secondly, much of the impact at the PFI level is 
intangible, making it problematic to establish firm evidence of outcomes directly attributable to 
the Facility; outcomes that would have happened in the same or similar way regardless of the 
Facility; and those outcomes that would have happened regardless of the Facility but have 
happened more rapidly due to the Facility intervention.  Where it is not possible to establish 
tangible evidence of linkages, the evaluators have relied upon the assessment made by 
management at the PFIs themselves. 
 
16. In its design, the Facility logframes setting out the intervention logic and the appropriate 
indicators for each level are weak.16  In order to achieve clarity on the use of terminology, and 
to assist in identifying impacts at the appropriate level, the Evaluation Team reconstructed the 
intervention logic, which is shown in Annex 7.   
 
                                                 
16  Only logframes for the following programmes were openly available: ZZ0013, ZZ0106, ZZ0108, ZZ0126. 
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2. PERFORMANCE OF THE FACILITY 
2.1 Grant support to the Facility was highly relevant for the first years, but its 
relevance declined over time   
17. The needs’ analysis underpinning the Facility was firmly grounded.  Before the 
introduction of the Facility, Phare was already deeply involved in financial instruments in 
support of SME creation and development, including through financial intermediaries.  As of 
1999, € 212 million of programmes had been supported in providing debt and equity finance.  
In addition, various Phare sector programmes in energy, environment and regional 
development included SME finance components.17  The Agenda 2000 impact study specifically 
identified lack of access to finance as a key bottleneck in SME development.  With the 
adoption of the Phare New Orientations in 1997, the Commission Services were mandated to 
establish a horizontal SME facility for the region as a whole.  The needs’ analysis underpinning 
the Facility was firmly grounded in the Agenda 2000 impact study, the EBRD/World Bank 
“Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Study” (BEEPS) in 1999, and in the 
Commission Services’ own feasibility study and market demand analysis18 supporting the 
design and launch of the Facility.  Based on this body of research, the 1999 Financing Proposal 
stated that SME financing problems were becoming increasingly serious. Demand for finance 
was found to be rising rapidly, but banks and investment funds continued to lack experience 
and were reluctant to provide finance to the sector.  The FP went on to conclude that SMEs 
were effectively excluded from debt and equity finance in virtually all SME size categories and 
countries.  All the evidence at the time pointed to the occurrence of market failure. 
 
18. The original concept and design of the Facility was strongly driven by the market 
environment of the mid to late 1990’s.  At that time, it was not clear that financial sector 
market liberalisation would continue; or what the private (financial) sector response would be 
in terms of competition, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), mergers and acquisitions.  The Asian 
market crisis of 1997 had undermined confidence in emerging market economies, which was 
subsequently reinforced by the 1998 Russian financial crisis.  In this period accession was 
uncertain.  Much of the banking sector in the region was still dealing with historic loan 
portfolios of state-owned enterprises facing financial difficulties. There was relatively little 
financial sector interest in lending to SMEs, and market failure was easily identified. 
 
19. The Facility as it was designed could therefore be characterised as intervening in two 
areas that inhibited banks from addressing SME needs: 
• Banks lacked the liquidity or access to term funding to support medium-term or foreign 
currency SME loan products, or 
• Banks lacked management capacity and willingness to provide appropriate products in a 
controlled risk environment under a sustainable business model.   
 
20. These opportunities for intervention sat well with the IFI partners’ institutional mandates.  
For the EBRD, supporting SMEs through financial intermediation is the core component 
(Pillar 1) of the Bank’s SME strategy.  For the EIB, the Facility is an opportunity to fulfil their 
role as an implementation arm of Commission policy and the Facility has been adapted and 
                                                 
17  Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Finance Facility Financing Proposal 1999. 
18  Based on Agenda 2000 and the Phare New Orientations, a Working Group comprising the Commission, the EBRD and the 
EIB was set up to collaborate on the design of the Facility.  The EBRD and EIB conducted their own market testing among 
financial intermediaries in the EU and the then Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs).  The Commission carried 
out a feasibility study and market demand analysis with target financial intermediaries in the EU and the then applicant 
countries.  
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implemented as an extension of their SME Global Loan product.  Likewise for CEB/KfW, the 
Facility has provided the chance to extend fulfilment of their respective mandates.   
 
21. By 2000 a series of major events were in process that were to fundamentally change 
the competitive landscape for the delivery of commercial banking services in candidate 
countries.  Firstly, future membership of the EU was firmly accepted as a policy goal by 
candidate countries.  With it came adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria and a move to reform 
and modernise banking sector regulation.  The evolution of banking sector regulatory reform 
can be tracked through the EBRD Banking Reform and Interest Rate Liberalisation Index.  
Above a value of 4, countries are considered to approximate to EU member standards.  Many 
of the candidate countries can be seen to accelerate the reform process from the late 1990s 
onwards (and in the case of Bulgaria and Romania progress in 2004 and 2005 is noticeable - 
see Figure 1). 
Figure 1.- Evolution of EBRD Transition Indicators for 5 countries 
EBRD Banking Reform and Interest Rate Liberalisation
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22. Secondly, and consistent with reform of the banking sector regulation, the bank 
privatisation process continued.  This coincided with the opening up of markets to foreign bank 
ownership.  By 2001, major banks in the region were already controlled by foreign banks.  The 
following figures present a few examples of the percentage of bank assets owned by foreign 
banks in 2001.19  
 
Table 4.-  Percentage of bank assets owned by foreign banks in 2001 
Country % 
Poland 51% 
Hungary  61% 
Czech Republic 78% 
Slovakia  75% 
 
                                                 
19  Comparison of Banks C&EE 2001 Bank Austria Creditanstalt. 
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23. By this time (2001), European commercial banks had clearly identified that beneficiary 
countries provided the potential for asset and profit growth rates far above west European 
levels.  Annual growth rates of 10-15% over the medium term were predicted by analysts at the 
time, albeit from a lower base than in mature European markets.  Banks were also aware of the 
need to establish their position in these fast liberalising markets or risk being excluded by high 
competitive barriers to entry.  Further, for many European banks, candidate country markets 
were regarded as being extensions of the home market or existing lines of business and 
therefore far more accessible than other emerging markets that might be on a similar reform or 
growth path but very distant geographically, commercially and culturally.   
 
24. With accession firmly in sight, investments in all sectors, including banking, increased. 
The path to accession was firmly established on 13 December 2002, with the decision of the 
Copenhagen European Council that ten candidate countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) could join the EU 
on 1 May 2004.  Subsequently on 16 April 2003, the EU signed accession treaties with these 
countries.  Thus the guarantees of political and economic stability and particularly rights of 
private sector bank ownership were established. This led not only to sharp increases in foreign 
direct investment, but also to intensified investments in the banking sector. 
 
25. Banks that had entered the market through acquisition were left with a major task of 
bank restructuring.  Retail banks often exhibited cost-income ratios approximating European 
levels but this was on account of high loan margins, which disguised an average ratio of costs 
(operating costs excluding loan provisions and extraordinary items) to volumes (customer 
loans and deposits) at approximately double west European levels.20  Interviews with foreign 
owned privatised banks in the sample group identified, without exception, that the period of the 
mid-late 1990s and early 2000s were dominated by restructuring issues.21  All banks 
interviewed also observed intensifying competition over this period in traditional larger 
corporate lending markets, evidenced by declining loan margins and easing loan conditions. 
 
26. Banks identified the SME market as a core business sector with potential for growth.  
With restructuring well underway, commercial challenges being faced in their traditional loan 
markets and the prospect of accession firmly on the horizon, banks turned to the SME market 
as one of the business sectors in which future growth opportunities existed.  Banks were also 
aware that in the face of intensifying competition, it was essential to build up a defensible 
market position in a short period of time.   
 
27. This shift in strategic emphasis by most of the major banks in the region is the third 
factor in the step change that has occurred in the competitive environment in which the Facility 
operates.  All banks interviewed in new member states identified their strategic priorities as 
addressing new SME market segments with appropriate products and business processes on a 
wider geographical basis than had previously been the case.  Thus from late 2002-onwards, 
competitive pressures caused banks to define their SME businesses models, deepen and widen 
target market segments and refine their products (maturities, margins, terms).   
 
28. For most PFIs, the timing of the Facility was fortuitous and coincident with the above-
described circumstances that had caused banks to reconsider their opportunities and approach 
to the SME market.  The same is also broadly true of leasing companies that reported similar 
                                                 
20  McKinsey Quarterly, ‘Eastern European Banking Matures’, No. 2, 2003. Di Maggio, Romanowski, and Walter. 
21  Banks in markets that went through an earlier process of privatisation and regulatory reform addressed SME business 
strategies ahead of this general timeframe.  
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competitive pressures to explore new clients, asset classes, flexibility in lease size and 
geographical coverage. 
 
29. The earliest Facility FP of 1999 recognised that the potential demand for SME finance 
far exceeded the capacity of an instrument such as the Facility to satisfy.  Rather, its value lay 
in establishing a critical mass of debt proposals that would demonstrate the profitability of the 
sector and provide a clear demonstration effect to entice other banks to start up similar 
operations themselves.  The later FPs also included objectives aimed at inducing or building 
the confidence of Participating Financial Institutions (PFIs) to expand and maintain their 
financing operations with SMEs.  However, whilst the increasing competitive pressures in the 
market forced banks to respond quickly, the Facility itself moved too slowly in the key period 
from 2002-2004 to maintain its effectiveness.  In that period, average (non-Facility) loan sizes 
by PFIs were decreasing, tenor was increasing, and the PFIs were actively seeking new and 
smaller segments of the SME market.  In this context, the Facility as a whole could have 
responded by identifying particular niches in the SME market e.g. support for start-ups or an 
intensified focus on micro-enterprises and micro-credits (areas into which the PFIs were still 
reluctant to expand), particularly for second credit lines.  With particular regard to micro-
finance, the Facility did not set any overall targets or objectives, but individual IFIs, in 
particular the EBRD, have taken action to encourage lending at the smaller end of the 
spectrum.  
 
30. In the period 2000-2004, for the reasons explained above, most of the major banks in the 
region had established their strategies for addressing the SME market and had begun to focus 
progressively on smaller loans and smaller clients, and the potential for the Facility to 
contribute to strategy development declined.  The design of the Facility failed to incorporate 
the management and governance mechanisms that would have facilitated a strategic review and 
consequent action plan regarding the Facility objectives and implementation in the light of 
fundamental changes in the market environment.   
 
31. From 2000, the overall objectives of the Facility presented in the FPs changed 
somewhat from an initial focus on building capacity, and interventions at the level of financial 
intermediaries towards contributing also to broader financial sector reform.  This was in 
response to Agenda 2000 and the New Orientations of the Phare programme.  Annex 8 shows 
the evolution of objectives over the entire period.  They have essentially remained unchanged, 
however, focusing continuously on improved SME access to banking services, and their 
sustainable supply from the banking sector.  The rationale and modus operandi of the Facility 
(provision of credit lines, incentives and technical assistance) did also not undergo any major 
changes.     
 
32. The design of the Facility was not underpinned by a robust intervention logic 
supported by appropriate indicators.  The available logframes were weak, particularly with 
regard to indicators of impact of the Facility at PFI level, or in terms of its wider objectives.  
While there is broad acceptance that the programme focuses on change at PFIs, there was no 
consistent agreement between the sponsor IFIs and the Commission Services on how this could 
be measured. While it is argued by the IFIs that the desired changes in bank behaviour are 
defined at the level of the project proposal in agreement with the PFI, these do not feed in to 
measurement of overall progress at programme level.  Indicators for the projects considered for 
this evaluation focussed largely on outputs (number and size of loans, average maturities etc.), 
rather than changes at PFI level. 
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33. Despite a focus on monitoring and control, there was little focus on the extent to which 
the Facility was meeting Phare’s strategic objectives.  In general, there was a preoccupation 
with monitoring and control at the operational level and little attention was given to which 
strategic goals the programme - and in particular the Phare funds - were trying to achieve.  
However, the extent to which the Facility meets the goals of the sponsor IFIs is a matter for 
internal discussion and debate within the IFIs themselves.  High levels of commitment of IFI 
funds to the Facility, in excess of commitments made during drafting of the FPs, indicate that 
there is considerable added value to the IFIs in this cooperation.  Therefore, under the current 
management structure of the Facility, it is perfectly possible for the continuing relevance to 
Phare grant support to be questionable, whilst at the same time satisfying internal guidelines on 
the part of the IFIs. 
 
2.2 Outputs were delivered effectively by the IFIs, and benefits from grant support 
were obtained in early stages, but these diminished over time. 
34. Implementation of the Facility is based on a partnership between the Commission 
Services and the sponsor IFIs.  Day-to-day management of the Facility activities is delegated 
to the IFIs.  A Steering Committee comprising representatives of the Commission Services 
(DG Enlargement, DG Agriculture, DG Enterprise and DG ECFIN) and the three sponsor IFIs 
deals with overall coordination.22  As the Secretariat of the Facility, DG ECFIN (Unit L) 
efficiently coordinates the flow of information between the Commission and the sponsors for 
all matters related to projects signed with the IFIs, the Steering Committee meetings, any 
technical meetings and the administration of the Special Account.23   
 
35. DG ECFIN closely monitors the implementation of the Facility by the IFIs.  As of 
November 2005, a new Programme Management System (PMS) has been put in place for all 
Commission mandated instruments,24 including the Facility.  The PMS is a specific relational 
database with an internet interface, which can re-group the information contained in several 
dispersed Excel files and which enables easier collection and analysis of data.  However this 
data is confined to issues of contracting (i.e. projects signed with the IFIs) and disbursement.  
The annual and semi-annual reports prepared by the IFIs contain more implementation level 
information, but this is not structured to be informative on progress towards meeting 
Commission objectives, especially since objectives are ill defined. 
 
36. The new monitoring policy has increased control of the Phare funds, but has proved 
cumbersome.  In 2005 a new monitoring policy was implemented by the Commission 
Services, to ensure that internal control systems at the IFIs were sufficient to confirm that the 
PFIs were fulfilling their obligations under their contracts with the IFIs and to permit timely 
identification and correction of problems in the application of the Phare eligibility rules.  
Feedback from the interviewing process indicates that the practical outcome of this exercise 
has been to increase the reporting requirements of both IFIs and PFIs and to increase the 
number of site visits and on-the-spot checks and missions, by both Commission Services and 
IFIs, to the PFIs.  At present count, PFIs undergo approximately seven kinds of monitoring: by 
sponsor IFI management; by sponsor IFI auditors; by sponsor IFI evaluation teams; by DG 
ECFIN; by DG Enlargement; by the Phare Evaluation exercises and ultimately by the Court of 
Auditors.  Although the Commission Services (DG Enlargement and DG ECFIN) combine 
                                                 
22  More detailed information on the management, coordination and activities of Facility is given in Annex 9. 
23  The Special Account is an interest bearing account held at the Sponsor IFIs for the Phare contribution. 
24  Financial instruments mandated to International Financial Institutions (IFIs): include the ETF Start-up; the SME Guarantee 
Facility; Seed Capital Action; SME Finance Facility; Municipal Finance Facility; Municipal Infrastructure Facility; and the 
Preparatory Action. 
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monitoring visits to minimise the burden on PFIs, the process is still onerous.  Reporting from 
the PFIs to the IFIs is also complex and lasts for the duration of the credit line signed with the 
IFI (up to 12 years).  While procedures to ensure transparency of the use of the Phare funds is 
to be welcomed, it is worth noting that the IFIs have a fiduciary responsibility to ensure that 
Phare funds are used with the same degree of probity as their own funds.  As the systems and 
procedures in place at the IFIs have been tested and verified as meeting the appropriate 
Commission standards, then both the added value of, and need for, additional cumbersome 
layers of operational monitoring must be questioned. 
 
37. Phare grant has supported delivery of considerable IFI loans.  Phare funds of M€ 323 
have been matched by M€ 2,214 of IFI credit lines.  Over the period 1999-2003, Phare made 
M€ 291 available under the Facility in the ten CCs.  From 2001, it was decided to extend the 
scope of the Facility to all CCs and M€1.5 was made available under Phare 2003 for Cyprus25. 
A further M€4 was made available for Facility projects with CEB-KfW in Turkey.  No Phare 
funding was programmed in 2004, but in 2005, an additional M€32 were made available for 
Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and (in the case of the agreements with CEB-KfW and EIB), for 
Turkey. In line with the FPs and Contribution Agreements, the Phare support is matched, at 
varying ratios by IFI credit lines, as shown in Table 5 below and in Annex 9.  To date IFIs have 
committed to provide at least M€ 2,214 in credit lines (as shown in the FPs), of which 
approximately M€ 1,723 has been committed to 156 credit lines under approved project 
proposals (PPs). 
 
Table 5.-  Credit Lines committed by IFIs 
IFI Phare support as per 
Financing Proposal (1999-
2005) 
Total Credit Lines as per 
FP* (M€ , 1999-2005) 
Credit Lines committed by 
IFIs to date** 
EBRD 173 690 1,100 
CEB-KfW 90 458 564 
EIB 60 670 550 
Totals 323 1,723 2, 214 
Source:  FPs 1999-2005.  * FP states a minimum contribution by the IFIs.  ** As of 10 July 2006. 
 
38. Phare funding has been used to provide a range of incentives for PFIs,26 which can be 
broadly divided into four categories (see Annex 9 for more detail): 
• Technical Assistance, which is a feature of the EBRD use of the Phare grant, and to a 
lesser extent and more recently, of the CEB-KfW projects; 
                                                 
25  Cyprus’ participation in the Facility was limited to projects with CEB-KfW.   
26  The purpose of the incentive is to ‘induce’ the PFIs to maintain and expand operations with SMEs.  While in more recent 
times the objective has been expanded (“… to assist the candidate countries in meeting the Copenhagen criteria – 2002 and 
“… to contribute to the reform and strengthening of the financial sector to cope with the competitive pressure within the 
European Union – 2003/2005), the Phare support continues to be used to induce changes in PFI behaviour towards SMEs. 
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• Performance-based incentives27 such as the Performance Fee, the Fee for Smaller Loans 
(FSL) and Transaction Fees (TF), all contingent on successful on-lending of credit lines by 
PFIs; 
• Risk-based incentives such as the Loan Guarantee (LG), the Exchange Risk Cover (ERC) 
and the Interest Rate Cap (IRC); 
• Equity finance (only in cooperation with the EBRD) in which the Phare grant provides 
seeding or soft financing terms for the fund by investing alongside the EBRD and other 
investors at specified ratios.28  
 
39. Performance-based incentives have been heavily used.  Performance-based incentives, 
particularly the Performance Fee, have been the most heavily utilised and account for 
approximately M€251.  Transaction Fees (TF) and Technical Assistance (TA) amount to 
approximately M€44 and M€49 respectively.  Risk-based incentives account for only a very 
small proportion of the total Phare financial incentives delivered, and are used most extensively 
by CEB-KfW (which utilises the widest range of incentives) (see Figure 2).  
  
40. To date, EBRD has signed approximately 75 TA contracts, for a total value of 
M€ 38.725, of which 34 have been completed.  Support for the EW constitutes approximately 
0.3% of Phare funds and has been primarily in the form of equity investments in four funds 
(see Annex 9 for more details).  
 
Figure 2.  Phare grant committed and utilised.   
 
 
41. The Facility has been implemented effectively by the participating IFIs (see Annex 9 
for more details).  In line with the reconstructed intervention logic (Annex 7), these can be 
divided into three main categories:  a) loans/leases to SMEs; b) outputs of the TA and; c) ‘soft’ 
capacity building e.g. experience in dealing with, and reporting to IFIs, new funding options or 
risk management instruments utilised. 
                                                 
27  In the context of the Facility, ‘performance’ is judged in different ways, based on discussions between the IFI and the 
respective PFI. Thus there is some variation between the IFIs on how performance is measured.  For EBRD projects, to 
draw down the performance fee, the PFI must meet specific performance and eligibility criteria related to the lending itself 
(e.g. size of loan) and quality of the lending (i.e. less than 5% arrears rate over 60 days, calculated as portfolio at risk on the 
volume of outstanding loans to SME borrowers funded by the Facility).  Performance fee rates differentiate between micro 
and small loans, with the aim of targeting micro loans.  In the case of CEB/KfW, the criteria for draw-down of the 
performance fee relates to the achievement of certain policy objectives, for example, in the case of the Rural Sub-Window 
(also relevant to EBRD), the eligible loans must be to SMEs in rural zones or farmers with less than 100 full-time 
employees (or the equivalent number of part-time employees).    
28  See Annex 9 for further information on the operation of the Equity Window (EW).  
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42. Table 6 below gives an overview of the outputs of the Loan Guarantee and Leasing 
Window (LGLW).  By the end of 2005, approximately 74,216 loans/leases to SMEs had been 
made by 115 PFIs.29  In general, and despite some start-up and IFI-specific structural problems, 
the Facility has been a relatively efficient instrument in terms of the large number of outputs 
delivered and PFIs involved.  
 
Table 6.-  Overview of Loan Guarantee and Leasing Window outputs 
IFI Loans/Leases Credit Lines Signed PFIs involved  
EBRD 64, 854 86 65 
CEB-KfW 7,354 31 30 
EIB 2,008 30 20 
Totals 74,216 147 115 
 
43. The Facility made good use of IFI resources to deliver outputs.  An important strength 
of the partnership with the IFIs is the ability of the Facility to utilise the resources, networks 
and specialist knowledge of the IFIs for implementation.  This means that on the Commission 
Services side, only comparatively limited resources need to be deployed.  For their 
implementation services, the EBRD and CEB-KfW receive a 1.25% flat management fee30 
while EIB receives a 1.2% fee.  These fees have amounted to €1,042,000; €416,000 and 
€120,000 respectively, for the entire period between 1999 and the end of 2005. Given that 
some credit lines can run for up to 12 years, with the related monitoring and reporting, this is a 
considerable amount of input by the IFIs for a very limited management cost to Phare. 
 
44. However the total cost of delivering the outputs must include the Phare grant.  In 
addition to the management fee, there is an additional cost to achieving the substantial outputs.  
Feedback from the interviews indicates that one of the main benefits of the Phare incentives 
(totalling M€265.74),31 and in particular the Performance Fee to PFIs, has been to increase the 
attractiveness of the IFI credit line.  Thus, part of the Phare grant (in the form of the 
Performance Fee) that has been used to promote take-up of the IFI credit line, should be seen 
as a cost to the Commission for the delivery of the outputs.  
 
45. TA provides the bridge between the use of the credit line + incentives model and the 
development of a sustainable SME business model.  TA is an important feature of EBRD 
projects.  It is implemented under EBRD Framework Agreements, and supports both the 
implementation of the credit line and wider capacity building activities at the PFIs.  Under the 
EBRD TA components, 75 TA contracts were implemented and approximately 4,400 bank 
staff received training.  Unlike the EBRD model, TA delivered within the CEB-KfW projects 
is contracted by the PFIs themselves in line with their own requirements (6% of total incentives 
used by CEB-KfW was for TA).   
 
46. Reported outputs of the TA (both EBRD and CEB-KfW) may be grouped into five 
categories: 
                                                 
29  By the end of 2006, EBRD’s cumulative commitments alone reached € 1,076.5 million to 39 banks and 37 leasing 
companies covering the 11 eligible countries; and over 82,500 sub-projects amounting to € 1.75 billion were disbursed to 
SMEs. 
30  Based on DG ECFIN data on disbursed amounts as of 10 July 2006. 
31  As per the Financing Proposals, M€323 has been made available to the Facility; M€265.75 has been contracted and 
M€125.63 has been disbursed. 
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• Support for organisational development including development of strategies towards 
SMEs; 
• Improved risk management processes; 
• Staff training and skill enhancement; 
• Improvements in procedures and documentation; 
• Marketing activities connected with the credit line. 
 
47. Efficiency of the EBRD TA has been adequate.  Efficiency of the EBRD TA depended 
inter alia on a number of factors given below.  Since not all these factors were always 
coincident there were a small minority of EBRD projects that failed to achieve their objectives 
as defined in the project proposal.  Success factors included:  well-designed TA components 
with good input from the PFI; a good ‘fit’ between the organisational needs of the PFI and the 
technical capacity of the contractor; commitment of senior bank management; active 
management of the TA contract by the EBRD Task Manager to ensure that where TA projects 
are not delivering they are either re-oriented or stopped.  This is particularly important given 
the often long duration of the interventions (up to 3 years).  In the cases where the TA was less 
than successful, this was due to a number of factors, including poor delivery by contractors 
and, importantly, marginalisation of the TA team within the PFI, whereby their role was seen 
primarily as providing sound management of the IFI credit line, rather than capacity-building 
in the wider institution.  
 
48. Despite recent improvements in the environment for equity capital, the Equity Window 
concept was not revived.  The Equity Window (EW) was introduced in 1999 and following a 
disappointing start, the EBRD noted that it would be difficult to commit the programmed funds 
within the allocated timeframe. In January 2003, the Steering Committee took the decision to 
re-allocate M€4.75 from the EW to the LGLW.  Later, in July 2003, the Steering Committee 
approved the EBRD request to transfer the outstanding amount of M€4 to the LGLW and it 
was agreed by the Committee that no further projects would be proposed under the EW, and 
the EW was not continued under subsequent annual programmes.  The factors influencing the 
poor performance of the EW in the 1999-2003 period, identified in the earlier IE report 
include:  
• The collapse of boom markets generally in the period and the loss of appetite by investors 
for what are perceived as high risk or low return funds; 
• The decline in interest in the technology and “new economy” sectors, which were 
considered a potentially fertile ground for the investment funds;  
• Fund structures that were more complicated and time consuming to resolve than originally 
anticipated;32  
• Unexpected delays in early stage markets in educating entrepreneurs in the benefits and 
modalities of involvement of private equity providers.  
  
49. However, despite improving market conditions for equity finance (noted in the EBRD’s 
2005 Annual Report), as evidenced by the successful recent performance of the EW funds (see 
Annex 9 and Table 7), no further development or refinement of the EW concept was carried 
out and the performance fee instrument was preferred. To date the EW has committed around 
M€18 of the planned M€61 and achieved 3 full exits.  
 
                                                 
32  For example, difficulties in reaching agreement on an appropriate domicile for one Fund.   
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Table 7.-  Overview of Equity Window Portfolio 
 Fund Size Committed 
(M€) 
Deals Full 
Exits 
Exit 
value 
(M€) 
Pipeline 
GIMV Fund33 12 2.0 3 2 2.4 0 
Euroventures Danube Fund34 15 4.5 5 1 .8 2 
Baltic SME Fund35 13.75 9.1 13 0 0 0 
Global Bulgaria & Romania Growth Fund 20 2.3 4 0 0 6 
Totals 60.75 17.8 25 3 3.2 8 
 
2.3 TA delivered immediate impacts, but intermediate and wider impacts of the Facility 
were limited. 
50. Immediate impacts focussed on inducing and ‘incentivising’ changes in business 
strategies and practices at PFIs with particular reference to the SME segments of their business. 
The model of Credit Line+Incentive+TA delivered immediate impacts for PFIs in early stages 
of transition, and this model provided good opportunities for ‘learning by doing’. However as 
the accession process accelerated, changes in competitive environments were the main engines 
driving capacity building. By 2002/2003 the majority of PFIs surveyed were well on their way 
to putting in place strategies and resources to address the SME market. Projects without TA 
may have delivered immediate impacts, but these are difficult to attribute to the Facility.  In 
practice, the principle impact of the Phare grant (Performance Fee) has been to enhance the 
attractiveness of the IFI credit lines to the PFIs.  Risk-based incentives were less frequently 
used but under the right conditions delivered capacity-building impacts. Intermediate and wider 
impacts of the Facility have been limited. 
  
51. Immediate impacts are defined as results, i.e. the extent to which assistance has had 
substantive, sustainable effects on direct beneficiaries of the assistance (i.e. the PFIs).  The key 
issue is what has changed in the way that direct beneficiary institutions and systems function as 
a result of the assistance.36  The following paragraphs analyse immediate impacts of the TA on 
the PFIs for both the ex post and 2002-2005 periods by: a) assessing the extent to which the 
immediate objectives have been achieved; b) assessing the adequacy/suitability of the 
immediate objective and identifying any unintended immediate impacts, if any.  Further notes 
on achievement of immediate objectives are given in Annex 10. 
 
52. Immediate objectives focused on inducing change at PFIs.  While the beneficiaries of 
the loans and leases are SMEs, the direct beneficiaries of the Phare support under the Facility 
(performance and risk based incentives and TA) are the PFIs themselves.  The immediate 
objectives are therefore focussed in the main on ‘inducing’ and ‘incentivising’ change in 
business strategies and processes that would not otherwise have taken place with specific 
reference to the SME segments of PFI business, and thereby creating a sustainable capacity to 
meet the needs of SMEs in the region and supporting the accession process.   
  
53. There are two aspects of the aim of grant supporting greater access to finance among 
participating SMEs in the region:  
                                                 
33  Due to the poor performance of the GIMV Fund, the Investment Committee took the decision on 29 October 2004 to 
liquidate the fund, when the last investment has been sold. 
34  More recently, strong and unanticipated competition from the Hungarian State Investment Fund means that the 
Euroventures Fund is likely to be unable to utilise its remaining funds within the deadline. 
35  Investment period has ended and only follow-on investments are possible.  
36  DG Enlargement, draft ‘Self-Evaluation Practical Guide’. 
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• Enhancing the ability of the Facility credit lines to address liquidity issues in both early 
stage Facility interventions (1999-2000) and in relation to particular types of PFIs for 
whom the Facility solves ongoing liquidity problems, as and where market failures occur; 
• Providing capacity building through learning by doing (credit line + incentive +/- TA) thus 
supporting PFIs to address the SME market with appropriate products and services in the 
longer term that would not otherwise have been present.   
 
54. The capacity of the Facility to address liquidity problems in the market is limited.  
Approximately 40% of interviewees noted that the Facility was important in addressing early 
stage liquidity problems.  These interviewees included development/promotional banks that are 
majority funded by government to fulfil policy objectives, and leasing companies whose inter-
group borrowings are limited by capitalisation and group exposure rules, at a time when access 
to capital markets by leasing companies remains generally limited.  So, while the Facility is not 
a mechanism to pump mass funding into the SME market, it was seen an important source of 
low, below-market-cost financing for a considerable percentage of PFIs.  However, the 
amounts are de minimis and insufficient to bring substantial extra capital into play. 
 
55. The credit line + incentive + TA model delivered immediate impacts.  This limited 
ability of the Facility to address liquidity issues was recognised in the design of the 1999 
Facility.  The 1999 PF included an immediate objective of “… enhancing capacity of PFIs and 
investment funds to serve the needs of SMEs”.  It is here that the essence of the Facility 
intervention logic is found.  The credit line + incentive + TA model delivered immediate 
impacts that are directly attributable to the Facility, as there is generally a causal connection 
between inputs (TA, training etc.) and results (new strategies in place, streamlined processes, 
new approaches to credit risk management).  In practice, for PFIs in the early stages of 
transition and indeed at key junctures in their development (e.g. during restructuring), the 
credit line + incentive + TA model provided good opportunities for ‘learning by doing’ in an 
environment where PFIs were hungry for new skills and where there were clear opportunities 
to influence changes in banking strategy and processes.  The EBRD’s 2005 Annual Report 
presents findings on impact based on questionnaires to the PFIs on conclusion of the TA,37 and 
these are reproduced in Figure 3.  
 
                                                 
37  The EBRD carried out systematic evaluation of TA programmes under the Facility only as of 2004.  On completion of TA 
programmes, PFIs are requested to provide feedback and evaluate the assistance received under the programme. In 2005, 11 
TA programmes were completed and in total 34 TA evaluation reports were received from 28 participating banks and 6 
participating leasing companies by the end of 2005. 
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Figure 2.- TA programme – main long-term impacts 
 
 
56. However, as the accession process accelerated, changes in the competitive environment 
were the main engines of change, rather than the Facility.  From the above (Figure 3), it is 
tempting to attribute a greater influence to the Facility in promoting sustainable change in PFIs 
than was the case in reality.  Interviews confirmed that the EBRD model of credit line + 
incentive + TA38 had the highest potential to deliver immediate impact.  The immediate impact 
of the EBRD TA was highest in PFIs at crucial stages in their development (e.g. during the 
early stages of their development, or during intensive restructuring) and among PFIs that were 
hungry to respond to the dynamic changes in the competitive environment.  However, as the 
accession process accelerated, changes in the competitive environment coupled with 
development of market maturity were the main engines of change, with the Facility serving as 
one of a number of ‘tools’ available to PFIs to support their restructuring, expansion and 
consolidation processes.  Other tools included support from parent banks/groups, transfer of 
knowledge from foreign owned banks, the purchase of TA (consultancy) services from the 
market, the hiring of experienced SME lending bankers, and access to long-term finance on the 
markets. 
 
57. Projects without TA may have delivered immediate impacts but these are hard to 
attribute to the Facility.  Projects that deliver credit line + incentive (performance or risk-
based incentives),39 but that do not have a TA component may have delivered benefits but these 
are difficult to attribute directly to the Facility and it is likely that they would have been 
generated without Facility, but over a longer period.  Examples of benefits to PFIs (leasing 
companies) include increases in new business through reduction in down-payment on leases 
and the use of the Performance Fee to support business development, marketing and training 
activities.  Figure 2 (see also para 39) shows that the Performance Fee is the most heavily 
utilised form of incentive,40 but the difficult cause-and-effect question is whether the 
performance fee stimulated capacity building that would otherwise have not taken place.  
Interviews provide information on how the Performance Fee has been used/booked by PFIs 
and their feedback on the main impacts of the Performance Fee on their business (see Table 8). 
                                                 
38  More recently introduced on a small scale by CEB-KfW. 
39  A ‘project’ is a financial package with a PFI, which comprises Facility and IFI Fund resources (credit line). 
40  There has been a move to reallocate funding from unused loan guarantees and other instruments etc. to Performance Fees 
and a tendency for second credit lines to use only Performance Fees. 
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Table 8.-  How has the Performance Fee been booked internally? 
 Response % 
Treasury 38.2 
Loan Dept.  – profit centre 20.6 
Branches/loan officers 14.7 
Don’t know 14.7 
Split allocation (e.g. divided between head office and branches 
according to a Performance Fee Policy) 
8.9 
How is the Performance Fee 
booked internally? 
Other (e.g. special fund to reduce down payment on leases) 2.9 
 
58. In approximately 44% of cases, the Performance Fee was booked to a part of the bank’s 
activity that had a direct link with implementation of the credit line.  This in turn focussed 
attention on the credit line and created a direct incentive for the relevant departments to 
disburse the funds.  In cases where the Performance Fee was booked to treasury, staff involved 
in the implementation of the credit line were not directly encouraged to market and promote 
the Facility product/approach actively.  In these cases, disbursement of the credit line, together 
with the introduction of new processes and procedures, was based on the ability of the relevant 
staff member to promote the Facility within the PFI.   
 
59. Principal impact of the Performance Fee has been to increase the attractiveness of the 
IFI credit lines, but with limited catalytic impact on PFIs.  As the main instrument of Phare 
support for the Facility, it is legitimate to consider the impact the Performance Fee itself on the 
PFI.  Interview feedback as shown in Table 9 indicates that the main perceived impact of the 
Performance Fee was on the cost of the IFI credit line to the PFI.  In 16% of cases, the price 
advantage of the credit line, including the Phare grant, was applied in a way to give marginal 
pricing flexibility when competing for loan business that would ultimately be financed through 
the Facility and was thereby passed on, at least in part, to the final beneficiary.  For a 
comparatively small segment of interviewees (8 %) the Performance Fee was an important way 
to focus management attention on the SME segment targeted by the Facility.  Given that the 
majority of banks sampled had already prioritised the SME market, and were progressively 
targeting smaller loans and clients, this is not surprising.  Thus in practice, there were limited 
catalytic impacts of the Phare grant finance.  
 
Table 9.-  Impact of the Performance Fee 
 Response % 
Made credit line more attractive 39 
Other (increased sales/revenue, motivated distribution of 
credit line) 
18 
Improved price of loan to client41 16 
Supported training, TA, marketing etc. 10 
Increased focus on micro and high risk loans 8 
Don’t know 6 
What was the main impact of the 
Performance Fee? 
No impact 3 
 
60. Where the Performance Fee has supported activities such as training or marketing, 
connected to the marketing and implementation of a new product, in many cases comprising 
small loans developed specifically under the Facility (smaller than those typical of the 
mainstream SME funding portfolio and with simplified procedures), then there is a clear link 
between the use of the Performance Fee and the credit line.  However it must be noted that 
there is no direct evidence that the activities would not have taken place without the Phare 
                                                 
41  It must be noted that EBRD loan agreements under the Facility specifically require that sub-loans be provided at market 
rates.   
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support.  It has been argued that the activities would not have taken place as quickly without 
the Phare support, but this is not necessarily the case due to the need for the PFIs to respond 
quickly to changes in the competitive environment or lose market share. 
  
61. Risk-based incentives and the Equity Window were small components with limited 
impacts.  Risk-based incentives delivered impacts where the instrument used was new to the 
participating financial institution, and this was the case in only a limited number of instances.  
Although Phare support is intended to encourage targeting of more risky segments in the asset 
class,42 a considerable number of PFIs interviewed noted that they target the best performing 
loans, or potentially best new clients to the Facility in order to avail of the Performance Fee.  
Thus the risk profile of the Facility portfolio consistently outperforms the PFIs’ standard 
portfolio with SMEs. 
 
62. The apparent Facility capacity to ‘leverage’ funds from IFIs was high.  The 2000-2001 
programmes introduced two new immediate objectives (see Annex 10): to leverage the largest 
amount of co-financing with the Community grant through co-financing with the IFIs and to 
ensure efficiency by delegating implementation to the IFIs.  With regard to the second 
immediate objective, implementation (identification and implementation of projects with IFIs) 
is taking place, but not on a delegated basis (in line with the Commission financial 
regulations). The division of responsibility for monitoring and ensuring financial control is 
complex and unclear.  The programmes are being implemented as efficiently as possible, given 
institutional and other constraints,43 and thus this immediate objective can be assessed as 
having been largely achieved.  However the appropriateness of the objective must be 
questioned, as ensuring efficiency should be an underlying principle irrespective of the 
objectives set. 
 
63. The concept of leverage is used extensively within the Facility literature: in the FPs 
which set minimum leverage ratios at programme and project level, and in the semi-annual and 
annual reports that report on the leverage achieved etc.  Leverage ratios reported in the semi-
annual reports indicate that the IFIs have contributed funding to the Facility in excess of that 
planned in the FPs.  For example, projects with the EBRD have in some cases achieved a 
‘leverage’ ratio of 8:1 in favour of Phare.  EIB has delivered the targeted 10:1 and the CEB-
KfW in excess of the planned 5:1.44   
 
64. The extent to which the Phare grant has leveraged IFI funding varies between the 
IFIs.  In practice, the Phare grant has been instrumental in mobilising EBRD funds.  As EBRD 
does not compete on price with financing from the private sector, it must deliver clearly 
defined additionality or ‘transition impact’.45  In the case of the Facility, this is delivered by the 
TA component which is funded by the Phare grant.  Thus the Phare grant is an important 
element, which leverages the EBRD credit line.  However, it is also clear that the EBRD PFIs 
are incentivised to target the best performing loans (see para 61) which, most likely, would 
have managed to find funding in any case.  Where an EIB Global Loan targeting SMEs is in 
place, or is already in place without the Phare grant (i.e. where there is earmarking of an 
existing Global Loan), then there is no leverage effect of the Phare funds.  In the case of the 
CEB-KfW funding, it is unclear whether their credit line would have been made available 
                                                 
42  Definition of what constitutes a risky segment varies between IFIs.  
43  The ability of the EIB systems and structures to ensure speedy disbursement while exercising adequate controls over the 
Phare spend have resulted in less than optimum efficiency (see also Footnote 4). 
44  Precise ratios are not reported in CEB-KfW 2005 Annual Report. 
45  ‘Transition impact’ refers to the influence of a project on the economy or on society, or to side effects from the project on 
the “wider economy” (e.g. impact on the environment).” 
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without the Phare grant.  Given the long history of KfW involvement in the region, particularly 
in the area of SME promotion and support for development and promotional banks, it is likely 
that funding would have been made available, thus potentially reducing the leverage of the 
Phare funding.  However it should be noted that in a number of instances at individual PFI 
level, new products were developed (comprising) small loans with simplified credit 
procedures, using the IFI credit line, the Phare grant and PFI funds.   
 
65. By 2002/2003 the majority of PFIs interviewed were well on their way to putting in 
place strategies and resources to address the SME market.  The 2002 and 2003 programmes 
share common immediate objectives (see Annex 10) that cumulatively should “…. continue to 
induce financial intermediaries to expand and maintain in the long term their financing 
operations with SMEs”.  The immediate objectives address: 1) confidence-building of financial 
intermediaries; 2) enhancing capacity to assess and monitor risks and manage financial 
exposure; 3) to deepen country coverage at a regional level by concluding more projects within 
each country; 4) sustain and maximise the existing projects under the LGLW by providing 
additional credit lines to the financial intermediaries concerned.  All PFIs surveyed saw their 
portfolios increase significantly, privatisations were by and large complete and reorganisations 
had bedded in.  Importantly, by 2003 accession was firmly on the horizon.  The comparatively 
small size of the Facility in the context of overall volumes at PFIs and the growing 
sophistication of the market meant that the ability of the Facility to deliver confidence building 
was limited. 
  
66. But a niche remained for the Facility in the case of ‘greenfield’ investments and 
development institutions.  There are however two exceptions to these trends which are worth 
noting.  Firstly in the case of greenfield investments (generally leasing companies with no 
parent group or only limited support from the parent group) and secondly in the case of 
development banks that struggled to find their niche in this complex and fast changing 
environment.  For these two groups, the Facility was both a source of funds and expertise as 
well as partnering and cooperation with the IFI.  In these instances the immediate objective of 
the Facility remained valid.  However, from the interviewing process, very few leasing 
companies reported capacity-building results from the TA components and, of the non-TA 
interventions, only a small number resulted in enhanced skills and techniques.  For 
development banks, particularly those cooperating with CEB-KfW, confidence building took 
place as part of their ongoing working relationship with KfW and was not specific to the 
Facility.  Using the credit line for on-lending also helped the development banks to build 
working relationships with domestic banks and leasing companies and to gain experience in the 
development and implementation of financial instruments in support of government policy in 
the SME sector, including microfinance.  
 
67. TA has supported new credit methodologies.  Credit-related objectives (‘capacity to 
assess and monitor related risks and to manage their financial exposure’) have been addressed 
through TA and there are some good examples of new methodologies that have been developed 
under the Facility and that have been taken up into the wider business model.  However, the 
ability of non-TA incentives to have an impact on capacity building in this area has been 
limited.   
 
68. Subsequent projects aim to build on existing systems, but this is insufficient 
justification for second credit lines.  The objectives of deepening country coverage and 
sustaining and maximising the impacts of existing projects under the LGLW are closely related, 
in that both emphasise the desirability of building on the systems put in place for the first credit 
line.  Justifications given by IFIs and PFIs for second credit lines included the need to address 
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‘remaining gaps’ or particular niches in the market, the desire of the IFI to induce the PFI to 
continue to ‘stretch the envelope’ in terms of their definition of a bankable project, and the 
annual Phare programming process which makes it necessary to divide support to a particular 
PFI into two or even three consecutive packages.  Changes are noticeable in the focus of 
second credit lines, for example the tendency to replace ERC, IRC, loan guarantees etc. with 
the more straightforward Performance Fee.  Given that the intervention logic of the Facility lies 
in its capacity building role, rather than as a pure distribution mechanism, the need for second 
credit lines would only appear to arise when capacity is still lacking.  The need to ensure 
additionality of second credit lines has been raised by the Facility Steering Committee and 
approval of Phare grants in support of second credit lines is not automatic. 
 
69. With regard to the deepening regional coverage element of this immediate objective, the 
aim of focussing PFI attention on businesses based outside the capital cities and more 
developed regional coverage is being met.  However, from the interviews it is clear that this 
parallels the development of the PFI branch network, rather than targets particularly 
disadvantaged areas.  The introduction of the Rural Sub-Window (RSW) in 2003, whereby 
funds were targeted to ‘rural’ areas, ‘rural enterprises’ and farmers (according to the relevant 
national classification) comprises less than 4% of the total Phare support for the Facility and is 
at an early stage of implementation.46  Even at maximum utilisation, and with maximum 
capacity-building at the PFIs, the RSW will have a limited impact on availability of financing 
for rural SMEs. 
 
70. Intermediate and wider impact of Facility was limited.  The intermediate impact of the 
Facility (in accordance with the reconstructed intervention logic) relates to the ability of the 
Facility interventions to provide ‘demonstration effects’ at a number of levels:  
a) The extent to which the interventions have influenced wider bank strategy and processes 
towards SMEs, and  
b)  Whether new business models have been developed based on the experience and skills 
obtained under the Facility.   
The good immediate impacts of the TA interventions have been taken up into wider bank 
strategies towards SMEs in less than half of the cases reviewed.  The comparatively small size 
of the Facility intervention (cumulatively barely the size of a small bank), limits the extent of 
its impact on the wider environment, in the absence of substantive capacity building.  As the 
Facility funding is relatively modest, it is therefore an essential element of the Facility rationale 
that demonstration effects should have become evident over time, taken up into wider bank 
business and transferred between members of the same bank group. 
 
71. For non-TA interventions, intermediate impacts are mostly found in banks with a 
development agenda, able to draw wider benefits from the relationship with the IFIs.  These 
benefits are largely intangible, for example increased understanding of the role of development 
and promotional banks in economic and regional development, as well as development of and 
support for new financial instruments.  
 
72. Where the wider impact of the Facility is to ensure that SMEs in the new member states 
have access to finance on the terms and conditions converging to those available in the EU-15, 
then there are indications that such convergence is taking place.  Findings from the 
questionnaire survey indicate that loan tenors in the general SME business of banks are equal 
                                                 
46  Nine projects with PFIs (7 with provision for TA) with 77 credit lines have been signed, and only 0.02% has been 
disbursed. 
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to, or indeed in excess of, tenors provided by the Facility credit lines (4 years plus).  While it is 
tempting to attribute this to the Facility, feedback from the interviews indicates that 
competitive pressures and the accession dividend are the main drivers of this trend, and that the 
Facility itself is only one of a number of tools used by PFIs to tailor their products to the needs 
of SMEs. 
 
73. The following factors should be taken into account when evaluating the wider impact of 
the Facility on a strengthened financial sector:  
• the Facility had a direct focus on SME financing; 
• the term funding and TA provided did contribute marginally to strengthening of the 
finances and institutional capacities of PFIs; 
• the Facility was comparatively limited in size, as the funds were disbursed over a wide 
geographical area; 
• the Facility had no direct link to other financial sector support measures in areas such as 
improved financial sector regulation and inspection.  
Considering these factors, the contribution to financial sector strengthening, while positive, 
must be assessed as marginal overall.   
 
2.4 Long-term sustainability of the Facility assistance is marginal  
74. The majority of PFIs interviewed had an SME business model/strategy in place, but 
few of these are directly attributable to the Facility.  Some aspects of the Facility have been 
carried into the medium-term (e.g. credit management skills, credit scoring methodologies 
etc.).  However, in most cases the fast changing business environment has required further 
evolution of the SME banking business model.  Those banks that received funding and TA 
could reasonably have benefited from the early support on methods, procedures and systems in 
their further development of the SME business.  However, a clear majority of the PFIs reported 
that they had evolved their SME business models using own resources (both financial and 
technical), and that little input was derived directly from their experience within the Facility.  
The responses to a number of control questions during the structured interviews confirming 
this effect, as elaborated below, leads to the conclusion that the sustainable contribution from 
Facility was marginal overall. 
 
75. Sustainability of TA results difficult to ascertain.  Of the PFIs interviewed, only 17% 
stated that new methodologies and processes developed under the Facility were still in use and 
deployed in the wider business model.  A further 25% reported traces of the TA interventions 
still being used in the business.  But a significant 53% of interviewees reported that strategies 
and processes developed under the Facility were no longer in use or had not been transferred to 
the wider business model, due to changes in the competitive environment, new processes 
introduced by parent bodies or introduced as part of wider banking group strategy.47   
 
76. Internal and external factors reduced sustainability of the TA overall.  Constraining 
factors within the control of the IFI included a lack of pro-active management of TA contracts, 
which at times resulted in poorly performing contracts running on without adequate 
intervention.  Factors external to IFI control that impacted negatively on sustainability of TA 
                                                 
47  EBRD notes that its questionnaires delivered on completion of TA contracts show that 21% of PFIs consider that the TA 
was the driving force behind their original SME strategy and instrument in the design of their current SME lending 
procedures, products and risk policies, 63% of respondents concluded that TA contributed to improvements in their existing 
SME strategies, produced efficiencies in their procedures and introduced new technologies, i.e. credit scoring, which have 
been assimilated into their wider business model for SME lending and have been used as a basis for the later development 
of their SME operations.  
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included successive large-scale restructurings at PFIs, lack of senior management commitment, 
or where commitment was not translated into practical support.  
 
77. Where sustainability is judged through development of human resource skills, these too 
have diminished in the medium term (24-36 months), if not refreshed in line with market 
requirements.  PFI restructuring has also had negative consequences for sustainability of 
impacts (particularly of training), as mergers have often been succeeded by the implementation 
of new or revised policies and procedures.  Despite these constraints, some enduring impact 
could still be traced from the interviews, and may reasonably be concluded from the TA 
provided, as discussed below. 
 
78. However, some ‘soft’ impacts have been sustained.  PFIs have however noted the 
sustainability of ‘soft impacts’: for example, attitudinal changes towards SMEs, particularly 
micro-enterprises and micro-credit; and an improved image of the PFI in the market place, 
through association with an EU-supported product that is marketed and perceived by potential 
clients as being of a ‘European standard’.  Most PFIs interviewed noted the growing 
importance of micro-enterprises and micro-credits in their portfolios. 
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3. THEMATIC/ CROSSCUTTING FINDINGS 
3.1 Catalytic effects of the grant support to the Facility diminished over time 
79. Conclusions of the previous IE on ensuring catalytic effect were not taken up 
adequately by Facility management.  The previous IE concluded that there was scope for the 
Facility as an instrument to be more responsive to regional (both inter and intra country) 
differences, differing market segments (including the less attractive market and product 
segments such as micro-financing and start-ups) and in adapting to meet changing needs to 
ensure its continued relevance.  The report recommended needs’ assessments of SME 
financing including identifying differences in market maturity at country and regional level, 
and in market/product segments that experience particular difficulty in accessing finance.  This 
was interpreted by the Steering Committee as referring only to Bulgaria, Romania and 
Turkey,48 and reports on access to finance by SMEs were duly commissioned from the sponsor 
IFIs.  While reports were submitted and considered by the Steering Committee for the May 
2004 meeting, there is no evidence that the Facility was reoriented to focus on market failures 
in any of these three countries.49  
 
80. In the Facility context, catalytic effect is determined at PFI level.  Catalytic effect refers 
to the ability of the Phare support to catalyse a priority accession-driven action which would 
otherwise not have taken place or which would have taken place at a later date.  In the Facility 
context, defining catalytic actions is left to individual PFIs, who are considered to be best 
placed to determine appropriate actions in light of market conditions and their own business 
models, while the IFIs provide the tools and the Phare grant provides the incentive.   
 
81. However, changes in the availability of funds to SMEs on reasonable terms has been 
driven by the market, not the Facility.  Average loan size has decreased, and maturity of loans 
and percentage of loans to regionally-based SMEs have increased, but there is no evidence that 
this is significantly attributable to the Facility rather than to the evolution of the competitive 
environment.  At best there were elements of Facility-related TA that have been carried 
forward, but in most cases the fast changing business environment has required further 
evolution of the SME lending business model. 
 
82. Many PFIs openly acknowledge the main impact of the Phare grant on their business is 
to increase the attractiveness of the IFI credit line.  However, while this raises concerns about 
possible distortion effects of Phare grants, including displacement of funds from other sources 
(particularly private sector sources), minor market distortions may in some instances be 
justified by the development objectives pursued. 
 
83. Some success in promoting micro-finance was achieved through the EBRD approach of 
paying higher performance fee rates for micro-loans with average loan sizes within the EBRD 
Facility portfolio comparatively lower than those for CEB/KfW.   
 
3.2 Additionality in line with the Phare definition has also declined over time.  
84. Definitions of additionality vary between the Commission Services and the IFIs.  Both 
the Commission Services and the sponsor IFIs are concerned with how additionality is ensured 
by the Facility.  However, definitions of what constitutes additionality vary between the 
partners.  Analysis of the extent to which the Facility is satisfying the sponsor IFIs’ internal 
                                                 
48  Minutes of the Steering Committee held on 4.07.2003. 
49  In addition, the report on Turkey submitted by KfW was dated 2001 and deemed to be unsuitable as a basis for strategic 
decision-making and an updated report requested.   
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tests for additionality is outside the scope of this exercise (although some remarks can be made 
about the additionality of TA/non-TA interventions), but the consistently high levels of 
commitment of IFI funds to the Facility (in excess of the minimums agreed in the FPs) 
indicates that the IFIs rate the facility highly according to their own criteria.   
 
85. IFIs can satisfy their internal tests for additionality even in near-developed markets 
(i.e. where the supply of funds to SMEs in the candidate countries and new member states, is at 
tenors and conditions approaching those of the EU-15 member states) by focussing on 
addressing remaining gaps in the market or on particularly high-risk segments.  However, a 
similar shift in the Facility philosophy would be in danger of moving the Facility out of the 
scope of Phare, because whilst there may be remaining gaps in the market to be filled, Phare 
may not be the most appropriate instrument.  This is particularly the case for the new member 
states, where Structural Fund programmes supporting SMEs (through grants and revolving 
funds) have been in place since 2004, but focus on providing finance to SMEs through 
financial intermediaries, and do not have an explicit focus on capacity building in the financial 
sector.  In addition, as banks act opportunistically to service new market niches, the role of the 
Phare grant in this context must be questioned. 
 
86. Additionality in line with the Phare definition has been eroded over time.  The Phare 
test for additionality states that “Phare support should not displace other financiers, especially 
from the private sector or from the international financial institutions”.  As accession became a 
near certainty, and with the resulting influx of foreign direct investment and expertise into the 
banking sector, the scope for additionality from the Facility has been substantially eroded.   
 
87. Looking at additionality from the Phare perspective in terms of displacement of other 
sources of financing, the Facility is only one of a number of sources of funds available to PFIs.  
Of the PFIs interviewed, at least 85% report that they are able to source funds of a similar type 
to that provided by the Facility (see Table 10), which raises concerns regarding possible 
displacement of funds.  However, some minor distortion of the market may be tolerable if it is 
in the interest of a particular policy objective, such as support for segments that are not being 
well served by the financial system.  But this would need to be made an explicit feature of the 
programme design. 
Table 10.-  Source of Funds 
 Response % 
Parent/group 19.00 
Deposit base 5.00 
Not known 15.00 
Markets 49.00 
Reliant on government 7.00 
Are you able to fund similar amounts, 
currency and tenor from non-Facility 
sources? 
Other 5.00 
 
88. TA is the central element that provides additionality for the EBRD credit line.  The 
EBRD definition of additionality states that the EBRD should not compete with other 
organisations, but rather should complement or supplement existing financing possibilities.  
Additionality refers both to the pricing of the EBRD loans and to the ‘transition impact’ it 
confers on the recipient economy.  In order to be judged ‘additional’ an investment must pass 
either of two tests:  
• Demonstrate that the pricing is no less favourable to the EBRD than it would be to a 
private financial institution doing the same transaction with the same information; or  
• Demonstrate that the financial agreement includes terms and conditions related to 
transition impact, by influencing the client to take actions important for their 
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transition impact, which would not necessarily have been agreed to if the investment 
was financed by a private bank.  
 
89. Taking these tests in turn, firstly within the Facility, the EBRD credit line is not priced to 
be attractive to the PFIs by itself and it is argued that the TA component, together with the 
strict eligibility criteria for sub-loans under the credit line ensure additionality.  However, once 
the Performance Fee is factored in, the overall price of the EBRD package becomes more 
attractive to the PFIs.  Secondly, the financial agreement with the PFIs contains terms and 
conditions governing the payment of the Performance Fee (not conditionalities linked to the 
implementation of the TA) that require the PFIs to meet certain performance criteria (e.g. size 
of loan, tenor, compliance with the EU definition of an SME, overall risk of the portfolio).  
These criteria reflect the direction in which the Facility would like the PFIs to move in their 
financing of SMEs.  However, in light of the step change in the competitive environment 
coupled with development of market maturity, most banks had already decided to move in 
these directions, therefore the additionality in these cases is provided by the extent to which the 
gap between the PFIs intention and its resources (financial and other) is filled by appropriate, 
well-managed and effectively implemented TA packages.   
 
90. The Facility risks displacing support from other sources.  Where PFIs can source TA 
from their parent, or elsewhere in their group, there is no justification for Facility TA support.  
An important finding regarding TA is that its additionality depends primarily on the 
relationship between the parent/shareholder and the PFI, rather than the form of ownership.  So 
for example, some banking groups set overall group policy and targets, leaving individual 
members to implement group strategies without recourse to group financing or skills.  In these 
instances, the TA delivered does not displace TA from the parent and was found to be the case 
in participating leasing companies.  However, the majority of parent/subsidiary relationships 
examined are characterised by strong hands-on involvement of the parent/shareholder in the 
entire business cycle.  In these latter cases, additionality of TA is difficult to ensure.  It is clear 
however, that the majority of PFIs are capable of identifying and funding their training and 
developmental needs without recourse to the Phare funding, although this is welcomed as a 
lower-cost option.  
3.3 Little linkage or complementarity with other support measures for SMEs  
91. Dialogue on Facility projects is largely conducted outside the scope of the CC policy 
arenas.  The Facility is aimed primarily at PFIs and implemented by the sponsor IFIs.  
Complementarity with sponsor IFI programmes is ensured by the IFIs.  However dialogue on 
Facility projects at country level takes place between the IFIs and the PFIs, and is largely 
conducted outside the scope of the CC SME policy arenas.  While DG Enterprise participates 
in the Steering Committee, and is consulted on project proposals, this is insufficient to ensure 
that the Facility as a whole is located appropriately within the wider spectrum of SME support, 
particularly through the Phare programme.  The focus of the Facility is on the PFIs and the 
Facility has an in-built flexibility whereby the PFIs themselves identify SME needs through the 
market.  However, in a number of cases (including in relation to the EW), competition from 
state-sponsored funds has resulted in delays in getting the credit lines up and running. 
 
92. Overlap of credit lines with domestic SME financing schemes.  All of the new member 
states, Bulgaria, and Romania run their own financial support schemes for SMEs and the 
number of such programmes has increased with the implementation of Structural Funds in the 
post-accession environment.  These schemes take the form of both direct loans to SMEs and 
indirect loan schemes operated via financial intermediaries.  These schemes target support to 
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priority categories of SMEs (defined in line with government SME policy) and are not 
envisaged as capacity-building exercises aimed at the financial sector.  There is an underlying 
assumption that the financial sector has the capacity to serve as a reliable partner for 
government in pursuit of state policies.  Overlap is in evidence with possible displacement 
effects between the Facility and the schemes in some of the new member states, in particular 
Hungary where interest-free loans are offered to certain categories of SMEs. 
 
93. Relationships with development banks were under-exploited in the Facility.  The CEB-
KfW relationships with development banks are a potentially good way to use the Facility in 
concert with domestic programmes of financial support to SMEs.  However this opportunity 
has not been exploited for a number of reasons, most importantly the perceived role of the 
Facility as an instrument for assisting PFIs to build capacity rather than as an instrument of 
SME policy.   
 
3.4 Multi-country programme delivery has been appropriate but the absence of a 
tailor-made approach constrained benefits.  
94. The horizontal delivery of the Facility has been appropriate.  The delivery of the 
Facility via a horizontal, multi-partner instrument was an appropriate response to the 
implementation of this type of intervention.  The main benefits include the linkages between 
the IFIs and the PFIs in the target countries, together with their extensive issue-specific 
expertise and well-qualified staff, and the potential for learning lessons and dissemination of 
good practice, not only between countries, but also between the IFIs themselves.   
 
95. Economies of scale achieved in implementation of TA achieved by the EBRD.  
Economies of scale have been achieved by the EBRD through the implementation of the TA 
components via a series of Framework Contracts that can be mobilized individually for 
country-specific missions.  The fact that the TA is contracted centrally by the EBRD has a 
number of aspects.  Firstly, there is the need to ensure a good ‘fit’ between PFI needs and the 
consultant and to ensure that the PFI feels ownership of the process and therefore of the 
ensuing TA contract.  Secondly the TA retained by the EBRD is perceived of as having an 
EBRD ‘seal of approval’ which creates confidence on the part of the PFI.   
 
96. Benefits would have been greater with a more differentiated approach.  The Facility 
focus on achieving ‘balanced regional coverage’, both in terms of country and regional 
distribution, has taken insufficient account of differences in country and market maturity.  At 
the programme level this ‘one size fits all’ approach across a range of markets at different 
stages of development does not address the need to tailor the Facility to prevailing market 
conditions.  While the Facility approach as it currently operates promotes a ‘tailor made’ 
approach at the ‘micro’ level, i.e. at the level of individual PFIs, this reflects corporate strategy 
and analysis of business opportunities rather than overall programme objectives.  
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
4.1 Conclusions  
Conclusion 1: Market developments were not matched by timely changes in the Facility, and 
the intervention logic of grant support to the Facility became less valid over time 
 
97. Over time the original intervention logic underlying the Facility became less about 
addressing market failures in the broader sense, and more about filling remaining gaps in 
developing markets, that were quickly approaching those of the ‘old’ member states with 
regard to the availability of SME financing at similar tenors and conditions.  This represented a 
significant shift in positioning and ethos of the Facility that was not matched by appropriate 
changes in objectives or methodologies.  Instead, changes in objectives paved the way for 
cooperation with additional sponsors to ensure ‘balanced’ regional coverage.  This approach 
does not allow for a policy-driven approach to market segments or regions.  The introduction 
of the Rural Sub-Window was a welcome innovation, but at such a limited scale that it cannot 
be said to represent a substantive shift in Facility thinking. 
 
98. Furthermore, it is questionable whether Phare, as a pre-accession instrument, should have 
continued its high level of support to the Facility in these new market conditions.  Funding for 
the Facility, while certainly popular with stakeholders as they expanded opportunistically in the 
new environment, also comes at a cost to the Phare programme overall in terms of 
opportunities lost for funding other sectors/initiatives that suffer from financial constraints, 
such as environmental remediation, phyto-sanitary controls at borders, civil society 
development, etc., all of which are high on the accession agenda.  For continued Phare funding 
at these high levels, the case for the Facility, based on analysis of clearly identifiable and 
agreed objectives and impacts, should have been made. The previous IE Report offered the 
opportunity to do so, and this opportunity was largely lost.  
 
Conclusion 2:  Catalytic effects of grant support diminished over time 
 
99. Catalytic effect refers to the ability of the Phare support to catalyse a priority accession-
driven action which would otherwise not have taken place or which would have taken place at 
a later date.  The previous IE concluded that there was scope for the Facility as an instrument 
to be more responsive to regional differences, differing market segments and in adapting to 
meet changing needs to ensure its continued relevance.  However there is little evidence that 
the Facility was reoriented to focus on clearly identified market failures in relation to particular 
regions, countries or segments.  Changes in the availability of funds to PFIs and generally to 
SMEs has been driven by the market, not the Facility – average loan size has decreased, and 
maturity of loans and percentage of loans to regionally-based SMEs have increased, but there 
is no evidence that this is significantly attributable to the Facility rather than to the evolution of 
the competitive environment.  Where changes were made, for example an increased focus on 
micro-credits, this was largely at the initiative of the IFIs, rather than part of a strategic re-
orientation of the programme. 
 
100. Catalytic impacts of the TA-based projects were highest in the early stages, and in some 
cases elements of Facility -related TA have been carried forward.  In most cases, however, the 
fast changing business environment has required further evolution of the SME lending business 
model.  Many PFIs openly acknowledge the main impact of the Phare grant on their business is 
to increase the attractiveness of the IFI credit line.  However, while this raises concerns about 
possible distortionary effects of Phare grants, including displacement of funds from other 
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sources (particularly private sector sources), minor market distortions may in some instances 
be justified by the development objectives pursued. 
 
Conclusion 3: More attention is needed to ensuring that the Facility delivers additionality 
within the Phare context 
 
101. While the IFIs can satisfy their internal definitions of additionality in developed markets 
(i.e. where the supply of funds to SMEs in the candidate countries and new member states, is at 
tenors and conditions approaching those of the EU-15 member states), the case for 
additionality according to the Phare definition has eroded over time.  The step changes in the 
business environment created new challenges for the Facility to maintain relevance and 
additionality.  However, with accession firmly in sight, increased availability of alternative 
funding, growing interest by other financial institutions in the SME segment, and the ability to 
buy in or transfer skills and methodologies either from the parent bank or from other sources, 
eroded the additionality of the Facility funds.  This is not to say that there were no instances 
where the Facility could continue to deliver additionality, but how this was defined and 
ensured at individual project level (and particularly in the case of second credit lines with the 
same PFI) was not consistently and clearly addressed. 
 
Conclusion 4: Cost-effectiveness of the Phare support declined over time. 
 
102. On the Commission Services side, only comparatively limited resources needed to be 
deployed, and the participating IFIs have delivered considerable outputs in terms of numbers of 
loans and leases made, staff trained and technical assistance contracts completed.  This came at 
an ostensibly modest cost to the Commission (the 1.2% to 1.25% management fee to the IFIs). 
However, analysis of cost-effectiveness must also include: a) the Performance Fees that 
support disbursement of credit lines, and b) the extent to which the Facility is fulfilling the 
Commission’s policy objectives.  In relation to the Performance Fees, these are the main part 
of the Commission input to the Facility and represent a significant amount. When seen in the 
light of the limited achievement of attributable capacity building, cost-effectiveness of the 
Phare support is low, and as currently structured, the Facility is weighted in favour of 
disbursement of sponsor IFI credit lines.  
 
Conclusion 5: The TA model stimulated capacity building under certain conditions, 
particularly in the early stages. 
 
103. The credit line + incentive + technical assistance model has the most potential to deliver 
(and has delivered) capacity building at PFI level.  The evaluation found that in practice, where 
immediate impacts were high, these were attributable to the TA-driven model.  The TA 
stimulated organisational changes and raised the levels of competence of the PFIs, both in the 
early stages of the transition period, and in their development, when the potential for failure 
was at its highest.  For the TA to respect the principles of additionality and deliver impacts, 
certain conditions need to be met, including lack of access to technical know-how, a good fit 
between the needs of the PFI and the assistance delivered, commitment of PFI senior 
management and active management by the sponsor IFI, based on output and impact 
indicators.  However, the TA did not have the anticipated significant sustainable impacts at the 
level of the PFIs, due partly to developments in the competitive market environment, including 
takeover by foreign banks, which resulted in changes to business models and practices.  
Moreover, technical assistance did not provide for value added in banks that benefited from 
being owned by foreign banks and additional technical know-how. 
SME Finance Facility Conclusions and Recommendations  
Ex post evaluation of Phare: MBP – SMEFF – October 2007, MWH Consortium  30
 
Conclusion 6:  The case needs to be clearly made for non-TA based interventions   
 
104. For non-TA based projects (i.e. comprising incentive only), it is difficult to identify and 
attribute changes in bank behaviour to the intervention.  Supporting non-TA based 
interventions needs careful agreement on what capacity building will be supported, how this 
will be measured and how this will be sustained in the longer term.    
 
Conclusion 7: The limited amount of total funding restricted wider impact 
 
105. Individual projects with participating financial institutions were not designed to have 
demonstration effect and there is little evidence of widespread take-up of Facility models.  The 
volume of funding involved was insufficient to make an appreciable contribution to the volume 
of finance available (barely the amount of a small bank).  It must also be noted that the Facility 
was never intended to be a significant presence in the markets, thus the potential for wider 
impact lies principally its ability to deliver demonstration effect (both within and between 
PFIs). However, whilst the increasing competitive pressures in the market forced banks to 
respond quickly, the Facility moved too slowly to be effective.  
 
Conclusion 8: Sustainable change is difficult to attribute to the Facility 
 
106. The tools used by the Facility, with the exception of TA combined with risk-based 
incentives, have proved to be insufficient to induce sustainable changes.  Where changes have 
taken place in the absence of TA, it is difficult to establish a causal connection between the 
Phare grant plus the credit line, and the changes.  Feedback from the interviews and surveys 
indicate that the technical assistance did improve capacity in the participating financial 
institutions, particularly in the early stages. 
 
4.2 Recommendations  
107. There are two key areas in which the recommendations are made for action: redesign of 
the Facility and need for proactive strategic management.  
 
Action 1: Redesigning the Facility 
 
Recommendation 1: Before launching a new facility, thorough re-assessment and redesign 
of grant support is required. 
 
108. There is a need for a full review of the future role and operations of a new SME Finance 
Facility, and its introduction under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) should be 
preceded by a thorough re-assessment and consequent redesign.  The future facility must have 
a clear intervention logic, establishing the case for any grant support to the new instrument. 
 
Recommendation 2:  The thorough re-assessment and redesign of the Facility should be 
based on detailed analysis of differences in the maturity of economies and markets. 
 
109. The redesigned instrument would need to be examined critically and reconstructed at 
every level, starting with an examination of the areas of market failure or a differentiation in 
the level of market maturity or market underdevelopment that can reasonably be addressed.  
Any methods and tools proposed should take account of the differing regional and country 
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conditions and market segments.  Specific objectives relating to micro-credit institutions or 
development/promotional banks should be clearly identified. 
 
Recommendation 3: Redesign should respect the principles of catalytic impact and 
additionality 
 
110. The principles of catalytic impact and additionality should be set up as positive criteria 
by the Commission Services that must be met by the individual arrangements with the IFIs, 
and clearly reflected in individual project proposals with PFIs.    
 
Action 2: Need for proactive strategic management  
 
Recommendation 4: The Commission Services should be proactively at the heart of strategic 
decision-making on the development of the Facility 
 
111. As the entire Facility instrument is largely driven by absorption of the Phare grant, the 
Commission Services (DG Enlargement, DG ECFIN, DG Enterprise and other Commission 
stakeholders) should be at the heart of strategic decision-making on the development and 
implementation of Facility.  This would involve clarity about the policy objectives at regional 
or segment level that the Commission is pursuing and the role of the Facility in achieving these 
objectives.  This should be set out in a series of working papers outlining the Commission’s 
expectations of the Facility, guidelines for ensuring additionality and catalytic effect and a set 
of core monitoring indicators linked to specific policy objectives.    
 
Recommendation 5: The management of strategic operations of the Facility should have the 
appropriate tools and resources to tailor the Facility’s response to changing conditions 
 
112. It should be the responsibility of the Facility strategic management to equip itself with 
the tools and methodologies to identify in which countries and market segments the Facility 
intervention is warranted (to be informed by and consistent with the intervention logic as 
described above).  Decisions about programmes should be placed firmly within the context of 
the competitive environment at the time a programme decision is taken. Fulfilment of the 
Commission Services’ requirements for catalytic impact and additionality should also be 
ensured.  Changes should trigger a process of review and refinement, for example to accelerate 
or stop implementation mid-programme if necessary.  This would be particularly applicable 
where the original intervention logic is no longer relevant or where a Commission Services 
definition of additionality can no longer be met.  Achievement of the policy objectives should 
be made central to strategic management by linking instrument design, management structures, 
performance measures and reporting tools to the underlying intervention logic. 
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Annex 1.  Terms of Reference 
[These terms of reference were approved 28 November 2005, and have not been updated to 
take account of small changes, for example, in the time line and definitions of impacts, that 
have occurred in the meantime.] 
 
OBJECTIVES 
 
The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the contribution of the Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprise Finance Facility (the Facility) in inducing financial intermediaries to expand and 
maintain, in the long term, their financing operations with Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises (SMEs). 
 
The evaluation of the Facility MBP (Multi Beneficiary Programme) is one of a series of MBP 
evaluations in different areas.  It will become a stand alone report but will also feed into a 
consolidated evaluation of Phare multi-beneficiary programmes.  The evaluation of the Facility 
will also feed into the section in the thematic evaluation of the SME sector that deals with 
issues of finance.  Both of these will in turn form part of a consolidated ex post evaluation of 
the Phare programme. 
 
 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
 
The specific objectives of the Facility have aimed at inducing financial intermediaries to 
expand and maintain their long term financing operations with SMEs.  These objectives have, 
since the start of the facility in 1999, evolved over time and in the year 2003 comprise of: 
 
• Building further the confidence of financial intermediaries to engage in financial operations 
with SMEs; 
• Enhancing further the capacity of financial intermediaries to assess and monitor the related 
risks and to manage their financial exposure; 
• Deepening country coverage at a regional level by concluding more projects within each 
country; and, 
• Sustaining and maximising the impact of existing Projects under Loan, Guarantee and 
Leasing Window by providing credit lines to the financial intermediaries concerned. 
 
During the ex post evaluation period (1996 – 2001), the Facility assistance was provided by six 
MBPs,50 with a total value of M€ 191.  During the period of interim evaluation 2002 and 2004, 
a further M€ 100 was provided to the Facility under another six MBPs.51  The ongoing post-
2001 programmes will also be evaluated.  The value of the ex post evaluation will be extended 
in this way by checking to what extent lessons learned up to 2001 have been incorporated in 
the subsequent programmes.  Moreover, the interim evaluation will ensure that the evaluation 
results are more up to date as inputs for decision making. 
 
Support to SMEs was also provided under Phare national programmes, as well as by other 
donors, such as World Bank, UNDP etc.  The Facility is primarily designed to support financial 
institutions.   
 
                                                 
50  Projects 1999/001-979, 2000/002-046, 2000/002-052, 2001/002-077, 2001/002-079, and 2001/002-095.  
51  Projects 2002/000-621, 2002/000-622, 2002/000-629, 2003/005-745, 2003/005-765, and 2003/005-766. 
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The EMS Interim Evaluation (IE) Report on the Facility, finalised in February 200352, 
concluded that while the Facility was a good concept, with a high potential for success, it 
required fine-tuning across a range of areas to respect Phare Guidelines related to catalytic 
effect, additionality and sustainability.  Key issues identified in the IE Report included: 
• Ensuring catalytic impact by identifying and addressing market failures 
The IE concluded that there was scope for the Facility as an instrument to be more 
responsive to regional (both inter and intra country) differences, differing market segments 
(including the less attractive market and product segments such as micro-financing and 
start-ups) and in adapting to meet changing needs to ensure its continued relevance.  The 
report recommended a needs' assessment of SME financing including identifying 
differences in market maturity, at country and regional level and in market/product 
segments that experience particular difficulty in accessing finance.   
• Ensuring additionality 
In most cases the Participating Banks (PBs) are already present in the SME market and will 
remain active.  Moreover, in several cases the PBs have major active foreign shareholders.  
Much more attention should therefore be paid to the selection of Banks and of projects to 
ensure that already strong and experienced PBs are not displacing other financial 
intermediaries such as smaller, regional locally owned banks. 
• Ensure sustainability by focussing on capacity building at Financial Institutions   
A core anticipated impact of the Facility is the development of a successful business model 
for addressing the SME market, underpinned at a strategic level within the PBs.  The IE 
report highlighted the weakness of the institution building components of the Facility and 
this will be an important focus for this ex post evaluation, particularly for remaining funds 
under the Facility in both the new member states and the remaining Candidate Countries 
(CCs). 
 
Capacity building at financial institutions through the delivery of technical assistance is an 
important part of the Facility.  However, the IE report concluded that the technical 
assistance had not delivered the expected value for money for different reasons: the 
commitment of the management of the PB, the 'fit' between the consultants and the needs 
of the PB, and the management by the International Finance Institutions (IFIs).  This has 
had an adverse impact on sustainability. 
 
• Clarify the role of, and approach to, the Equity Window 
In the EU-15 member states, equity funds open to smaller businesses are considered a 
useful instrument to support SME development.  In the new member states and remaining 
CCs however, the availability of such funding is relatively low.  The IE report found that 
the implementation of the Equity Window (EW) component of the Facility to be 
proceeding at a slow pace53.  The demonstration effect is largely dependant on the funds 
achieving profit in the longer term, which will in turn motivate other providers of SME 
equity finance to enter the market.  Delays in implementation will therefore have an 
adverse effect on potential impact.  Furthermore, even operating at its optimum, the number 
                                                 
52  R/ZZ/SME/02.146 issued on 18 February 2003. 
53  The slow rate of take up of the equity window might be explained by the restrictive criteria used for the selection of fund 
managers, as well as for the selection of the investment projects by the different investment funds.  The same evaluation can 
be made of the EW as regards the use of resources and the cost of management.  In terms of results, three investment funds 
and five investments in SMEs for a total of M€ 4.7 invested since May 2000, does not appear to be efficient. 
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of SMEs that could benefit from the EW Fund, would be a maximum of around 100 
investments, thus confirming its effect as a demonstration, rather than a deep impact.   
 
• Operational issues 
Operational issues identified included : a) the need to ensure a uniform quality of reporting 
from the participating IFIs to the Commission Services and; b) more transparent 
management of the PB pipelines, including the availability of information on terms and 
conditions offered by all participating IFIs to the PBs and leasing affiliates.   
 
EVALUATION QUESTIONS 
 
The evaluation questions and related judgement criteria for this exercise will be derived from: 
• Performance evaluation questions 
• Thematic/cross-cutting questions 
 
Performance evaluation questions 
 
Needs assessment and design 
The evaluation will start with an assessment of whether the relevance and design of the Facility 
was coherent with the principles of catalytic impact, additionality and sustainability.  In 
particular, attention will be paid to whether  the analysis of the demand for SME finance, took 
sufficiently into account known and/or potential needs, e.g. level of development of the local 
market, market failures, need for institution building, type of capital required (equity versus 
debt), presence of foreign-owned banks, and access to venture capital.   
 
The extent to which inputs/activities have produced outputs/results 
The outputs envisaged by the Facility are: i) expanded capacities of the PBs and leasing 
affiliates to serve the needs of SMEs and, iii) a demonstration effect to other potential financial 
intermediaries that operating with SMEs is viable; ii) greater access to finance among 
participating SMEs in the region. 
 
The evaluation will assess the cost effectiveness of the activities.  The evaluation will review 
whether the technical assistance provided to the PBs and leasing affiliates was appropriate. 
 
The extent to which the results/impacts contributed to achieving wider objectives 
The specific objectives have been aimed at inducing financial intermediaries to expand and 
maintain in the long term their financing operations with SMEs.  The evaluation will assess the 
extent to which the specific objectives of building further the confidence of financial 
intermediaries to engage in financial operations with SMEs, enhancing further the capacity of 
financial intermediaries to assess and monitor the related risks and to manage their financial 
exposure, deepening country coverage at a regional level by concluding more projects within 
each country and sustaining and maximising the impact of existing Projects under Loan, 
Guarantee and Leasing Window by providing credit lines to the financial intermediaries 
concerned  have been achieved.   
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Long-term viability following the withdrawal of Phare support 
Long-term sustainability will be investigated at a number of levels.  Linked to the overall 
objective, the focus will be on whether a successful business model has been developed in the 
PBs/leasing affiliates, directly or indirectly attributable to their participation in the Facility.  
This will include for example, whether PBs/leasing affiliates have adopted new strategies, 
policies, procedures and attitudes to undertaking, marketing actions, managing and pricing 
SME credit risk.    
 
Thematic/cross-cutting questions 
 
The extent to which Phare support improved the performance of CC beneficiaries 
The purpose of this question is to assess whether Phare support through the Facility in practice 
addressed the ex post needs of the beneficiaries.  Thus the evaluation would seek to assess 
whether the original objectives (ex ante needs) of the programme have evolved appropriately.  
This assessment would augment the analysis based on the five performance evaluation criteria. 
 
Complementarity of the Facility to other SME financial support measures 
The purpose of this question is to locate the role of the Facility within the context of other 
financial support measures to stimulate development of the SME sector such as SME support 
under economic and social cohesion.   
 
Effectiveness and efficiency of the MBPs as a delivery mechanism 
There are inherent strengths and weaknesses with centralised MBPs.  Positive factors include 
economies of scale in design and implementation, scope for more effective cross-fertilisation, 
and the ability to utilise the expertise of the specialist bodies to which management is 
delegated.  Negative factors include difficulties in effective monitoring by the Commission and 
the risks associated with a “one size fits all” approach.  With particular reference to the 
Facility, the ex post evaluation will consider the extent to which the multi-beneficiary approach 
has delivered the required results. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
To reflect the high level of interest and strategic value of the Facility MBP, this evaluation will 
be in-depth, and will include not only a strong basis of retrospective assessment (the ex post 
evaluation of the 1996 – 2001 programmes) but also an interim evaluation of post-2001 
allocations.   
 
Following an initial collection of available documents, the evaluation will start with a desk 
review.  This will be followed by further data gathering using the most appropriate tools 
(interviews or focus groups in Brussels and/or the CCs, and/or questionnaires)54.  The 
evaluation will use a sample of participating banks/SMEs selected based on: 
• The distribution of funds between the sponsoring organisations (EBRD, EIB, CEB/KfW); 
• The distribution of funds between participating banks; 
• The geographical focus – including representative samples of countries focussing on four 
new member states [Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Estonia], plus Bulgaria and Romania. 
                                                 
54  Interviews and questionnaires may be carried out by telephone, if appropriate. 
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To support the evaluation questions a set of judgement criteria and evaluation indicators will be 
developed.  These may be both quantitative and/or qualitative.  A preliminary set of indicators 
will be discussed during the kick-off process with the aim of ensuring that requests for 
information relating to the indicators are understood in context.  The preparation of a set of 
indicators will take into account the indicators of achievement related to the Institution 
Building component that has recently been introduced by the sponsors. 
Representatives of stakeholders and target audiences will be invited to participate during the 
kick-off process which may involve a meeting and/or electronic consultation meeting.  This 
process is crucial for ensuring a common understanding of the evaluation questions and related 
indicators, and for allowing maximum participation.  Stakeholders will also be invited to join a 
virtual steering group. 
 
 
REPORTING AND TARGET AUDIENCES 
 
The main users of the evaluation will be DG ELARG Directorate responsible for the Facility, 
DG ECFIN, and DG Enterprise, EC Delegations/Representations, and the National Aid 
Co-ordinators of beneficiary countries.  In addition, country teams for the Western Balkans and 
Turkey will be important users of the evaluation results. 
 
ACTIVITIES, RESOURCES AND TIMETABLE 
The Facility MBP evaluation will be conducted in a number of stages as follows: 
 
2005 2006 Step Activity 
Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb 
1 Preparation         
2 Info gathering and processing         
3 Drafting of report for E4       
4 Comments from E4        
5 Drafting of final SMEFF MBP report and submission to Consolidated MBP Report 
      
 
The evaluation will be carried out by a team consisting of the deputy project director, a key 
expert, other senior and junior experts, and short-term technical specialists (SSTS), both 
international and local.  Since the Facility exercise is an in-depth evaluation, the total resource 
envelope available for this exercise amounts to 90 man-days. 
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Annex 2.  Evaluation Plan 
This document defines the scope of the evaluation, the approach to fieldwork, the construction of the evaluation 
sample and the questionnaire to be administered to the participating banks/leasing companies etc.  It is supported 
by working documents giving primary sources of evidence and evaluation criteria for each evaluation question. 
Phase (1, 2 or 3) 1 – Multi-Beneficiary 
Programme (1999-2001)55 
Subject Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise 
Finance Facility (the Facility) 
Level of Evaluation (‘standard’ or ‘in depth’) In-depth 
Evaluation 
Conclusions 
A three-point rating system (satisfactory, barely satisfactory and unsatisfactory) will be 
used to rate effectiveness and impact of the instrument.  No rating will be applied to 
the thematic/cross-cutting questions.   
Evaluation 
questions 
Performance criteria 
1. Needs assessment and design 
2. Extent to which inputs/activities have produced outputs 
3. Extent to which results/impacts contributed to achieving wider objectives 
4. Long term viability of institutional reforms following the withdrawal of Phare 
support 
Thematic/Cross-cutting questions 
5. Extent to which Phare support improved the performance of the CC beneficiaries 
6. Complementarity of the Facility to other SME financial support measures 
7. Effectiveness and efficiency of the MBP as a delivery mechanism 
Sampling A sample of participating banks/leasing companies etc. will be selected in consultation 
with the Steering Group56.  This sample will aim to: a) follow-up the participating 
banks surveyed in the 2002 Interim Evaluation Report (R/ZZ/SME/02.146); b) be 
representative of the distribution of funds between the international financial 
institutions (IFIs); c) be representative of the new Member States and Bulgaria and 
Romania and; d) include participating banks/leasing companies address the rural farm 
business sub-objective.  Overall, the sample should represent over 33% of total 
funding, depending on the number of participating banks etc.  Note that where the 
sample size is small, this will reduce the confidence in the data and conclusions that 
can be drawn therefrom. 
Sources of evidence The potential sources of evidence are desk review of implementation documents and 
monitoring reports (as compiled by D2), a questionnaire to participating banks/leasing 
companies etc., analysis (e.g. of available databases), and interviews.  In the sources of 
evidence document (see attached), a score is used to indicate for each evaluation 
question and each source whether it is dominant i.e. a major dependency on 
information from one source, or whether several sources support each other, giving 
good triangulation, or whether difficulty is expected in accessing data or the question 
is predominantly qualitative.   
Interviews 
1 Commission staff 
Present and former task managers from ELARG D2, and any former/current staff from 
the EC Delegations in the period 1998-2004 that can be located. 
2  NMS and CCs Participating banks; representatives of IFIs as available; SME agencies etc.   
3 IFIs The three IFIs will be formally interviewed. 
3 Other stakeholders A selection of participating banks to be decided with the Steering Committee 
Supporting 
documents 
Table 1.  (Working document) - Primary Sources of Evidence  
Table 2.  (Working document) - Evaluation Indicators 
Questionnaire for participating banks/leasing companies etc. 
                                                 
55  The evaluation will also take account of post-2001 allocations where appropriate, based mainly on IE reports. 
56  This includes the Evaluation Unit of DG ELARG, D2, D3 (Horizontal Programmes Unit) and the three IFIs (EBRD, EIB, 
CEB/KfW).  
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Primary Sources of Evidence 
The potential sources of evidence to answer the evaluation questions are desk review, questionnaire, analysis (e.g. of a database), and interviews.  For each 
evaluation question, a three-point weighting score is used to indicate for each source whether it is dominant (●●●) i.e. a major dependency on information 
from one source, not dominant (●●) where several sources are expected to support each other (i.e. provide good triangulation), or minor (●) where difficulty 
is expected in accessing data or the question is predominantly qualitative.  This is a planning tool and will be updated in the course of the fieldwork where new 
information sources become known, or a significant change in approach is required. 
Performance Evaluation Criteria 
Interviews Evaluation Criteria Desk 
Review 
Survey
57 
Analysis 
Brussels/ 
IFIs 
NMS/CCs 
1.  Needs assessment and design      
1.1   Adequacy/suitability of the Facility design in the light of known market/sectoral needs ●●  ●● ●● ●● 
1.2   Link between the Facility and other Phare/donor instruments  ●●  ●● ●● ●● 
1.3  The extent to which the design of the Facility ensures catalytic impact ●● ●● ●● ●●  
1.4 The extent to which the design of the Facility ensures additionality ●● ●● ●● ●●  
1.5 The extent to which the design of the Facility ensures sustainability ●● ●● ●● ●●  
2.  Extent to which inputs/activities have produced outputs/results 
2.1   What were the tools/activities/resources58 used to produce the outputs59? ●●  ●● ● ● 
2.2   Were there resources/tools provided that were under-used or not used?   ●●  ●● 
2.3   What co-financing and leveraging resulted?  ●●  ●● ●●  
2.4   How cost effective was the production of outputs?  ●●  ●● ●●  
2.5   What factors influenced the delivery of outputs (e.g. internal management by IFIs, managed 
pipeline approach etc.) 
●●  ●● ●●  
2.6   Have there been any unanticipated results? ● ●●  ●● ●● 
                                                 
57  The Survey will take the form of a questionnaire to 21 Participating Banks (as previously surveyed), plus an additional set, to be defined jointly with the Steering Group. 
58  Equity Window, Loan Guarantee and Leasing Window and TA. 
59  The SMEFF had three outputs:  a) greater access to finance for SMEs; b) expanded capacity at the PBs to serve the needs of SMEs and; c) a demonstration effect. 
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3.  Extent to which results/impacts contributed to achieving wider objectives 
3.1   To what extent is there evidence that the Facility induced financial intermediaries to maintain and/or 
expand their financial operations with SMEs and/or to develop their product offering?  
● ●●● ● ● ● 
3.2   To what extent did capacity building take place at the financial intermediaries? ● ●●● ● ● ● 
3.3  To what extent did the Facility demonstrate additionality? ● ●●● ● ● ● 
4.  Long term viability of institutional reforms following the withdrawal of Phare support  
4.1   To what extent has a new business model been adopted by the PBs? ● ●●● ● ● ● 
4.2   To what extent are there lasting results in terms of capacity building that has taken place and 
continued to evolve in response to market challenges?  
● ●●● ● ● ● 
Thematic/Cross-Cutting Criteria 
Evaluation Criteria Desk 
Review 
Survey Analysis
  
Interview 
Brussels     NMS/CC 
5.   Extent to which Phare has supported the performance of the NMS/CC beneficiaries      
5.1   Did the Facility address ex post needs?60  ● ● ●●● ● ● 
6.  Complementarity of the Facility with other instruments 
6.1   What was the ratio of the Facility funding compared with funding to SMEs via other instruments 
(e.g. Phare ESC)?  
●  ●●● ● ● 
6.2   To what extent was the Facility complementary to other Phare initiatives, particularly those 
supporting development/capacity building in the banking sector? 
●  ●●● ● ● 
6.3   To what extent did the Facility coordinate/cooperate with other programmes/instruments? ●  ●●● ●  
7.   Effectiveness and efficiency of the Facility MBP as a delivery mechanism 
7.1   How effective was the MBP approach to delivery of outputs?   ● ●●● ● ● 
7.2   How appropriate (efficient) was the division of tasks between the various actors?  ● ●● ●● ●● 
7.3   To what extent were good practices in the Facility outputs delivery shared across the NMS/CCs?    ●● ●● ●● 
 
                                                 
60  This will be derived from the analysis of the first four questions/issues. 
SME Finance Facility Annex 2 
Ex post evaluation of Phare: MBP – SMEFF – October 2007, MWH Consortium  41
Evaluation Indicators 
 
The evaluation indicators are a wider concept than “performance indicators”, and identify static and dynamic 
information and events for use in the evaluation.  They are divided into three categories, discrete, where there are 
only two possible states (e.g. present/absent), relative, where more than two states are possible (e.g. satisfactory, 
barely satisfactory and unsatisfactory), and qualitative, where the expert judgment of the evaluator will be used to 
reach a conclusion based on all the evidence gathered for the evaluation criteria.  This is typically in the areas of 
outcome and impact evaluation conclusions. 
 
Evaluation Questions Evaluation Indicators Assessment 
  
D
is
cr
et
e 
R
el
at
iv
e 
Q
ua
lit
at
iv
e 
1.  Needs assessment and design 
1.1. Adequacy/suitability of the 
Facility design in the light of known 
needs 
• Availability of financial sector analysis  
• Integration with financial sector analysis  
• Availability of bank needs’ analysis 
• Integration with bank needs’ analysis 
• Availability of SME needs’ analysis  
• Integration with SME needs’ analysis 
• Availability of regional market needs’ analysis  
• Integration with regional market needs’ analysis 
● 
 
● 
 
● 
 
● 
 
 
 
  
● 
 
● 
 
● 
 
 
● 
1.2. Link between the Facility and 
other Phare/donor instruments  
• Existence of other Phare activity in the 
SME/banking sector 
• Existence of other donor activity in the 
SME/banking sector 
• Identified niche for the Facility 
• Quality of dialogue between the Facility 
programming and other Phare/donor initiatives 
● 
 
● 
 
 
 
 
 
● 
 
 
 
 
● 
1.3. antification of need for SME 
finance across market segment/re 
• Quantification of need for SME 
finance across market segment/region 
• Quantification of availability of 
financing from the private sector and 
other IFIs 
• Identification of types of finance 
required/available 
● 
 
● 
 
  
 
 
 
● 
 
1.4. Extent to which the Facility 
design ensured additionality 
• Follow up to recommendations in 
R/ZZ/SME/02.146 (see attached) 
• Criteria for selection of PBs/PLCs and other 
institutions 
● 
 
  
 
● 
 
1.5. Extent to which the Facility 
design ensured sustainability 
• Follow up to recommendations in 
R/ZZ/SME/02.146 (see attached) 
• Criteria for selection of PBs/PLCs and other 
institutions 
● 
 
  
 
● 
 
2.  Extent to which inputs/activities have produced outputs 
2.1   What were the 
tools/activities/resources61 used to 
produce the outputs62? 
• Quantitative description of tools 
/activities/resources 
• Qualitative description of tools 
/activities/resources 
  ● 
 
● 
                                                 
61  Equity Window, Loan Guarantee and Leasing Window and TA. 
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Evaluation Questions Evaluation Indicators Assessment 
2.2  What results/outputs were 
produced? 
• Quantification of finance provided by PBs/PLCs 
• No of SMEs supported 
• No of SMEs supported including by market 
segment 
• Take up of model by other financial 
intermediaries 
● 
● 
● 
● 
  
2.2   Were there resources/tools provided 
that were under-used or not used? 
• Allocation and disbursement rates by the IFIs to 
the PB s (including performance fees, TAs and 
other) 
• Disbursement rates by PBs and equity funds 
● 
 
 
● 
  
2.3   What co-financing and leveraging 
resulted?  
• From IFI 
• From PB 
  ● 
● 
2.4   How cost effective was the 
production of outputs?  
• Cost per bank  
• Cost per employee trained 
• Cost per SME directly supported  
• Administration costs recovered from the Facility 
● 
● 
● 
● 
  
2.5   What factors influenced the 
delivery of outputs (e.g. internal 
management by IFIs, managed pipeline 
approach etc.) 
• Qualitative analysis    ● 
2.6   Have there been any unanticipated 
results? 
• PB records/questionnaire   ● 
3.  Extent to which results/impacts contributed to achieving wider objectives63 
3.1  To what extent is there evidence that 
the Facility induced financial 
intermediaries to maintain and/or expand 
their financial operations with SMEs 
and/or to develop their product offering?  
• Growth or decline in SME market share of PB 
• Growth or decline in farm business share of PB 
• Product development by PB  
• Investment return of investment funds supported 
by the Facility  
• SME share in PB balance sheet assets 
• Farm business share in PB balance sheet assets 
● 
● 
 
● 
 
● 
● 
  
 
● 
3.2  To what extent did capacity building 
take place at the financial intermediaries 
(PBs)? 
• Identification of strategic development of 
products and services targeting SMEs within PBs 
• Identification of strategic development of 
products and services targeting farm business 
within PBs 
• Identification of new permanent resources 
established within PBs and equity funds 
• SME credit/leasing application processing time 
reduced 
• Product and risk assessment adapted to rural 
business clients; 
• Services, terms and conditions of loans to farm 
business improved 
• Change in number of small loans or leases to 
SMEs 
• Amount of staff at PB/PLC familiar with concept 
• Results of TA components 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● 
 
 
 
 
 
● 
 
● 
 
 
 ● 
 
 
● 
 
 
● 
 
 
 
● 
 
● 
 
 
 
 
 
● 
3.3  To what extent did the Facility 
demonstrate additionality? 
• Distribution of the Facility funding by form of 
PB/PLC ownership 
• Distribution of funding by market segment 
● 
 
● 
  
                                                                                                                                                          
62  The 1999 and 2000 Facility had three outputs:  a) greater access to finance for SMEs; b) expanded capacity at the PBs to 
serve the needs of SMEs and; c) a demonstration effect. The 2003 programme with the EBRD included a Rural Sub-
Window. 
63  As identified in Financing Memoranda. 
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Evaluation Questions Evaluation Indicators Assessment 
4.  Long term viability of institutional reforms following the withdrawal of Phare support  
4.1  To what extent has a new business 
model been adopted by the PBs? 
• Improved business processes (e.g. speed of 
decision and cost per applicant); 
• Loan loss patterns  
 ● 
 
● 
 
4.2  To what extent are there lasting 
results in terms of capacity building that 
have taken place and continued to evolve 
in response to market challenges?. 
• Future intention of PB and investment fund to 
participate in the sector 
• Link between future intentions of PB and use of 
TA/TC 
 
  ● 
 
● 
5.  Long term viability of institutional reforms following the withdrawal of Phare support  
5.1 Did the Facility address ex post 
needs?  
• This will complement the analysis of questions 1-4 
above, therefore no new indicators are envisaged. 
   
6.  Extent to which Phare support improved the performance the country’s pre-accession process 
6.1  What was the ratio of the Facility 
funding compared with funding to SMEs 
via other instruments (e.g. Phare ESC)?  
• Ratio of the Facility /Phare ESC funding ●   
6.2  To what extent was the Facility 
complementary to other Phare initiatives, 
particularly those supporting 
development/capacity building in the 
banking sector? 
• Ratio of the Facility /banking sector funding 
• Ratio of the Facility /private sector financing 
 
  ● 
6.3  To what extent did the Facility 
coordinate/cooperate with other 
programmes/instruments? 
• Quality of dialogue with other Phare programmes 
during programming 
• Quality of dialogue with other donors during 
programming 
• Clear niche identified for the Facility 
 
 
● 
 
● 
 
● 
 
 
 
 
7.  Effectiveness and efficiency of the Facility MBP as a delivery mechanism 
7.1  How effective was the MBP 
approach to delivery of outputs? 
• Admin costs 
• Resources engaged for delivery (complexity of 
delivery structures) 
• Speed of decision 
● 
● 
 
● 
  
7.2  How appropriate (efficient) was the 
division of tasks between the various 
actors? 
• Clarity of task allocation 
• Speed of decision-making processes 
 ● 
● 
 
7.3  To what extent were good practices 
in the Facility outputs delivery shared 
across the NMS/CCs?  
• Good practices identified 
• Mechanisms in place for transfer of good 
practices 
 
 
● 
 ● 
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Annex 3.  Follow-Up to Recommendations of Previous Report 
Recommendations from R/MIER/SME/02146 dated 18 February 2003 
 
 Recommendation Expected Output(s) Decision taken at the Facility Steering 
Committee  
1 A review of the needs for finance of the SMEs should be developed by Commission 
Services (with the possible participation of the IFIs).  It should focus on the 
identification of regional differences between the countries and the segments of SMEs 
that have difficulties to be reached should be taken into account.  It should be 
accompanied by indicators that would serve as base for an historical comparison in the 
next stages of the project.  A starting point could be the indicators developed in the 
Annex 8. 
Improve the objective and 
quantifiable measurement of the 
needs and its improvements.  
Identify the real needs. 
EBRD and KfW will provide studies on 
access to finance of SMEs for Bulgaria, 
and Romania (EBRD) and Turkey (KFW) 
before the end of 2003.   
 
2 The wider objective of the programme should improve in precision, as well as the 
intermediate objectives that are nearly self-fulfilling at this stage. 
Any further SMEF programme should adapt its wider objective to the evolution of the 
needs of the financial intermediaries, and focus on the sustainable development of the 
SME lending capacity. 
More precision in the design for 
an increased efficiency of the 
programme 
No further follow up is required.  The 
revised objectives will be included in the 
new CAs to be signed with the Sponsors.  
New indicators of achievement have been 
added and the Sponsors have to monitor 
them. 
 
3 Sustainability should be clearly identified by the Commission Services for each 
selection of a new PB.  It should be a clear focus in the agreements between the 
Commission Services and the IFIs, which could include the need to demonstrate how 
institutional building is integrated in the process.   
Those projects which show good prospect for sustainability because institutional 
development has taken place, should be analyzed and their replication considered. 
Improved sustainability Following discussions at the Technical 
Meeting it was agreed that all Sponsors 
will address “Project specific” 
additionality, sustainability and impact in 
future proposals to allow an evaluation of 
results. 
 
4 The Commission Services and the IFI should reflect on the concept of additionality in 
the SMEF concept and envisage a tighter interpretation, which has and impact of the 
definition of the target PBs. 
 Following discussions at the Technical 
Meeting it was agreed that all Sponsors 
will address “Project specific” 
additionality, sustainability and impact in 
future proposals to allow an evaluation of 
results. 
5 For new PBs, the additionality should be clearly demonstrated.  in particular for PBs 
with foreign active shareholder.  Priority should be given to niche players and regional 
banks,  where the additionality and the effectiveness is likely to be higher.  For other 
players, criteria such as the existence of a group strategy towards SME, the training 
systems and resources in place could be taken into account. 
For the existing projects, the IFIs that do not propose TC should be asked to 
Improved conditions on 
additionality 
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 Recommendation Expected Output(s) Decision taken at the Facility Steering 
Committee  
demonstrate, after a reasonable period of time (e.g. after one third of the elapsed time 
for the loan), which are the impact and sustainability on the activities of the PBs. 
6 Efficiency of the programme with TC component can be improved by the financial 
participation of the PB.   
A greater role of the PB in the selection and the monitoring of the TC could improve its 
general efficiency.  Clear deliverable and milestones should be a minimal monitoring 
tool by the project manager. 
Additional specialized and dedicated resource need to be mobilized by the EBRD, 
specifically on the management of the consultants. 
Increased efficiency 
EBRD did not find this proposal 
acceptable for new clients.  If the PBs see 
the positive results of TA they may 
consider co-financing as an option at a 
later stage when requesting a second 
credit line.  It was agreed to continue 
discussions on this issue at the next 
technical meeting. 
7 The ERC only makes sense when it covers specific risks on a one to one basis rather 
than general traded portfolio risks.   
  
8 Projects are more at risk than other, and a base of knowledge could be developed to 
make a good usage of the lessons learned from the weakest and strongest projects. 
Consideration should be undertaken for the PeKaO (Poland) and SZRB (Slovakia) with 
a view to establishing corrective actions or suspend the projects. 
Increased efficiency  
9 There should be uniform reporting from IFIs (the EBRD gives much more detailed 
information), with minimum requirements for semi-annual reports: number of loans, 
number of SMEs, and what is in the EBRD report.  The first part should be on the 
results, the second on the main achievement in the period, third on the main difficulties 
and pending problems and risks, fourth part on the pipeline, fifth part other specifics 
(i.e. the special comments on regional coverage of the EBRD semi-annual report 2002).  
It should also include tracking of actions agreed to be taken on new problems, actions 
on previous problems reported and current status. 
Easier management for the 
Commission Services 
 
10 Commission Services and IFIs should agree on simple transparent conditions what is 
offered to the PB, and what are the negotiation rules.  PBs should have an overview of 
terms and conditions offered by all participating IFIs and then chose the most 
appropriate package. 
Avert reputation risk on the 
image of the Facility 
 
11 The creation of a multi-bank school for credit to SME (at regional level) could be an 
effective way to insure the sustainability of the transfer of skills of bankers.  This 
should be co-financed by the banks and an EU grant (on the principle that people value 
more something they pay than something they are offered).  Modalities of the 
implementation could involve a banking training centre for SME lending in one bank 
shared by the others, or proposed by the national Bankers associations, or the 
specialized banking trainers. 
 
 
Diversification  
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 Recommendation Expected Output(s) Decision taken at the Facility Steering 
Committee  
12 The use of the ERC should be confined to those PBs where the ERC enhances the 
overall credit risk of the PB and should not be extended to those PBs that are able to 
manage their exposures on a pooled basis from existing market sources. 
Improvement of the efficiency of 
the incentives 
 
13 The EW should be given clearer objectives: either to freeze the further efforts to sell 
more the window to other potential fund managers or to offer a more flexible solution 
to them (e.g. relax the max investment size, resolve the domicile issue etc).  Its 
additionality needs closer examination 
The EW is drifting without a firm management direction.  A strategic review should be 
undertaken by the stakeholders and clear objectives set for the EW.  The main choices 
are : 
a) to suspend further efforts to establish new IFs and redirecting the committed funds to 
other programmes.  A decision should also be made on what action to be taken in 
respect of the slow rates of investment by the 3 existing funds; or 
b) to promote the EW more aggressively with the intention of establishing new funds 
and introducing corrective actions to ensure an acceleration in the rate of investments 
made by the existing funds. 
Improved possibility to achieve 
immediate objectives 
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Annex 4.  List of Participating Financial Institutions Interviewed 
Country No Bank IFI 
Bulgaria 1 Hebros EBRD 
 2 United Bulgaria Bank EBRD 
 3 Pro Credit Bank CEB-KfW 
 4 Union Bank EBRD 
 5 Encouragement Bank EIB 
6 Volksbank Leasing EIB Czech Republic 
7 Volksbank EIB 
 8 Ceska Sporitelna EBRD 
 9 CSOB Leasing EIB 
 10 CMZRB CEB-KfW 
Hungary 11 Volksbank EBRD 
 12 CIB EIB 
 13 Raiffeisen Bank/ CEB-KfW 
 14 Raiffeisen Leasing CEB-KfW 
 15 IKB-Leasing CEB-KfW 
Latvia 16 Unibanka EBRD 
 17 LHZB CEB-KfW 
Poland 18 Raiffeisen EBRD 
 19 Franfinance/SGEF EBRD 
 20 BOS CEB-KfW 
 21 BRE Leasing EIB 
 22 Citi Handlowy CEB-KfW 
 23 WZBK EBRD 
 24 Pekao EBRD 
Romania 25 Bancpost EBRD 
 26 Alpha Bank EBRD 
 27 Banca Romanesca CEB-KfW 
 28 BRD EBRD 
 29 BCR EBRD 
 30 Banca Transilvania EBRD 
 31 Banca Transilvania Leasing EBRD 
 32 Volksbank EBRD 
33 SZRB CEB-KfW Slovak Republic 
34 VUB EBRD 
Slovenia 35 Banka Koper EBRD 
 36 NLB EIB 
 37 SEC/SID CEB-KfW  
 38 Postna Banka Slovenia* CEB-KfW on-lending bank 
 39 Abanka* CEB-KfW on-lending bank 
    
* On-lending banks which have received finance for lending through SEC/SID 
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Annex 5.  Questionnaire 
For Participating Banks, Leasing Companies and Other Financial Institutions64 
1. General Information on the Respondent 
 
1.1 Name of the IFI  
1.2 Name of participating institution  
1.3 Short description of the participating institution   
1.4 Ownership (e.g. foreign shareholding)  
1.5 Position in national market   
1.6 Position in SME market  
1.7 Evolution of this market share (since participation in 
Facility) 
 
1.8 Total value of loan portfolio to SMEs  
1.9 Proportion of loans to SMEs in total loans  
1.10 Department managing the Facility  
For Technical Assistance/Technical Cooperation/Capacity Building Instruments 
1.11 Name of Consultant  
1.12 Budget of TA/TC/capacity building contract  
1.13 Date of signature  
1.14 Brief description of TA activities  
 
2. Relevance 
 
2.1 How/why did the Respondent come to participate in the 
Facility? 
 
2.2 Was the respondent active in the SME market prior to 
receiving facilities under the Facility? 
 
2.3 Average loan life of corporate client/average loan life of 
the Facility portfolio? 
 
2.4 Short description of market segment supported by the 
Facility 
 
2.5 What is the added value of participation in the Facility to 
the Respondent?  
 
For Technical Assistance/Technical Cooperation/Capacity Building Instruments 
2.6 How were your organisational needs for TA/TC/capacity 
building defined? 
 
2.7 To what extent is the TA/TC/capacity building meeting 
these needs? 
 
2.8 What are the main expected results of the TA/TC/capacity 
building activities? 
 
2.9 What % of training and development is Phare providing 
compared to in-house supports? 
 
2.10 Number of staff trained/overall % of staff  
 
                                                 
64  This was a confidential questionnaire.  Individual respondents were told that they would not be identified, and that 
information would be included in the ex post evaluation in summary form only.  
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3.  Efficiency 
 
3.1 Total number of loans outstanding to SMEs by respondent 
institution 
 
3.2 Total number of loans outstanding under the Facility  
3.3 Balance sheet value of the Facility loans 
outstanding/balance sheet value of all SME credit 
outstanding  
 
For Technical Assistance/Technical Cooperation/Capacity Building Instruments 
3.4 Has the TA/TC/capacity building component been 
delivered in a timely manner? If not, why not? 
 
 
4.  Effectiveness/Impact 
 
Evidence that the Facility has induced participants to maintain/expand operations with SMEs 
4.1 Rate of growth /decline in SME assets (from beginning of 
participation in the Facility)? 
 
4.2 Rate of growth /decline in SME assets in segment targeted 
by the Facility (from beginning of participation in the 
Facility)? 
 
4.3 Rate of growth /decline in SME market share of 
respondent (from beginning of participation in the 
Facility)? 
 
4.4 Rate of growth /decline in SME market share of 
respondent in segment targeted by the Facility (from 
beginning of participation in the Facility)? 
 
4.5 SME share in respondent’s balance sheet  
4.6 Rate of growth/decline in farm business share of 
Respondent (for Rural Sub Window participants)? 
 
4.7 In what way has the Facility been an incentive to 
maintaining/enhancing operations with SMEs at the 
Respondent institution? 
 
For Technical Assistance/Technical Cooperation/Capacity Building Instruments 
4.8 To what extent has the TA/TC/capacity building 
instrument contributed to new product development?  How 
has it done so? 
 
4.9 To what extent has the TA/TC/capacity building 
instrument helped to improve services to SMEs?  How has 
it done so? 
 
Evidence that the Facility has contributed to capacity building at participating institutions 
4.10 Average application to approval time (weeks) at the 
respondent institution for loan/leasing applications under 
the Facility compared to SME approval time before the 
Facility? 
 
4.11 Has the Facility contributed to new product development? 
How has it done so? 
 
4.12 To what extent have product and risk assessment been 
adapted to rural/farm business clients? (for Rural Sub 
Window only)? 
 
4.13 To what extent have services, terms and conditions of 
loans/leasing agreements to farm business changed since 
participation in the Facility? (for Rural sub-window only) 
 
4.14 Number of staff familiar with new concepts/ products  
4.15 What have been the main impacts of the Facility in terms 
of capacity building at the respondent institution? 
 
4.16 In general terms, what has the respondent changed because 
of the Facility?  
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For Technical Assistance/Technical Cooperation/Capacity Building Instruments 
4.17 What have been the main impacts of the TA/TC/capacity 
building activities at the respondent institution? 
 
 
5.  Long-term viability of results 
 
5.1 % of the Facility portfolio at risk65  
5.2 % of total SME portfolio at risk  
5.3 Loan write offs as a % of the Facility portfolio  
5.4 Is the Respondent likely to maintain SME/ rural 
lending/leasing operations in the medium period? If not, 
why not? 
 
 
6. Proposals for Change 
 
6.1 What changes would the respondent make to enhance the 
effectiveness and impact of the Phare support? 
 
6.2 What additional supports would the respondent consider 
useful to assist in developing the SME sector? 
 
For Technical Assistance/Technical Cooperation/Capacity Building Instruments 
6.3 How would the respondent improve the design and 
delivery of TA/TC/capacity building instruments for 
future projects? 
 
                                                 
65  For the purpose of this exercise "risk" is defined as: any loan where any payment due is over 30 days in arrears or the loan 
has been downgraded to a classification with risk of loss such as special watch, substandard, doubtful or bad. 
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Annex 6.  Note on Interview Methodology 
 
Overview of Interview Methodology  
 
Interviews with Participating Financial Institutions (PFIs) were undertaken using a structured 
interview methodology designed to: 
 
• Establish the linkage between the strategic priorities of the respondent and the objectives of the 
Facility; 
• Differentiate between wider influences of the competitive environment and the capacity of the 
Facility to induce behavioural changes; 
• Identify the method of the Facility implementation and its impact of the SME business model used 
by the PFIs). 
 
Each interview was conducted around four core modules, commencing with the wider SME competitive 
environment, how the PFI addressed commercial opportunities and competitive pressures at the 
strategic and operational level and finally implementation of the Facility itself and its impact (short and 
medium term) at the strategic and operational levels. 
 
The interview structure was highly complementary to the questionnaire in that it allowed significant 
opportunity to explore strategic and commercial imperatives of the SME business within the bank.  The 
interview structure can be presented schematically as follow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market 
determined 
(macro) 1. Evolution of the commercial banking competitive 
environment 3-5 years
2. PFI strategy to address SME market 
3. SME business profile and 
model 
4. Facility 
Implementatio
n and impacts 
Bank 
determined 
(micro) 
Test for 
Impacts 
(2 and 3) 
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The interview hierarchy under each of these categories is presented in the following sections. 
 
Competitive Environment 
• Trends over previous 3-5 years in commercial banking market 
• Impact on SME lending / leasing sector 
• Indicators: 
- Pricing (margins and fees) 
- Terms (collateral, tenor, covenants, size) 
- Service (speed, understanding of SME needs) 
• Competitor analysis (SME market) 
- Leading players; 2nd and third tier players 
- Estimated market shares or niche strengths 
- Implications for competition and strategy – barriers to entry, winners and losers (critical mass)  
 
PFI Strategy 
• Bank background and recent history 
• Opportunities for the PFI in the SME market 
• Sources of competitive advantage 
• Short and medium term objectives: 
- Client segments 
- Product markets 
- Geographical 
• Critical mass 
 
SME Business of the PFI 
• Product offering and positioning 
• Business model: 
(Front office) 
- Marketing and distribution 
(Mid office) 
- Application process and approval 
- Credit methodologies 
(Back Office) 
- Booking  
- Credit risk management 
• Bank funding 
- Asset / liability management 
- Availability of medium – long term wholesale funding for banks (liquidity) 
- Pricing of medium / long term funding 
- Interest risk exposures / matched funding considerations 
 
Facility Implementation and Impact 
• Objectives of participating in the Facility 
• Internal management and sponsorship  
• Linkages between the Facility and:  
- Transfer of technology, know-how, processes or procedures from the Facility portfolio to wider 
portfolio (front, mid or back offices) 
- Transfers to other business units or departments 
• Booking the incentives – which department / how managed  
• Tangible uses of incentives (especially performance fees) 
• Intangible uses of incentives (change in bank behaviour / policies) 
• Persistence of methods, procedures, behaviour, policies (capacity building) adopted under the 
Facility over time. 
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Annex 7.  Reconstructed Intervention Logic for the Facility 
 
 
What we control What we influence directly What we influence indirectly 
 
 
 
Inputs Outputs Immediate Impacts Intermediate Impacts Wider impacts 
Credit Line 
• Performance fee 
• Technical assistance 
• Exchange and interest risk 
cover 
• Other incentives 
 
Equity finance 
• Enhancements 
• Loans/leases to SMEs 
• Outputs of TA – training 
delivered, manuals and 
processes designed and 
implemented 
• “Soft capacity building” 
e.g. PFI reporting 
procedures to IFIs for 
the Facility in place, new 
funding options or risk 
management instruments 
utilised. 
 
• Loans / leases to SMEs 
meeting certain criteria 
(maturity, size etc.) accepted 
as a target market 
• Improved product delivery by 
PFIs to service SME clients  
• Improved management of 
SME lending e.g. marketing, 
product design, credit risk, 
procedures and business 
process etc.   
 
• Wider bank strategy 
towards SMEs in place 
• Models for sustainable 
SME business based on 
the Facility model, skills 
or experience in place 
 
• SMEs in CCs and new 
Member States have 
access to finance on terms 
and conditions converging 
to those available in (old) 
MS 
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Annex 8.  Overview of the Facility Objectives 1999-2005 
Based on Financing Proposals 
 
Prog.  No. Prog.  Title Overall Objective Immediate Objective(s) 
ZZ-9901 1999 SME Finance Facility • To induce financial intermediaries in the ten 
Applicant Countries to expand and maintain in 
the long term their debt and equity financing of 
SME operation.   
 
(i) Greater access to finance among participating 
SMEs in the region;  
(ii) Expanded capacity of participating banks and 
investment funds to serve the needs of SMEs; 
and; 
(iii) Example to other potential financial 
intermediaries that operating with SMEs is 
possible.   
ZZ-0007 2000 SME Finance Facility Phase 2 - 
CEB 
ZZ-0013 2000 SME Finance Facility Phase 2 - 
EBRD 
ZZ-0106 2001 SME Finance Facility Phase 2 - 
EBRD 
ZZ-0108 2001 SME Finance Facility Phase 2 – 
CEB 
ZZ-0126 2001 SME Finance Facility - EIB 
• To induce Financial Intermediaries in the ten 
CCs to expand and to maintain in the long 
term their financing operations to SMEs. 
 
Through this Financing Proposal, the Commission 
intends: 
i) To further expand the current range of 
participating financial intermediaries from the 
candidate countries in the Facility as well as; 
ii) To expand the existing operations under the 
Loan and Guarantee Window of the Facility 
to meet the new and maturing needs of SMEs 
in the applicant countries. 
(i) To leverage the largest amount of co-financing 
with the Community grant through co-financing 
with the International Financing Institutions 
(IFIs), and; 
(ii) To ensure greatest efficiency of the management 
of this complex financial scheme by delegating 
implementation to the respective IFIs, whose 
expertise is extensive in these areas. 
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2002-000-621 2002 SME Finance Facility  - EBRD 
2002-000-622 2002 SME Finance Facility  - CEB-KfW 
2002-000-629 2002 SME Finance Facility  - EIB 
• To assist the candidate countries in meeting the 
Copenhagen criteria and to contribute to the 
reform and strengthening of the financial 
sector.” 
• To build further the confidence of financial 
intermediaries to engage in financial operations with 
SMEs; 
• To enhance the capacity of financial intermediaries 
to assess and monitor the related risks and to 
manage their financial exposure; 
• To deepen country coverage at a regional level by 
concluding more Projects within each country; 
• To sustain and maximise the impact of existing 
Projects under the Loan, Guarantee and Leasing 
Window by providing additional credit lines to the 
financial intermediaries concerned and`;  
• Thereby to continue to induce financial 
intermediaries to expand and maintain in the long 
term their financing operations with SMEs. 
2003-005-745 2003 SME Finance Facility  - EBRD 
2003-005-765 2003 SME Finance Facility  - EIB 
2003-005-766 2003 SME Finance Facility  - CEB-KfW 
• To assist the acceding and candidate countries in 
continuing the reform and strengthening of their 
financial sectors in order to cope with the 
competitive pressure and market forces within 
the Union. 
• To build further the confidence of financial 
intermediaries to engage in financial operations with 
SMEs; 
• To enhance the capacity of financial intermediaries 
to assess and monitor the related risks and to 
manage their financial exposure; 
• To deepen country coverage at a regional level by 
concluding more Projects within each country; 
• To sustain and maximise the impact of existing 
Projects under the Loan, Guarantee and Leasing 
Window by providing additional credit lines to the 
financial intermediaries concerned and;  
• Thereby to continue to induce financial 
intermediaries to expand and maintain in the long 
term their financing operations with SMEs. 
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2005-017-220 2005 SME Finance Facility  - EIB 
2005-017-221 2005 SME Finance Facility  - EBRD 
• To assist the acceding and candidate countries in 
continuing the reform and strengthening of their 
financial sectors in order to cope with the 
competitive pressure and market forces within 
the Union. 
2005-017-222 2005 SME Finance Facility  - CEB  
• Strengthening financial intermediaries in expanding 
and maintaining in the long-term their financial 
operations with SMEs: 
• To build further the confidence of financial 
intermediaries to engage in financial operations with 
SMEs, including leasing; 
• To enhance further the capacity of financial 
intermediaries to assess and monitor the related risks 
and to manage their financial exposure; 
• Promote geographical diversification of the SME 
loan portfolio and improve financial intermediation 
at regional level; 
• To sustain and maximise the impact of existing 
Projects under the Loan, Guarantee and Leasing 
Window by providing additional credit lines to the 
financial intermediaries concerned. 
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Annex 9.  Overview of the Facility Operations 1999-2005 
A dynamic SME sector had been identified by the European Commission (EC) as a necessary 
condition (Agenda 2000, New Phare Orientations 1999) for the accession of the Candidate 
Countries (CCs)66 to the EU.  Access to finance has been identified as one of the key 
constraints restricting the development of SMEs in these countries.   
 
The Commission Services has developed a number of different programmes to improve the 
environment for SME67 development within the framework of the Phare national programmes.  
To address the need to ensure a stable supply of finance, together with a functioning financial 
sector, capable of meeting the needs of SMEs, the Commission Services created a Working 
Group comprising the EC, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
and the European Investment Bank (EIB).  Based on the conclusions of the Working Group, 
the SME Finance Facility (the Facility) started operations in March 1999 with the signature of 
an agreement between the EBRD and the Commission Services.   
 
The original overall objective was “… to induce financial intermediaries in all ten CCs to 
develop and maintain over the long term their debt and equity financing of SMEs”.  This was 
first expanded in 2000 to cover “…financing operations” with SMEs and in 2002 was further 
broadened to locate the Facility in the wider context of the accession process as follows: “… to 
assist the candidate countries in meeting the Copenhagen criteria and to contribute to the 
reform and strengthening of the financial sector.”  In light of the imminent accession of eight 
of the ten CCs, in 2003 the overall objective became “… to assist the acceding and candidate 
countries in continuing the reform and strengthening of their financial sectors in order to cope 
with the competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.”  No funding was allocated 
under the 2004 Phare programme and in 2005, the Facility was restricted to Bulgaria and 
Romania and expanded its geographical coverage to Croatia and Turkey68.  The overall 
objective remained the same.   
 
A pilot Phase 1 of the Facility was launched by Phare in co-operation with the EBRD, whereby 
Phare and EBRD funds were jointly mobilised through a special fund to provide two types of 
support through two “windows”: (i) the Loan and Guarantee Window (LGW) and (ii) the 
Equity Window (EW).  Within the LGW, Phare funds were used as incentives to support the 
efforts of Participating Financial Institutions69 (PFIs) in their penetration of the SME market, 
whilst EBRD funds were used to provide PFIs with credit lines to be used for SME loans.  In 
theory, this combination of incentive + credit line provided an opportunity for ‘learning by 
doing’ and the possibility to demonstrate how lending to SMEs can be an attractive segment 
for the PFIs, at minimum risk to the PFI.  In the EW, funds were invested in investment funds 
(IF) managed by financial intermediaries, who then provided equity to their SME clients. 
 
Phase 1 was evaluated by the OMAS Consortium between June and November 2000 and the 
report was distributed in January 2001.  The evaluation stated that that achievement of 
objectives was Unsatisfactory, principally due to the slow pace of implementation in the start-
up phase.  The Report provided several recommendations, which aimed to lead to a higher 
                                                 
66  Estonia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
67  The national Phare programmes provide support for SME policy development (alignment with the acquis), institution 
building directed at SME support agencies, grant financing schemes for direct support to SMEs and different forms of credit 
financing.  These credit financing schemes have generally not been entirely successful in achieving their immediate 
objectives, notably because they were implemented in isolation from the institutional framework 
68  For EIB and CEB-KfW interventions only. 
69  Initially Participating Banks (PBs) and later extended to leasing companies. Collectively these are known as Participating 
Financial Institutions. 
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degree of achievement of the objectives and acknowledged that many of these 
recommendations were already being implemented by the stakeholders.   
 
In Phase 2 of the Facility (post –1999) additional co-financing International Finance 
Institutions (IFIs) joined the programme.  In December 2000 a Contribution Agreement (CA) 
was signed with the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) in association with the 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW).  The EIB signed its first Contribution Agreement in 
December 2001.  The LGW (then renamed LGLW) was modified to include leasing activities 
through support to Participating Leasing Companies (PLCs) and no further funds were 
allocated to the EW.   
 
The EMS Consortium completed an Interim Evaluation (IE) of the Facility in 2003.  The IE 
Report, finalised in February 200370, concluded that while the Facility was a good concept, 
with a high potential for success, it required fine-tuning across a range of areas to respect Phare 
Guidelines related to catalytic effect, additionality and sustainability.  Key issues identified in 
the IE Report included: the need to ensure catalytic impact by identifying and addressing 
market failures; the need to ensure additionality, particularly where the PFIs have major active 
foreign shareholders; to ensure sustainability by focussing on capacity building at Financial 
Institutions and the use of institution building to develop successful business models for 
addressing the SME market and; the need to clarify the role of, and approach to, the EW.  
Operational issues identified included: a) the need to ensure a uniform quality of reporting 
from the participating IFIs to the Commission Services and; b) more transparent management 
of the PFI pipelines, including the availability of information on terms and conditions offered 
by all participating IFIs to the PFIs and leasing affiliates.   
 
The IE report concluded with 13 recommendations which focused inter alia on: the need to 
fine-tune the Facility to be more responsive to regional and sectoral variations; to re-examine 
how the Facility projects are delivering additionality and catalytic impact and to improve the 
quality of reporting by the IFIs (see Annex 3).  While some changes were introduced (e.g. 
more attention to tracking indicators and greater standardisation of reports from the IFIs to the 
Commission Services), the underlying rationale and intervention logic, despite the fast pace of 
change in the CC’s competitive environments, remained largely unchanged.  Importantly, the 
recommendation for an updated analysis of the situation in the countries in which the Facility 
operated was only partially acted on.  The Steering Committee71 for the Facility downgraded 
the recommendation to focus only on Bulgaria and Romania, despite plans for second credit 
lines in the soon to be member states.  Even this downgraded recommendation was only 
partially implemented. 
 
To date the three implementing IFIs have an exclusive position within the Facility which is 
described in the 2005 PFs as follows: “The technical nature and the multi-country approach of 
the SME Finance Facility required the involvement of highly-specialised financial institutions, 
with a long track record in international finance and SME development.  Also the preference 
was for financial institutions with the status of international public-law bodies, who shared the 
values of the EU, in particular, in relation to enlargement and had similar public policy 
objectives, rather than private-sector financial institutions looking for commercial investment 
terms…In terms of the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget (Art.110), and its 
Implementing Rules (Art.168), the characteristics of these financial institutions as public-law 
bodies, pursuing European public policy objectives not just for profit, as well as their track 
                                                 
70  R/ZZ/SME/02.146 issued on 18 February 2003. 
71  4 July 2003. 
SME Finance Facility Annex 9 
Ex post evaluation of Phare: MBP – SMEFF – October 2007, MWH Consortium  59
record and specialisation in financing international development, therefore put them in a 
monopoly situation leaving no other choice as partner for the Commission in these actions.” 
 
Description and organisation of the SMEF 
 
The SME Finance Facility is a Programme whereby Phare provides a grant contribution, which 
serves as an incentive (under different forms) for local banks, leasing companies or investment 
funds to establish and utilise credit lines provided and financed by the Sponsor IFIs (EBRD, 
and later CEB with KfW, and EIB).  The grant contribution is a small, but highly important 
proportion of the total contribution to the SME Facility, whereby the sponsor IFIs (EBRD, the 
CEB in co-operation with KfW, and the EIB), are the main financial contributors.  The IFI’s 
contribution is not a grant but is a part of their commercial credit operations and therefore IFI 
funds are returned with interest.  Because of the specificities of the co-financed element, 
authority was delegated to the IFIs by the Commission Services to administer and manage the 
Facility, including the Commission’s grant contribution, in return for a flat management fee of 
1.25% of total funding over the period.  The incentives to PFIs are in the form of Performance 
Fees, Technical Assistance (TA), Guarantees, or other tailored incentives as mentioned in the 
next paragraph. 
 
Table 11.-  Phare contribution allocated in the period 1999-2005 - by IFI 
    1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2005 Total 
LGLW (M€ ) (M€ ) % 
  EBRD 25 30 30 20 15 18 138 48.8 
  CEB/KFW 0 21 30 15 10 9 85 30 
  EIB 0 0 30 15 10 5 60 21.2 
  Total LGLW 25 51 90 50 35 32 283 100 
EW         
  EBRD 25 0 0 0 0 0 25 100 
 Total EW 25 0 0 0 0 0 25 100 
RSW         
 EBRD 0 0 0 0 10 0 10 66.4 
 CEB/KFW 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 33.4 
 EIB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Total RSW 0 0 0 0 15 0 15 100 
Totals 50 51 90 50 50 32 323  
 
LGLW 
 
Each IFI proposes a different set of incentives for utilisation of the Phare Grant) accompanying 
their credit line.   
 
• EBRD links its credit line with Technical Assistance (TA), also called Technical 
Cooperation (TC).  This is a 12-24 months input from consultants recruited by EBRD to 
promote and administer the credit line and deliver capacity building to the PFI.  In addition, 
each PFI can avail of Performance Fees (PFs), which are calculated as a percentage of each 
loan to each SME, under conditions of eligibility (including average size of loan and 
maturity) and risk (general risk of the portfolio must be less than 6 %).  The incentive 
decreases over time, thus serving to reward PFIs that draw down their credit line promptly.  
The consultants are residents in the PFIs during the mission and have a supervisory role in 
relation to the credit line, and in the reporting to the EBRD; 
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• CEB in collaboration with KfW (CEB/KfW) provides a wider range of incentives:  
 
(i) Fees for Smaller Loans (FSL), relates to loans up to € 50,000 and a flat fee is 
provided to the PFI of 3% on loans up to € 30,000 (minimum € 300 flat fee) and 1% 
flat for the amount from € 30,001 to € 50,000; 
 
(ii) An Exchange Risk Cover (ERC) facility was introduced by KfW in response to 
requests from PB/PLCs and modest commitments have been made to date.  The 
intention is that by making the PFI less sensitive to the risk of taking a hard 
currency loan from the IFI (on which the PFI would have exchange risk), the PFI 
will be more willing to take the facility.  The ERC offers two types of cover: a) the 
cost of implementing forward foreign exchange transactions to reduce currency risk 
and; b) a currency swap (in fact a simplified but effective version compared to that 
traded on the inter bank market).  Since most Projects under the LGLW comprise 
only a few percent of the PFIs’ balance sheet, a one-off hedge facility will do very 
little to change its risk profile.  Therefore it should be recognised that the ERC is 
mainly an educational tool and a small palliative for the PFI and not in itself an 
effective hedge measure for credit exposure to the PFI by the IFI;  
 
(iii) A Loan Guarantee (LG) facility and; 
 
(iv) TA specific to the requirements of the PFI.  This however is not a central feature of 
the CEB-KfW support and is marginal compared with what is offered by EBRD TA 
and; 
 
(v) Interest Rate Cap (IRC) the main component of which is the Performance Fee, 
based on the same principle as the one used by the EBRD. 
 
EIB offers a unique incentive: a flat subsidy of € 5,000 for each eligible SME loan on 
condition that it does not exceed 10% of the loan.  The incentive is therefore optimised for 
loans of € 50,000. 
 
Each of the IFIs receives a management fee for the management of the facility.  The amount is 
paid at each payment of a tranche of the Phare Grant and comprises 1.25% for EBRD and 
CEB/KfW, and 1.2 % for EIB. 
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Table 12.-  Overview of packages offered by the three IFIs under the Facility 
Sponsors EBRD CEB/KfW EIB 
Type/name of account Interest bearing account "Phare account" "Trust account" 
Total Phare contribution (in M€ 1999-2005) 
Total sponsor contribution 
(in M€ ) 
   
Type of intervention Credit Line and investment Loan to KfW by CEB, 
parallel financing of KfW 
and CEB, exclusive 
financing of KfW 
Credit Line 
Eligible countries 10 CC up to 2003 
2005 Romania, Bulgaria, 
and Croatia  
10CC up to 2003 
Turkey (additional 4 
M€ from MEDA) 
10CC+MEDA later 
Projects (at 10/07/2006)    
Size of project with PFI Between M€ 5 and 15 Between M€ 5 and 15 Between M€ 3 and 30  
Limits of the micro-loans 
Maximum for small loan Contractually: 250 
Thousands of  € (K€ ), with 
a voluntary cap of 125 K€  
K€ 2    K€ 250  
Obligation of reporting Monthly financial 
statement 
Quarterly pipeline reports  
6 monthly operational 
progress report 
Annual operational report 
Monthly financial 
statement 
Quarterly pipeline reports 
Semi-annual PR 
Annual operational report 
Monthly financial 
statement 
Quarterly pipeline reports 
Semi-annual PR 
Annual operational report 
Ceiling No more than 50% of PG to 
Performance Fee 
No more than 50% of PG to 
Performance Fee 
No more than 50% of PG to 
TA 
TF< 25% of SA 
Management fee 1.25% 1.25% 1.20%+ cost of auditing 
Termination of the Fund 31/12/2011 31/12/2011 10 years from the date of 
receipt of the 1st tranche  
‘Leverage’ of Phare 
contribution 
General: min 3 to 1, with an 
objective of 5 to 1 
Per project: min 3 to 1, with 
an objective of 5 to 1 
Per project: min 5 to 1, 10/1 
when the TF is the only 
incentive 
Source: Contribution Agreements, Annual Operational Reports of EBRD, EIB and CEB-KfW (latest dated 31.12.2005) and 
data from DG ECFIN dated 10.07.2006. 
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Table 13.-  Overview of the results of the Facility per country 
Country Credit lines 
 Committed Disbursed by IFI to PFIs Outstanding payment 
 M€ M€  M€  
Bulgaria 27.592 10.434 17.158 
Czech Rep. 39.946 13.292 26.654 
Estonia 13.316 7.245 6.071 
Hungary 39.917 14.266 26.651 
Latvia 10.587 7.609 2.978 
Lithuania 9.025 5.77 3.255 
Poland 68.012 33.371 34.641 
Romania 32.026 16.522 15.502 
Slovakia 22.509 11.021 11.488 
Slovenia 12.542 6.075 6.467 
Grand Total 275.472 125.605 149.867 
Source:  Data from semi-annual reports from IFIs as of 31/12/2005 
 
Table 14.-  Overview of the results of the Facility per IFI 
IFI Credit lines Phare Grant commitments to PFIs 
 Signed Signed for 
incentives 
Disbursed 
of 
incentives 
PF  TA TC FSL ERC LG ICap Other Total 
Phare 
Grant  
 M€  M€  M€  M€ M€ M€ M€ M€ M€ M€ M€ M€ 
EBRD 918.50  156.69 83.42 98.19 42.25 5.36 0 0 0 0 16.25 156.69 
CEB-KfW 611.75 69.96 33.26 50.08 3.99 0 4.97 1.16 4.04 0.35 0 69.96 
EIB 391.00 39.10 9.95 0 0 39.10 0 0 0 0 0 39.10 
Total 1921.25 265.74 125.63 148.27 46.24 44.46 4.97 1.16 4.04 0.35 16.25 265.74 
 
Source:  Data from DG ECFIN as of 10/07/2006 
 
Equity Window 
 
The following table presents an overview of the EW. 
 
Table 15.-  Overview of the EW financial elements 
Component Start Date Expiry 
Date 
Amount 
(M€ ) 
Committed by 
EC to Facility 
% 
Committed by SC 
to Projects % 
Disbursed 
Equity 16/03/1999 31/01/2001 25 100 39% 18.8% 
Source: Annual Operational Report of EBRD, 12/01 
 
Aims 
The Equity Window (EW) is only sponsored through the EBRD.  Its aim is to facilitate access 
to equity investment by SMEs in the ten CCs.  Independent Fund managers are appointed as 
partner FIs to manage the funds on a fee plus profit sharing basis.  The ability of the FI to 
introduce private sector investors as co-investors in the fund, and ability to generate a deal flow 
are amongst several other important criteria used in evaluating a fund manager. 
Functioning 
The Phare EW funding provides “seeding” for the fund by investing alongside the EBRD, 
usually in matching amounts.  Other investors can be public sector bodies (e.g. the EIF) or 
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private sector investors.  The EW aims to attract a minimum of 1/3 private sector investment in 
the fund.  Therefore, since Phare will invest 1:1 with the EBRD, the Phare contribution to the 
fund should be not more than 1/3 of the committed capital and is usually less than this. 
 
Phare contributions usually share the same risk as the other investors for distribution of the 
initial capital commitment but Phare accepts a reduced rate of return if the fund is generates 
profits arising on the liquidation (exit) of successful investments. 
 
Distributions from each liquidation have a hierarchical ranking.  The capital committed to each 
investment is returned first, pro rata to the investors’ contribution to the IF.  Hence Phare 
shares an equal capital risk with the other investors if the exit value is below the original 
investment value. 
 
If an exit takes place above the initial investment cost, profit distribution allows the other 
investors agreed minimum rates of return (and a profit share element in the case of the fund 
manager) before the Phare investment shares in any profit element (the Hurdle Rate).  Once the 
hurdle rates are achieved, Phare share in the profits on an equal basis with the other investors.   
It should be noted that the high Hurdle Rates (e.g. 18% in the case of the Baltic SME Fund 
whereas most Hurdles rates are 8-9%) and the profit related management fees mean that it is 
highly likely that Phare will see little or no return on its share of the investment in an IF, whilst 
the co-investors will receive an enhancement of their return.  This is a classic and highly 
appropriate method for seeding a fund by influencing the reward rather than the risk element 
on the underlying investment portfolio.  By not distorting the risk profile the seeding 
mechanism continues to reward the use of good investment methodologies. 
 
In addition to its investment, Phare may make a grant contribution for funding part of the 
management cost associated with establishing and running the fund, up to 25% of total 
available Phare funding (Management Cost Funding or MCF).  Management costs comprise 
both (i) Management Fees charged by the Fund Manager, out of which the Fund Manager 
covers wages, office costs and overheads and (ii) transaction costs of pursuing and holding 
completed investment deals.  In private equity funds, management costs are usually born by the 
fund directly.  In the early period when there are no liquidations, management costs are a direct 
erosion of the value of the capital invested. 
 
The Phare contribution is a lump sum amount paid into the fund on an agreed schedule.  The 
Phare contribution therefore further enhances the potential return on the fund available to the 
investors by covering part of the costs that would otherwise have to be covered out of the 
investors’ capital. 
 
This mechanism has only been used in one of the three IFs established under the EW so far, as 
the EBRD has not generally found an adequate case for making it available. 
 
Other typical characteristics of the IFs are : 
Maturity : 8 years, closed end, with up to 2 years extension. 
Exit : Through liquidation of the investment portfolio before the final 
maturity date. 
Investment Period : Years 1 to 4 (all investment to be made by the end of year 4) 
Divestment Period : Years 5 to 8 
Portfolio Investments: SMEs (EU definition).  Maximum investment M€ 1.  Minimum 
equity stakes of 10%, maximum 49%. 
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Activities 
The Financing Memorandum for the SME Facility, dated 26 March 1999 (BDS99-32) 
presented an indicative disbursement schedule suggesting the EW would be fully disbursed by 
the end of 2001 (M€ 25 EBRD and M€ 25 Phare).  Recognising the long lead times for IFs to 
be fully invested, it is possible that the terminology was intended as the EW being fully 
committed. As of 31 December 2005, M€ 14.75 had been committed of which M€4.71 had 
been disbursed. Due to difficulties in committing to suitable projects in the time period (see 
below) M€ 4.75 was re-allocated to the LGLW in January 2003. The July 2003 meeting of the 
Steering Committee approved the reallocation of the outstanding M€ 4 to the LGLW. 
 
Implementation of the EW was slower than originally anticipated.  The reasons identified, by 
the recent IE and more recently (in the 2005 Annual Operational Report) include: 
• Management issues within the EBRD at the time the EW was established, which were 
resolved at the time of the first interim evaluation by bringing management of the EW 
under the Financial Institutions Group; 
• Reduced interest from private sector co-investors in the CCs (at least for the Baltic 
States), resulting from the Russian crisis of 1998;  
• Collapse of boom markets generally and the loss of appetite by investors for what are 
perceived as high risk or low return funds; 
• Decline in interest in the technology and “new economy” sectors, which was a potential 
fertile ground for the Ifs; 
• Fund structures that were more complicated and time consuming to resolve than 
originally anticipated72; 
• Unexpected delays in early stage markets to educate entrepreneurs in the benefits of 
involvement of private equity providers. 
 
The signed projects under the EW are as follows: 
 
Table 16.-  Equity window: the signed projects 
Date EBRD  Phare Country 
Coverage  
Financial Intermediary 
Investment Investment MCF Total 
Other 
Investors Total 
Signed             
Czech Rep. 
& Slovakia 
 
05/00 GIMV Czech Ventures 3.00 3.00 0.00 3.00 6.00 12.00 
Hungary& 
Slovenia 
 
05/01 Euroventures Danube B.V. 3.75 3.75 0.00 3.75 7.50 15.00 
Baltics 10/01 Baltic SME Fund 3.00 2.25 0.75 3.00 8.50 14.50 
   Sub-total A 9.75 9.00 0.75 9.75 22.00 41.50 
Source: Annual Operational Report of EBRD, December 2005.  All amounts in M€  
 
The 2005 Annual Report from the EBRD to the Facility Steering Committee indicates:  
• The range of sectors covered by the investments made (e.g. lead battery recycling, 
software, auto components, paint distribution) appear highly appropriate to the SME 
Facility.  The EBRD reports provide evidence that the investments are made in conformity 
with the EW eligibility criteria. 
• Three new funds are identified as being under various stages of consideration by the 
EBRD.  If the pipeline is concluded, this would fully commit allocation of the EW and 
extend coverage to all ten CCs.  However caution has been expressed that the availability 
                                                 
72  The proposed domicile of one Fund in a tax-evading jurisdiction lead to the refusal of the proposal and to the transfer of the 
domicile from Jersey to the Netherlands.   
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of private sector co-financing for the pipeline is limited.  Therefore there must be 
considerable doubt at this time that significant further commitments will take place under 
the EW, including the approved but unsigned First Hungarian SME Fund. 
Results 
Phare contributions have achieved the required objective of raising slightly more than the 1:1 
co-financing ratio with EBRD.  Total Phare commitments (including MCF) have achieved a 
co-financing ratio of 3.3:1 (including EBRD). 
 
However the rate of private sector participation is 50 % in two of the three operational equity 
funds must be noted as disappointingly low.  In the case of the Baltic SME Fund, for example, 
private sector participation is nominally 30% but this has been committed through another fund 
under the same fund manager and cannot be considered new participation. 
 
This being the case, it is essential that the EW is able to reach an adequate number of SMEs, 
generating an acceptable quality of deal flow, in order to make a meaningful impact in the 
countries in which it operates.   
 
In keeping with the demand driven nature of the EW, if funds invested by the active IFs do not 
reach a critical mass within a satisfactory period of time this may raise questions over the 
genuine level of underlying demand.  It also raises questions over the viability of the fund as 
management charges are paid on the value of funds committed not the level of funds invested.  
Therefore a situation may arise where a full management charge is being paid but only a 
modest level of funds actually invested. 
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Annex 10.  Achievement of Immediate Objectives 1999-2005 
Prog.  No. Prog.  Title Immediate Objective(s) Achievement of immediate objectives (comments at ex post) 
ZZ-9901 1999 SME Finance Facility • Greater access to finance among participating 
SMEs in the region;  
• Expanded capacity of participating banks and 
investment funds to serve the needs of SMEs; 
and; 
• Example to other potential financial 
intermediaries that operating with SMEs is 
possible.   
Greater access to finance 
• Amounts involved de minimis 
• Step changes in competitive environment (rather 
than the Facility) caused banks to enter SME 
market 
 
Expanded capacity 
• Attributable Impacts greatest where EBRD 
model appropriately applied, plus some ‘soft’ 
impacts in CEB-KfW model 
• No capacity building observed in EIB model 
 
Example to other potential financial intermediaries 
• Increasing competitive pressures in markets 
forced banks to respond quickly, the Facility 
moved too slowly to be effective 
 
ZZ-0007 2000 SME Finance Facility Phase 2 - CEB 
ZZ-0013 2000 SME Finance Facility Phase 2 – 
EBRD 
ZZ-0106 2001 SME Finance Facility Phase 2 – 
EBRD 
ZZ-0108 2001 SME Finance Facility Phase 2 – CEB 
ZZ-0126 2001 SME Finance Facility - EIB 
• To leverage the largest amount of co-
financing with the Community grant through 
co-financing with the International Finance 
Institutions (IFIs), and; 
• To ensure greatest efficiency of the 
management of this complex financial scheme 
by delegating implementation to the 
respective IFIs, whose expertise is extensive 
in these areas. 
‘Leverage’ 
• Phare grant enabled EBRD to commit credit line 
by enabling EBRD to satisfy internal definitions 
of additionality (through provision of TA 
support, rather than Performance Fee) 
• No ‘leverage effect’ under EIB where Global 
Loan already existed 
• Unclear the extent to which Phare grant 
leveraged CEB-KfW funding 
 
Efficiency 
• Not an appropriate immediate objective. 
 
2002-000-621 2002 SME Finance Facility  - EBRD • To build further the confidence of financial Confidence building  
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2002-000-622 2002 SME Finance Facility  - CEB-KfW intermediaries to engage in financial operations 
with SMEs; 
• To enhance the capacity of financial 
intermediaries to assess and monitor the related 
risks and to manage their financial exposure; 
• To deepen country coverage at a regional level 
by concluding more Projects within each 
country; 
• To sustain and maximise the impact of existing 
Projects under the Loan, Guarantee and 
Leasing Window by providing additional credit 
lines to the financial intermediaries concerned 
and`;  
• Thereby to continue to induce financial 
intermediaries to expand and maintain in the 
long term their financing operations with 
SMEs. 
• PFIs had already begun to put in place strategies 
and resources to address the SME market 
 
Capacity to assess and monitor related risks and to 
manage their financial exposure 
• Credit-related objectives addressed through TA 
• Some good examples in EBRD projects of 
achievement of this objective 
• For non-TA interventions, very limited 
contribution 
 
Deepen country coverage 
• Did not allow for the Facility to reflect regional 
and sectoral variations 
 
Sustain and maximise existing projects under 
LGLW  
• Unclear objective 
• Justification for additional credit lines rather 
than based on needs’ analysis 
 
Thereby to continue to induce and expand financial 
intermediaries to maintain in the long-term their 
financing operations with SMEs 
 
 
2002-000-629 2002 SME Finance Facility  - EIB   
2003-005-745 2003 SME Finance Facility  - EBRD Note: 2003 projects at early stage of 
implementation  
2003-005-765 2003 SME Finance Facility  - EIB 
• To build further the confidence of financial 
intermediaries to engage in financial operations 
with SMEs;  
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2003-005-766 2003 SME Finance Facility  - CEB-KfW • To enhance the capacity of financial 
intermediaries to assess and monitor the related 
risks and to manage their financial exposure; 
• To deepen country coverage at a regional level 
by concluding more Projects within each 
country; 
• To sustain and maximise the impact of existing 
Projects under the Loan, Guarantee and 
Leasing Window by providing additional credit 
lines to the financial intermediaries concerned 
and;  
• Thereby to continue to induce financial 
intermediaries to expand and maintain in the 
long term their financing operations with 
SMEs. 
2005-017-220 2005 SME Finance Facility  - EIB • Strengthening financial intermediaries in 
expanding and maintaining in the long-term 
their financial operations with SMEs: 
• To build further the confidence of financial 
intermediaries to engage in financial operations 
with SMEs, including leasing; 
• To enhance further the capacity of financial 
intermediaries to assess and monitor the related 
risks and to manage their financial exposure; 
• Promote geographical diversification of the 
SME loan portfolio and improve financial 
intermediation at regional level; 
• To sustain and maximise the impact of existing 
Projects under the Loan, Guarantee and 
Leasing Window by providing additional credit 
lines to the financial intermediaries concerned. 
Too early to comment 
2005-017-221 2005 SME Finance Facility  - EBRD  
2005-017-222 2005 SME Finance Facility  - CEB 
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Annex 11.  List of Interviews 
 
Institution Interviewee Date 
European Commission, 
DG ELARG, 
Brussels, 
Belgium. 
Nathalie Boutin, 
Administrator, IFI Facilities, 
Unit D3 Regional Programmes 
02.02.2006 
European Commission, 
DG ECFIN, 
Wagner Building,  
Luxembourg. 
Philippe Tarillon, 
Administrator 
 
27.01.2006 
European Commission, 
DG ECFIN, 
Wagner Building,  
Luxembourg. 
James McGing, 
Head of Unit 
 
27.01.2006 
European Commission, 
DG ECFIN, 
Wagner Building,  
Luxembourg. 
Dennis Wernerus, 
Administrator 
 
27.01.2006 
European Commission, 
DG ECFIN, 
Wagner Building,  
Luxembourg. 
Joseph Salacz, 
Principal Administrator, 
 
03.02.2006 
The Council of Europe Development Bank 
55 Av.  Kleber,  
Paris. 
France 
Theodore Ivanov, 
Directorate General for Loans, 
Director of Department, 
Projects Department 
31.01.2006 
The Council of Europe Development Bank 
55 Av.  Kleber,  
Paris. 
France 
Michael Lixenfeld 
Directorate General for Loans, 
Senior Country Manager, 
Projects Department 
31.01.2006 
KfW Palmengartenstr.  5-9 
60325 Frankfurt 
Germany 
Dr.  Michael Ruffing 
Vice President 
Global Loans Central and Eastern 
Europe 
31.01.2006 
EBRD, 
One Exchange Square, 
London, 
United Kingdom. 
Nora Kocsis, 
Senior Banker – Financial Institutions, 
2.02.2006/ 
09.06.2006 
EBRD, 
One Exchange Square, 
London, 
United Kingdom. 
Jean-Marc Peterschmitt, 
Director, Bank Relationships, 
Financial Institutions 
 
09.06.2006 
EBRD, 
One Exchange Square, 
London, 
United Kingdom. 
Jose Carbajo, 
Office of the Chief Economist, 
Director, Project Design and Appraisal 
 
09.06.2006 
EBRD, 
Husova 5, 110 00 Praha 1 Czech Republic. 
Zdenka Vicarova, 
Head of Prague Resident Office  
28.04.2006 
EIB 
100 Boulevard Konrad Adenauer, 
Luxembourg. 
Heinz Olbers, 
Head of Division, 
Lending Operations in Poland 
03.02.2006 
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EIB 
100 Boulevard Konrad Adenauer, 
Luxembourg. 
Maris Briedis, 
Loan Officer, 
Lending Operations in Poland, 
 
03.02.2006+ 
VB Leasing CZ, spol.s r.o 
Herspcika 813/5, 639 00 Brno 
Ing.Pavel Rexa, 
Prokurista 
Ekonomicky reditel 
26.04.2006 
VB Leasing CZ, spol.s r.o 
Herspcika 813/5, 639 00 Brno 
Ing.Petr  Burian 
Prokurista 
Risk Management 
26.04.2006 
VB Leasing CZ, spol.s r.o 
Herspcika 813/5, 639 00 Brno 
Dkfm.Waldemar Jacobsen 
Greschaftsfuhrer 
26.04.2006 
Volksbank CZ, a.s 
Herspcika 5, P.O Box 226 
CZ – 658 26 Brno 
Karel Necesal 
Deputy Head of Division Retail 
Department Head Sales Support 
26.04.2006 
Ceska Sporitelna,  
Na Perstyne 1 
Prague 1, 
Czech Republic. 
Petr Musil, 
FL Portfolio Management 
 
27.04.2006 
Ceska Sporitelna, 
Olbrachtova 1929, 
Prague 4, 
Czech Republic 
Ing Tomas Halla, 
Director of Loan Business Dept., 
 
27.04.2006 
CSOB Leasing, 
Na Pankraci, 
Prague 4 
Czech Republic. 
Martin Koubek, 
Strategy and Special Transactions, 
 
27.04.2006 
CSOB Leasing, 
Na Pankraci, 
Prague 4 
Czech Republic. 
Ing Lukas Bucek 
Specialist, 
 
27.04.2006 
CSOB Leasing, 
Na Pankraci, 
Prague 4 
Czech Republic. 
Ing Stepan Havlas 
Manager, Financial Leasing, 
 
27.04.2006 
Czech-Moravian Guarantee and 
Development Bank  
Jeruzalemska 964/4,  
Praha 1, 
Czech Republic 
Dr Lenka Loudova, 
Department of Financing, 
 
28.04.2006 
Czech-Moravian Guarantee and 
Development Bank  
Jeruzalemska 964/4,  
Praha 1, 
Czech Republic 
Vaclav Jakobe, 
Director, Dept.  of Financing, 
 
28.04.2006 
Czech-Moravian Guarantee and 
Development Bank  
Jeruzalemska 964/4,  
Praha 1, 
Czech Republic 
Lubomir Rajdl, 
Member of the Board of Directors, 
Head of Support and Strategy Division, 
 
28.04.2006 
Czech-Moravian Guarantee and 
Development Bank  
Jeruzalemska 964/4,  
Praha 1, 
Czech Republic 
Jiri Jirasek, 
Member of the Board of Directors, 
 
28.04.2006 
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Alpha Bank, 
237B, Calea Dorobantilor.  Sector 1 
010566 Bucharest, Romania 
Cornelia Dumitrescu, 
Manager, Risk Division 
 
02.05.2006 
Alpha Bank, 
237B, Calea Dorobantilor.  Sector 1 
010566 Bucharest, Romania 
Catalina Baltag, 
Head of Dept., Retail Division 
 
02.05.2006 
Bancpost, 
Calea Vitan 6, 
Bucharest, 
Romania. 
Adina Bulgaru, 
Expert Institutional Relations Dept.. 
 
02.05.2006 
Bancpost, 
Calea Vitan 6, 
Bucharest, 
Romania. 
Doina Ionescu, 
Chief, International Services., 
 
02.05.2006 
Bancpost, 
Calea Vitan 6, 
Bucharest, 
Romania. 
Adrian Stefanescu, 
Credit Manager. 
 
02.05.2006 
Banca Romanesca,  
B-dul Unirii, nr 35 sector 3, 
Bucharest, 
Romania. 
Georgeta Serbanescu, 
Head of Dept. 
Dept.  of Financial Institutions 
03.05.2006 
BRD, 
Tour BBD 1-7, 
Blvd Ion Mihalache, 
Bucharest, 
Romania. 
Petru Bindila, 
Director, Commercial Dept. 
 
03.05.2006 
BRD, 
Tour BBD 1-7, 
Blvd Ion Mihalache, 
Bucharest, 
Romania. 
Patrice Begue, 
Director, Commercial Dept. 
 
03.05.2006 
BCR, 
5 Regina Elisabeta Blvd., 
Bucharest, 
Romania 
Cristina Maria Marin, 
Head of Dept.  External Programmes 
 
03.05.2006 
BCR, 
15 Calei Victorei Street, 
Bucharest, 
Romania 
Andreea Florea, 
Corporate Business Development 
 
03.05.2006 
BCR, 
5 Regina Elisabeta Blvd., 
Bucharest, 
Romania 
Ramona Angela Ivan, 
Deputy Executive Director 
 
03.05.2006 
BT Leasing, 
Calea Turzii 134, 
Cluj-Napoca, 
Romania. 
Titus Nicoara, 
Director General 
 
04.05.2006 
BT Leasing, 
Calea Turzii 134, 
Cluj-Napoca, 
Romania. 
Ionut Calin Morar, 
Director Leasing Dept. 
 
04.05.2006 
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BT Leasing, 
Calea Turzii 134, 
Cluj-Napoca, 
Romania. 
Simona Sopon, 
Director Economic. 
 
04.05.2006 
BT Leasing, 
Str.  G.  Baritiu 8, 
Cluj-Napoca, 
Romania. 
Marsela Petreus, 
Credit Manager 
Director Economic 
 
04.05.2006 
Volksbank, 
171 Mihai Bravu Avenue Sector 2, 
Bucharest, 
Romania. 
Klaus Mueller, 
Vice President 
 
05.05.2006 
Hebros Bank, 
2 Knyanginya Maria Luiza Blvd., 
Sofia, 
Bulgaria. 
Stanka Gancheva, 
Product Development Manager 
 
09.05.2006 
United Bulgarian Bank, 
5 Sveta Sofia Str., 
Sofia, 
Bulgaria. 
Hrisimira Malcheva 
 
09.05.2006 
United Bulgarian Bank, 
5 Sveta Sofia Str., 
Sofia, 
Bulgaria. 
Stefan Vassilev, 
Manager SME Credit Card Centre and 
International Lending Programmes 
09.05.2006 
ProCredit Bank, 
131 Hristo Botev Blvd., 
Sofia, 
Bulgaria. 
Susanne Decker, 
Executive Director 
 
10.05.2006 
ProCredit Bank, 
131 Hristo Botev Blvd., 
Sofia, 
Bulgaria. 
Kai Lim, 
Member of the Management Board 
 
10.05.2006 
ProCredit Bank, 
131 Hristo Botev Blvd., 
Sofia, 
Bulgaria. 
Mila Razsolkova, 
Compliance Officer 
 
10.05.2006 
ProCredit Bank, 
131 Hristo Botev Blvd., 
Sofia, 
Bulgaria. 
Rumiana Todorova,  
Head of Branch Network Dept 
 
10.05.2006 
UnionBank, 
10-12 Damyan Gruev Str., 
Sofia, 
Bulgaria. 
Ivo Gadev,  
Head of Corporate Lending Division 
 
10.05.2006 
UnionBank, 
10-12 Damyan Gruev Str., 
Sofia, 
Bulgaria. 
Ana Delcheva, 
Expert, Corporate Lending Dept. 
 
10.05.2006 
UnionBank, 
10-12 Damyan Gruev Str., 
Sofia, 
Bulgaria. 
Zhivko Zhivin, 
International Project Finance 
 
10.05.2006 
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UnionBank, 
10-12 Damyan Gruev Str., 
Sofia, 
Bulgaria. 
Zdravka Furnadjieva, 
Head of International Division 
 
10.05.2006 
Encouragement Bank, 
1 Dyakon Ignatiy Str., 
Sofia, 
Bulgaria 
Zaharina Todorova, 
Senior Expert Credit Lines Dept. 
 
11.05.2006 
Encouragement Bank, 
1 Dyakon Ignatiy Str., 
Sofia, 
Bulgaria 
Krasimira Saeva 
Procurator and Head of Credit 
Administration and Monitoring 
Division 
11.05.2006 
Encouragement Bank, 
1 Dyakon Ignatiy Str., 
Sofia, 
Bulgaria 
Sasho Tchakalski, 
Executive Director 
 
11.05.2006 
Slovak Guarantee and Development Bank, 
Stefanikova 27, 
Bratislava, 
Slovak Republic. 
Ing Michael Krajcovic,  
Deputy Chairman, Deputy General 
Director for Business Activities 
 
09.05.2006 
Slovak Guarantee and Development Bank, 
Stefanikova 27, 
Bratislava, 
Slovak Republic. 
Miroslav Kunik,  
Dept.  of Product Development, 
 
09.05.2006 
Slovak Guarantee and Development Bank, 
Stefanikova 27, 
Bratislava, 
Slovak Republic. 
Juraj Topolcany,  
Head of Credit Lines Dept. 
 
09.05.2006 
Slovak Guarantee and Development Bank, 
Stefanikova 27, 
Bratislava, 
Slovak Republic. 
Ing.  Ludovit Konczer,  
Chairman of the Board of Directors 
 
09.05.2006 
VUB, 
Mlynske Nivy 1,  
Bratislava, 
Slovak Republic. 
Roman Krajcir 
Head of Project Finance/Real Estate 
Financing Department 
 
09.05.2006 
VUB, 
Mlynske Nivy 1,  
Bratislava, 
Slovak Republic. 
Patrik Tuleja, 
Executive Manager Project Finance, 
Syndications& EU Funds 
 
09.05.2006 
VUB, 
Mlynske Nivy 1,  
Bratislava, 
Slovak Republic. 
Eliska Hupkova, 
Project Finance Specialist 
 
09.05.2006 
SEC, 
Josipine Turnograjske 6, 
Ljublijana,  
Slovenia 
Sasa Keleman, 
 
10.05.2006 
SEC, 
Josipine Turnograjske 6, 
Ljublijana,  
Slovenia 
Alesa Korencic, 
 
10.05.2006 
ABANKA, 
Ljubljana, 
Slovenia. 
Vanja Jeraj Markoja, 
Director 
 
10.05.2006 
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ABANKA, 
Dunajska 160,  
Ljublijana, 
Slovenia. 
Marjana Cresnar 
Small Business Dept. 
 
10.05.2006 
Post Bank Slovenia, 
Ulica Vita Kraigherja 5, 
Maribor, 
Slovenia. 
Boris Bobek, 
Head of Dept. 
 
10.05.2006 
Nova Ljubljanska Banka, 
Trg.  Republike 2, 
Ljublijana,  
Slovenia. 
Zdenka Koron,  
Regional Manager, Financial 
Institutions and International 
Industrialised Countries 
11.05.2006 
Nova Ljubljanska Banka, 
Trg.  Republike 2, 
Ljublijana,  
Slovenia. 
Damjana Lavric, 
Area Manger, Financial Institutions 
and International Industrialised 
Countries 
11.05.2006 
Nova Ljubljanska Banka, 
Smartinska 132,  
Ljublijana,  
Slovenia. 
Patricija Papez, 
Marketing Manager, Marketing and 
Call Centre, 
 
11.05.2006 
Trg.  Republike 2, 
Ljublijana,  
Slovenia. 
Barbara Smolnikar, 
Senior Director, 
Branch Network 
11.05.2006 
SG Equipment Finance, 
Saski Point,  
Ul.  Marszalkowska 111, 
Warsaw, 
Poland. 
Tomasz Wlazlo, 
Director – Financing and Operations 
Dept. 
16.05.2006 
BOS, 
Al.  Jana Pawla, 
Warsaw, 
Poland. 
Malgorzata Dusza, 
Director, Financial Institutions Dept. 
17.05.2006 
BOS, 
Al.  Jana Pawla, 
Warsaw, 
Poland. 
Malgorzata Kowalczuk, 
Manager of European Integration and 
Financial Institutions Dept. 
 
17.05.2006 
Bre Leasing, 
Ul.  Ks.  I.  Skroupki 5, 
Warsaw,. 
Poland. 
Jacek Zajac, 
Financial Director 
 
18.05.2006 
Bre Leasing, 
Ul.  Ks.  I.  Skroupki 5, 
Warsaw,. 
Poland. 
Robert Urban, 
Products Specialist 
 
18.05.2006 
Bre Leasing, 
Ul.  Ks.  I.  Skroupki 5, 
Warsaw,. 
Poland. 
Danuta Wieleznska,  
Finance Specialist 
 
18.05.2006 
Citibank Handlowy, 
Ul.  Senatorska 16, 
Warsaw, 
Poland. 
Monika Kur, 
Specialist, Financial Assistance and 
European Integration Dept. 
 
18.05.2006 
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Citibank Handlowy, 
Ul.  Senatorska 16, 
Warsaw, 
Poland. 
Jacek Szoroszyk, 
Commercial Banking and Investments 
 
18.05.2006 
BZWBK, 
PL.  Wladyslawa Andresa, 
Poznan,  
Poland. 
Mariusz Silingiewicz, 
Credit and Support Director 
 
18.05.2006 
BZWBK, 
PL.  Wladyslawa Andresa, 
Poznan,  
Poland. 
Andrzej Kurys, 
Manager 
 
18.05.2006 
BZWBK, 
PL.  Wladyslawa Andresa, 
Poznan,  
Poland. 
Michal Zielke, 
Head of SME Market 
 
18.05.2006 
BZWBK, 
PL.  Wladyslawa Andresa, 
Poznan,  
Poland. 
Andrzej Rosiek, 
Business Development Manager 
 
18.05.2006 
Pekao, 
53 Grzybowska Street,  
Warsaw, 
Poland. 
Tomasz Marek Tomaszewski, 
Head Office, Individual Banking 
Division 
19.05.2006 
Pekao, 
53 Grzybowska Street,  
Warsaw, 
Poland. 
Izabela Fotyga, 
Strategy, Marketing and Product 
Development Dept. 
 
19.05.2006 
Volksbank, 
Credit Risk Management – Corporate 
Clients, 
Rakoczi ut.  7, 
Budapest, 
Hungary. 
Attila Biro, 
Head of Dept. 
 
16.05.2006 
Volksbank, 
Rakoczi ut.  7, 
Budapest, 
Hungary. 
Dr.  Laszlo Balazs, 
Chairman and CEO 
 
16.05.2006 
CIB Ltd., 
Medve ut.  4-14, 
Budapest, 
Hungary. 
Teremi Bela, 
Director, International Dept. 
 
16.05.2006 
CIB Ltd., 
Medve ut.  4-14, 
Budapest, 
Hungary. 
Zsuzsanna Strifler Fekete, 
Senior Product Manager, Business 
Support Dept. 
16.05.2006 
Raiffeisen Bank, 
Akademia ut.  6, 
Budapest, 
Hungary 
Istvan Vass, 
Head of Correspondent Banking 
 
17.05.2006 
Raiffeisen Bank, 
Akademia ut.  6, 
Budapest, 
Hungary 
Janos Laincsek, 
Head of SME Banking 
 
17.05.2006 
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Raiffeisen Leasing, 
Vaci ut.  81-85, 
Budapest, 
Hungary 
Ezster Horvath 
 
17.05.2006 
Raiffeisen Leasing, 
Vaci ut.  81-85, 
Budapest, 
Hungary 
Pal Antall, 
CEO 
 
17.05.2006 
Raiffeisen Leasing, 
Vaci ut.  81-85, 
Budapest, 
Hungary 
Attila Domotor, 
Deputy CEO 
 
17.05.2006 
IKB Leasing, 
Kapas Ut 6, 
Budapest, 
Hungary. 
Thilo Sertel, 
Director 
 
17.05.2006 
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Annex 12.  List of Documents Consulted 
 
Originator Title of Document Date 
Prog.  No. Prog.  Title 
ZZ-9901 1999 SME Finance Facility 
ZZ-0007 2000 SME Finance Facility Phase 
2 - CEB 
ZZ-0013 2000 SME Finance Facility Phase 
2 – EBRD 
ZZ-0106 2001 SME Finance Facility Phase 
2 – EBRD 
ZZ-0108 2001 SME Finance Facility Phase 
2 – CEB 
ZZ-0126 2001 SME Finance Facility - EIB 
2002-000-621 2002 SME Finance Facility  - 
EBRD 
2002-000-622 2002 SME Finance Facility  - 
CEB-KfW 
2002-000-629 2002 SME Finance Facility  - EIB 
2003-005-745 2003 SME Finance Facility  - 
EBRD 
2003-005-765 2003 SME Finance Facility  - EIB 
2003-005-766 2003 SME Finance Facility  - 
CEB-KfW 
2005-017-220 2005 SME Finance Facility  - EIB 
2005-017-221 2005 SME Finance Facility  - 
EBRD 
European Commission 
2005-017-222 2005 SME Finance Facility  - 
CEB 
FMs 
European Commission The Financing Proposals EBRD 1999, 2000 and 
2001, with CEB/KfW 2000, 2001, and with EIB, 
2001, 2002 
1999-2001 
European Commission SME Finance Facility / Memorandum / Guidelines 
for co-ordination of the pipelines between Sponsors 
and for differentiation between PBs and OLBs 
02/10/2001 
European Commission Note for the attn of the Members of the Steering 
Committee of the SME Finance Facility / Submission 
to the SME Finance Facility Steering Committee 
29/09/2000 
European Commission SME in Europe, including a first glance at EU 
candidate countries 
2002 
European Commission Several reports on the different projects of co-
operation between the IFIs and the PBs or IFs, 
introduced by the IFIs for agreement of the 
Commission Services, accompanied with the 
commentary notes of the Commission Services 
1999 to 2002 
European Commission Commission Staff Working Paper Enterprises’ 
Access to Finance, Brussels, 19.10.2001 SEC(2001) 
1667 
October 2001 
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European Commission Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament Access to Finance of 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Brussels 
1.12.2003 COM (2003) 713 Final   
December 2003 
European Commission European Commission Staff Working Document  
Microcredit for European small businesses 
September 2004 
European Commission Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
the European Parliament, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
‘Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme:  
Financing SME Growth – Adding European Value – 
Access to Finance – the Way Forward’ Brussels, 
Brussels, 29.6.2006  COM(2006) 349 final.  
2006 
European Commission Commission Staff Working Document, Annex I to 
the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions ‘Implementing the Community Lisbon 
Programme:  Financing SME Growth – Adding 
European Value – List of Actions, Brussels, 
SEC(2006) 856 
2006 
European Commission Commission Staff Working Document, Annex II to 
the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions ‘Implementing the Community Lisbon 
Programme:  Financing SME Growth – Adding 
European Value – Impact Assessment, Brussels, 
SEC(2006) 841 
2006 
European Commission Commission Staff Working Document, Annex III to 
the Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions ‘Implementing the Community Lisbon 
Programme:  Financing SME Growth – Adding 
European Value – List of Actions Brussels, SEC 
(2006) 842/ 
2006 
European Commission,  
DG ECFIN –FOS 
Minutes of the Facility Steering Committee  04.07.2003/28.05.
2004/12.11.2004/
02.02.2006 
European Commission,  
DG ECFIN –FOS 
SME Finance Facility Phase I and II EBRD Financial 
Statements as at 31 December 2002 
31 December 
2002 
European Commission,  
DG ECFIN –FOS 
Note – Budgetary programs reporting as at Feb 2006, 
July 2006 
11/0720/01 
European Commission 
DG Enterprise and Industry 
How to Deal with the new rating culture A practical 
guide to loan  financing for small and  medium-sized 
enterprises,. 
July 2005 
European Commission 
DG Enterprise and Industry 
Results from the survey of European banks Carried 
out for the guide  “How to deal with the new  rating 
culture: A practical  guide to loan financing  for small 
and medium-sized  enterprises”  
May 2005 
European Commission 
DG Enterprise and Industry 
Microcredit for small business creation:  bridging a 
market gap 
November 2003 
European Commission (Author 
OMAS) 
Assessment of the SME Finance Facility - 
R/ZZ/SME/00088 
12/2000 
European Commission (Author 
OMAS) 
Interim Evaluation BSP - Assessment of the 
European Union Phare Programme - R/ZZ/PRI/01045 
20/11/2001 
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European Commission (Author 
EMS) 
Interim Evaluation SME - R/ZZ/SME/02.146 2003 
Bank for International 
Settlements 
The increased role of foreign  bank entry in emerging 
markets   
2003 
EBRD Memorandum / Annual Operational Report on the 
SME Finance Facility at end December 2001 
31/12/2001 
EBRD Memorandum / EU/EBRD SME Finance Facility 
Operations Report for 2001 
10/01/2002 
EBRD Memorandum / Semi-annual Operational Report on 
the SME Finance Facility at end June 2001 
30/06/2001 
EBRD Memorandum / Annual Operational Report on the 
SME Finance Facility at end December 2001 
31/12/2000 
EBRD Call off Notice for Framework Contract for 
Consultancy Services 
 
EBRD Loan Agreement (SME Finance Facility) Operation 
No.  751 
 
EBRD SME Facility Inception Report for Hebros Bank 
Bulgaria 
12/2001 
EBRD Regional SME Finance Facility 26/3/1999 
EBRD TA Inception Reports and Quarterly Reports 2000-2005 
EBRD Semi-annual/Annual Reports 2001/2002/2003/2
004/2005 
EBRD Transition Report  (Ten years of Transition). 2000 
EBRD Transition Reports  2001-2005 
EBRD Project Proposals (Loan and EWs) 1999/2002/2003/2
004 
EBRD Contribution Agreement in respect of SME Finance 
Facility Special Fund Phase 2 of the SME Finance 
Facility 
25/02/2002 
CEB Project Proposals 2001/2002/2003/2
004 
CEB-KfW Semi-annual/Annual Reports 2002/2003/2004/2
005 
CEB/KfW Project proposal 2000/2002/2003/2
004 
CEB/KfW Agreement of Responsibilities 11/12/2000 
CEB/KfW Amended Contribution Arrangement in respect of a 
SME Finance Facility Phase 2 Special Fund 
 
EIB Contribution Agreement in respect of a SME Finance 
Facility Phase 2 Special Fund 
13/12/2001 
EIB Semi-annual/Annual Reports 2003/2004/ 
2005 
EIB Le Groupe BEI au service des PME 06/2002 
EIB Evaluation Report / Review of the Current Portfolio 
Approach for SME Global Loans 
03/2002 
EIB The IEB Group / Activity Report 2001 2002 
EIB SMEF: Participating Financial Institutions Handbook 10/2002 
KfW Annual Operational Report on SME Finance Facility 
at end 12/2001 
12/2001 
KfW Semi-annual Report of the SME Finance Facility on a 
Sub-project Level 
12/2001 
KfW Semi-annual Report on the EU SME Finance Facility 
at end June 2001 
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KfW EU SME Finance Facility Phase 2 / other appropriate 
incentives 
 
KfW Small Enterprises, Large impact 30/11/1998 
KfW KfW’s Papers on Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises and Structural Policy 
09/2000 
McKinsey McKinsey Quarterly, ‘Eastern European Banking 
Matures’ 
2003 
National Bank Of Poland Summary Evaluation of the Financial Situation of 
Polish Banks 2001 
05/2002 
National Bank Of Poland Assisting the Development of the Banking System 2000 
OECD Financing Newly Emerging Private Enterprises in 
Transition Economies 
2000 
BEST Independent Expert Group Guarantees and Mutual Guarantees      BEST Report   
Report to the Commission by an Independent Expert 
Group 
 
GBRW Ltd. and the Good 
Corporation 
Study on Asset-Backed Securities – Impact and Use 
of ABS on SME Finance, Final Report  
November 2004 
TNS Sofres/EOS Gallup Flash Eurobarometre 184 July 2006 
TNS Sofres/EOS Gallup Flash Eurobarometre 174 October 2005 
Various PBs Various information from the PBs Web Site 2002 
BA East West / The Food Industry in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland / Initial Sign of Economic 
Recovery 
2002 
BA Report / Konjunktur: Kein dynamischer Aufschwung 2002 
BA Does Foreign Bank Penetration Reduce Access to 
Credit in Developing Countries? / Evidence from 
Asking Borrowers 
 
 
